Charles T. Wells

This case concerned the interpretation of Florida Statutes section 627.727(6)(b) governing the timing of an underinsured motorist (UM) insurer's subrogation claim against a tortfeasor. After the tortfeasor's insurer offered policy limits and the UM insurer paid the injured party to preserve subrogation rights, the trial court dismissed the tortfeasor from the injured party's suit and indicated the UM insurer would need to pursue a separate third-party action. The Fifth District affirmed in part, ruling that the statute requires the UM insurer to wait until final resolution of the UM claim before bringing any subrogation action, and the Florida Supreme Court approved that decision. The core reasoning was that the statute's plain language conditions the right to seek subrogation on the conclusion of the UM claim, precluding joinder or third-party practice during the ongoing UM proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, Jodi Benjamin, as personal representative of a deceased nursing home patient, sued Tandem Healthcare for negligence and sought records of adverse medical incidents under Amendment 7 to the Florida Constitution. The trial court ordered production, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that nursing homes are not included in the amendment's definitions of health care facilities or providers. The court reasoned that the amendment incorporates definitions from section 381.026, Florida Statutes, the Patient's Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, which applies only to hospitals and certain physicians, not nursing homes.

healthcareprocedure

The case concerned whether a trial court could consider a sexual abuse victim's recantation when deciding if the state was unable to prove the elements of the charged offenses, allowing admission of the defendant's statement under section 92.565, Florida Statutes, without first establishing corpus delicti. The Florida Supreme Court held that a victim's recantation is a relevant factor in that determination and approved the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision remanding the case for a new hearing with specific findings. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language, including the phrase "but are not limited to," permits trial courts to consider factors beyond the enumerated examples of victim disability at the time of the offense. It disapproved conflicting precedent from the First District that had strictly limited the statute to cases involving such disabilities.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was an advisory opinion requested by Florida's Attorney General on the validity of a citizen-sponsored initiative petition to amend the state constitution's growth management provisions. The proposed amendment would allow registered voters in a county or municipality to petition for a referendum on changes to local growth management or land-use plans, requiring approval by 10% of voters in the jurisdiction before the change could take effect. The Florida Supreme Court held that the initiative complied with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, that the ballot title and summary satisfied the clarity standards of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes, and that the financial impact statement met statutory requirements. The core reasoning was that the amendment's scope was limited to creating a narrow petition-and-referendum mechanism without substantially affecting multiple branches of government or altering existing voter rights in a misleading way.

electionsenvironmentproperty

In Ford v. Browning, appellants challenged two proposed constitutional amendments submitted by the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission (TBRC) for the 2008 ballot, arguing that the TBRC lacked authority to propose changes to the religious freedom provision (article I, section 3) and the public education provision (article IX, section 1) of the Florida Constitution, and that the ballot title and summary for one proposal was misleading. The Florida Supreme Court held that the TBRC possessed authority under article XI, section 6(e) to propose amendments on these subjects because the constitutional text grants broad power without explicit subject-matter limits. The Court further determined that the ballot title and summary for Proposed Amendment 9 (on school funding and the state's education duty) violated section 101.161 by combining distinct issues under an incomplete title that failed to inform voters of a major change, while the language for Proposed Amendment 7 was not addressed as misleading in the excerpt. The decision rested on de novo review of the constitutional language and established precedent requiring clear, accurate ballot disclosures without misleading omissions.

religious libertyelectionscivil rights

This case concerned whether a defendant's consent to provide a saliva sample for DNA testing was voluntary when obtained through police deception. While detained on a probation violation, Wyche was told by an investigator that the sample was needed for a fictitious burglary investigation, when it was actually sought for an unrelated sexual assault probe; the sample later matched evidence from a different burglary, leading to charges. Wyche moved to suppress the evidence, citing a conflicting appellate decision, but the trial court denied the motion, he was convicted, and the First District affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court approved that affirmance, distinguishing the conflicting case and holding that voluntariness of consent is determined by the totality of the circumstances under Supreme Court precedent, with deception not automatically rendering consent involuntary. The court reviewed the legal question de novo while deferring to factual findings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the adoption of two young children whose natural parents had both died, with the maternal grandparents filing a petition to adopt them while the paternal grandmother sought guardianship instead to ensure ongoing visitation rights for both sides of the family. The trial court denied the adoption, finding that guardianship would better serve the children's best interests by allowing court oversight to maintain relationships with the paternal grandparents, despite deeming both sets of grandparents fit caregivers and noting the father's preference for the maternal grandparents. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion under Chapter 63, Florida Statutes, because adoption confers permanent legal rights equivalent to those of natural children, including inheritance and support benefits, and grandparents have no constitutional right to court-mandated visitation over the objections of fit adoptive parents. The decision relied on precedents establishing that such visitation cannot be imposed based solely on a best-interests analysis without proof of harm to the child. The Court directed that the adoption petition be granted.

family law

This case involved petitioners Zamir Garzon and Ray Balthazar, who were tried jointly with a third defendant and convicted of multiple crimes including armed burglary, armed robbery, armed kidnapping, and conspiracy arising from a home invasion. The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court's unobjected-to use of the phrase "and/or" between the defendants' names in the jury instructions on the elements of each count constituted fundamental error. The court held that the phrasing was error because it could potentially allow the jury to convict one defendant based solely on another's actions without proper linkage, but it was not fundamental error in these consolidated cases given the evidence presented, the standard principals instruction, and the multiple-defendants instruction that required separate consideration of each defendant. The court therefore approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision affirming the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Sandra Frosti sued for damages from a 1996 car accident, served two unaccepted proposals for settlement on the defendant, and obtained a jury verdict exceeding the offers by more than 25 percent. The trial court denied her post-trial motion for attorney fees and costs under section 768.79 and rule 1.442 because the proposals had been filed before entry of judgment, a ruling affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that neither the statute nor the rule requires proposals for settlement to be filed after judgment and that Frosti had satisfied the statutory threshold for fees based on the net judgment obtained. The Court remanded for calculation of reasonable fees and costs, including on appeal, and approved contrary precedent from the Fifth District. The dispute centered on the timing requirements for proposals for settlement in civil damages actions.

proceduretorts & liability

In State v. Rubio, dentists and associates were charged with over 100 counts including racketeering, conspiracy, Medicaid provider fraud under section 409.920(2)(a), patient brokering under section 817.505(1)(b), and white collar crime, based on allegations of billing Medicaid for unrendered dental services and splitting fees from a management arrangement targeting Medicaid-eligible children. The trial court dismissed all charges, finding the relevant statutes unconstitutional and the patient brokering counts multiplicitous, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed in part by holding the Medicaid fraud statute unconstitutional while reversing on the patient brokering statute's constitutionality but upholding dismissal on multiplicity grounds and affirming dismissal of the racketeering charges. On review, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the unconstitutionality ruling on the Medicaid fraud statute and the multiplicity finding for patient brokering charges, while affirming dismissal of the racketeering and white collar crime charges for lack of sufficient predicate acts under the statutes.

criminal lawhealthcare

This case concerned whether Florida's Valued Policy Law (VPL) under section 627.702(1), Florida Statutes (2004), required an insurer to pay the full face amount of a homeowners policy for a building deemed a total loss when damage resulted partly from a covered peril (wind) and partly from an excluded peril (flood) following Hurricane Ivan. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, quashing the First District Court of Appeal's decision and disapproving the earlier Mierzwa ruling. The Court held that the VPL applies only when a covered peril causes the total loss, and an insurer's liability is limited to the portion of the loss attributable to the covered peril when an excluded peril also contributes significantly. The reasoning centered on the plain language of the 2004 statute, its historical development from fire coverage to all perils, and the absence of any requirement to pay for non-covered causes. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Hosty, the Florida Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of section 90.803(24), Florida Statutes (2001), which allows admission of certain out-of-court statements by disabled adults in criminal proceedings if the trial court finds them reliable. The case arose from sexual battery charges against a bus driver, where the prosecution sought to introduce hearsay statements made by the mentally disabled victim to her teacher and to law enforcement. The court rephrased the certified question and held that the statute does not violate the Confrontation Clause when applied to nontestimonial hearsay statements that satisfy the reliability requirements, but it does violate the Clause as applied to testimonial statements to police. The decision rested on the distinction drawn in Crawford v. Washington between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, under which only the former require a showing of unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned a conflict over the interpretation of section 768.043(1), Florida Statutes, which authorizes a trial court to order an additur when a jury's damages award in a motor vehicle personal injury case is found inadequate. After a jury awarded the Moras $42,000 but nothing for pain and suffering, the trial court imposed a $10,000 additur over their objection and denied their motion for a new trial; the Fourth District reversed, holding that plaintiffs could reject the additur and demand a new trial. The Florida Supreme Court approved that decision and disapproved contrary precedent, ruling that the "party adversely affected" by an additur or remittitur is the complaining party who objects to its amount, consistent with the statute's text and earlier cases such as Adams v. Wright. The court reasoned that this construction preserves the parties' option to choose a new trial on damages rather than accept an unsatisfactory adjustment.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved Billy Martinez's petition to the Florida Supreme Court seeking discretionary review of a lower appellate decision in his case against the State of Florida. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction and denied the petition for review. Its reasoning was that it had already denied review in a similar case, Washington v. State, 895 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), on May 16, 2006. The denial was final, with no rehearing permitted under the appellate rules. The justices concurred in the decision.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Florida Statute section 775.089 authorized restitution awards in a second-degree murder case for the lost wages of the victim's parents who voluntarily attended the trial and for the victim's lost future earnings payable to his estate. The Florida Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the negative, holding that such lost wages were not recoverable because they lacked a significant relationship to the underlying offense. The Court answered the second question in the affirmative, concluding that the statute permits recovery of the victim's lost future income by the estate as damages causally connected to the crime. The rulings rested on the text of the restitution statute, its legislative intent to compensate victims broadly, and distinctions between direct losses and voluntary third-party expenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a party in a wrongful death lawsuit could recover costs when their motion to tax costs was filed more than 30 days after the final judgment, despite the judgment reserving jurisdiction for such matters. The Florida Supreme Court held that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 requires motions for costs to be served within 30 days after the filing of the judgment, and a reservation of jurisdiction does not excuse noncompliance with this deadline. The Court reasoned that the plain language of the rule, adopted in 2001, creates a bright-line time requirement that supersedes prior case law allowing extensions via jurisdictional reservations, resolving conflicts among district courts of appeal.

procedure

In Morris v. Morris, the former wife petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to reinstate her district court appeals, which had been dismissed with sanctions after she failed to comply with a judgment forfeiting assets under a post-nuptial agreement. The underlying dispute involved her challenge to child visitation provisions in the agreement, leading to a forfeiture order and contempt proceedings that she claimed were void as contrary to Florida public policy protecting children's rights. The court denied the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to reinstatement of the appeal or an indisputable duty by the lower court. The majority relied on the standard from Huffman v. State requiring a clear legal right, an indisputable duty, and no other adequate remedy. A dissent argued that the denial prevented review of potentially void orders affecting constitutional appeal rights.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned Cedrick Jones's convictions for two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer and one count of resisting arrest without violence, and whether the missing and irreconstructible transcript of jury selection entitled him to a new trial based on possible errors in the State's use of peremptory challenges. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Fourth District (which affirmed the convictions) and the Third District by holding that a defendant is not entitled to a new trial when the missing transcript cannot be shown to contain a specific, identifiable error. The core reasoning was that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that prejudicial error actually occurred during trial, and the mere possibility that reversible error might have taken place in the absent portions is insufficient to require reversal under precedents such as Darling v. State.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a firearm discovered during a search incident to arrest should be suppressed when the arrest was based on an outstanding warrant discovered after an unlawful traffic stop for failure to signal and a cracked taillight. The Florida Supreme Court held that the outstanding arrest warrant constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the connection between the illegal stop and the discovery of the firearm, making the evidence admissible. The court's reasoning relied on the attenuation doctrine under the Fourth Amendment, distinguishing between voluntary acts by the defendant and lawful arrests pursuant to warrants that are independent of the initial illegality, and aligning with precedent such as United States v. Green.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned Kimberly Sult, who was convicted under section 843.085, Florida Statutes, for wearing a T-shirt displaying an official sheriff's star and the word 'SHERIFF' along with carrying a related identification card, even though she was not employed as a law enforcement officer at the time. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a certified question on whether the statute was unconstitutional as overbroad, vague, or violative of substantive due process. The court held that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and violated substantive due process because it criminalized innocent conduct, such as wearing or displaying commercially available law enforcement-related items without any requirement of intent to deceive or impersonate officers. The decision emphasized that the law failed to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct and swept in activities that did not pose a genuine risk of misleading the public.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rights