David L. McCain

In Lowe v. Stack, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief after being tried and convicted of first-degree murder based on an information rather than an indictment, arguing the proceeding was invalid under Florida's constitution following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia. The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial was void because capital offenses, once the death penalty procedures were reinstated by Chapter 72-72 effective October 1, 1972, required indictment by grand jury under Article I, Section 15(a) of the Florida Constitution. The court reasoned that Furman had invalidated only the prior sentencing statute (Chapter 70-339), not the underlying capital offense category, and that the new bifurcated trial procedures in Chapter 72-72 re-established the need for indictment, consistent with its earlier ruling in State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth. On rehearing, the court adhered to this conclusion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Dennis Wayne Wilson appealing his conviction for second-degree murder after a jury trial on a first-degree murder charge. Wilson challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a confession without an explicit finding of voluntariness and the constitutionality of Florida statute § 913.08(1)(a) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.350(a), which provided the same number of peremptory challenges to defendants charged with capital felonies as to those charged with felonies punishable by life imprisonment, claiming violations of due process and equal protection. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the confession was properly admitted as voluntary based on uncontroverted testimony regarding Miranda warnings, the defendant's understanding, and the absence of any coercion or mistreatment. The court further ruled that the peremptory challenge provisions were valid procedural rules that did not infringe on fundamental rights and that Wilson had not demonstrated any prejudice from their application.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a dispute between V. Jackson Kennedy and Mary E. Kennedy over the terms of their divorce judgment, specifically regarding alimony, property division, and support obligations. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dissolution of marriage, child custody arrangements, and attorney's fee award, but reversed the awards of lump sum alimony, periodic alimony, and the requirement for life insurance to secure payments. The court reasoned that the wife, who earned over $20,000 annually and possessed significant assets and professional skills, did not demonstrate a need for alimony or maintenance under Florida's no-fault divorce laws, and thus modified the property division to equal shares in the marital home while confirming prior payments as rehabilitative. The matter was remanded for entry of a conforming judgment.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute between Saul Goodman and attorney Richard Olsen over a $300,000 agreement executed in New York for purchasing stock in Omega Equities as a joint venture, including a $150,000 loan from Goodman to Olsen secured by stock and with repurchase guarantees. Goodman sued in Florida seeking the unpaid loan balance and breach damages after Olsen refused to buy back shares, and Olsen defended on grounds that the contract was usurious. The Florida Supreme Court determined that New York law governed the agreement's validity under choice-of-law rules and concluded it was a joint venture with uncertain contingencies rather than a usurious loan. The court therefore reversed the lower court judgment in Olsen's favor and remanded for a new trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved multiple defendants convicted of conspiracy to commit arson and arson after gasoline-filled bottles were thrown into a closed school building, following their participation in a demonstration protesting the busing of black children. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that Florida's conspiracy statute (§ 833.04) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad for lacking an overt-act requirement, and that the jury selection statute (Chapter 40) was invalid, while also raising claims of trial errors including voir dire restrictions, insufficient evidence, witness disclosure issues, severance, evidentiary rulings, and prosecutorial misconduct. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the statutes were constitutional because the conspiracy provision adequately defined prohibited conduct under due process standards and did not require an overt act, while deeming other asserted errors either unsupported by the record or harmless. A dissent argued that the conspiracy statute threatened free speech by criminalizing mere agreement without an overt act or clear danger.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned the five-year revocation of George J. Abraham's driver's license by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles after he was classified as a habitual traffic offender under Sections 322.264 and 322.27(5), Florida Statutes. Abraham petitioned for certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, which denied relief, and he then appealed directly to the Florida Supreme Court challenging the statutes' constitutionality. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the same statutes had already been upheld as constitutional in its recent decision in Zarsky v. State and finding no basis to depart from that precedent.

criminal law