In Eardley v. McGreevy, a property owner appealed a trial court ruling that denied an implied easement over a neighbor's land for use of a gravel drive shown on an unrecorded plat. The case arose in a quiet title proceeding after the plaintiff purchased a one-acre parcel that had direct frontage on a public road (Jett Road) but claimed an easement based on the plat and prior use. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that an implied easement requires necessity for access, which was absent here because the property could reach the public road without unreasonable difficulty. The court further ruled that no easement arose from the plat because it was neither recorded nor referenced in the deed, and an unrecorded plat alone cannot bind subsequent owners or create an easement under Georgia law.

property

The case Masters v. Redwine involved a dispute over an oral agreement to exchange parcels of land between Fred Masters and David Redwine. Masters sought specific performance of the contract after Redwine refused to sign the deed for his portion of the exchange. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the jury's verdict in favor of Masters was supported by sufficient evidence, including partial performance by Masters and acceptance by Redwine, which satisfied the statute of frauds requirements despite the lack of a complete written description. The court reasoned that focusing solely on the written agreement was erroneous and that extrinsic evidence like surveys and deeds could establish the property details.

property

In Wilson v. Lane, Floyd Wilson filed a caveat challenging the testamentary capacity of Jewel Jones Greer when she executed her 1997 will, which was offered for probate by executrix Katherine Lane and distributed her property equally among mostly relatives plus her caregiver. A jury found Greer lacked capacity, but the trial court granted Lane's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the propounders established a presumption of capacity through testimony from the drafting attorney and others that Greer was competent and chose her beneficiaries rationally, while the caveators presented only evidence of eccentricity, age, peculiar habits, a later guardianship petition, and equivocal medical references to dementia that did not show Greer was unable to form a decided and rational desire regarding the disposition of her property. The opinion emphasized that neither advancing age, weakness of intellect, nor eccentricity is inconsistent with testamentary capacity under Georgia law, and insufficient evidence existed to overcome the presumption or support the jury verdict.

family lawproperty

The case involved Quentin Lamar Wright's conviction for felony murder based on the shooting death of a cab driver during an alleged robbery attempt, with key testimony from several accomplices and related witnesses. Wright appealed on the ground that the trial court erred by granting the State's motion in limine and barring cross-examination of those witnesses about their juvenile adjudications, probationary status, or pending cases. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation entitles a defendant to inquire into a witness's current probation or open juvenile matters to reveal possible bias or motive to testify favorably for the State. The court found the record adequate to raise the issue for three witnesses, rejected distinctions based on commitment versus probation, and concluded the error was not harmless because witness credibility formed the core of the prosecution's case.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ross v. State, the defendant was convicted by a Fulton County jury of malice murder and related charges, including possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, based on evidence that he shot and killed a man at his estranged wife's home. Ross argued on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing his offer to stipulate to his status as a felon and instead admitting the name and nature of his prior conviction for enticing a minor. The Georgia Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Old Chief v. United States, holding that admitting the details of the prior offense was error because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice in proving a status-based offense. However, the court concluded the error was harmless given the overwhelming other evidence of Ross's guilt and therefore affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Edith Tillyne Sammons, who was convicted by a jury of murdering her estranged husband after claiming self-defense due to battered person syndrome. On appeal, Sammons argued that she was improperly excluded from a critical stage of the trial when the court replaced a juror following an ex parte discussion without her presence or consent. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant's constitutional right to be present at all proceedings, including those involving changes to jury composition, was violated, and she did not waive or acquiesce in this absence. The court mandated a new trial because prejudice is presumed from such a denial of rights.

criminal lawprocedure

John Randall Futch filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the voluntariness of his 1993 guilty plea to felony criminal damage to property, which had later been used to enhance a federal sentence. The habeas court granted relief after finding that Futch had not been informed of the constitutional rights he was waiving. On the State's appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the State failed to meet its burden to show the plea was knowing and voluntary, because no transcript existed and the testimony of plea counsel plus the signed form showed that the rights to a jury trial, confrontation of witnesses, and against self-incrimination had not been explained before the plea was entered.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the disbursal of $200,000 in condemnation proceeds paid by Fulton County for real property originally owned by Accolades Apartments Joint Venture (AAJV), which was held by its owners Consolidated Equities Corporation and John Hancock Mutual Insurance Company before transfer to Accolades Apartments, L.P. A judgment lien against CEC raised the question of whether AAJV qualified as a partnership, which would make the property partnership property exempt from the lien. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the public filing of a statement of partnership under OCGA § 14-8-10.1 constitutes conclusive evidence that a partnership exists. The court reasoned that such a filing represents an express agreement evidencing the parties' intent to form a partnership, is supported by specific provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, and enables third parties to rely on public records without further inquiry. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals and trial court rulings that had treated the filing as only some evidence of partnership formation.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned Scarlett Folsom's appeal of a superior court order upholding the City of Jasper's suspension of her liquor license for thirty days and imposition of probation, based on two violations of an ordinance banning advertisements of alcoholic beverages, brand names, or prices, and one violation stemming from an alleged battery by an employee. The court reversed the judgment, holding that the ordinance's restrictions on commercial speech were unconstitutional. It applied the Central Hudson test from 44 Liquormart and found that the blanket prohibition on truthful, nonmisleading speech failed to directly advance the city's interest in temperance with any supporting evidence and was more extensive than necessary. The court also held that the ordinance's provision allowing license revocation based on the city's own determination of any legal violation violated due process principles.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Georgia residents who filed suit against insurance companies over rating schemes in group medical policies and sought to enjoin a proposed settlement in a parallel Alabama class action that covered similar claims. The Georgia trial court granted an injunction against the Alabama settlement and held the insurers in contempt, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed those rulings. The court held that only members of the class have standing to challenge a class settlement, and because the Alabama court had explicitly excluded the Georgia plaintiffs from the class, they lacked standing to object either individually or as potential representatives of a Georgia class. The opinion emphasized that non-class members cannot indirectly challenge a settlement from which their rights are unaffected.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

Michelle Hammond filed a class action against Carnett's, Inc. under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, alleging that the company sent 73,500 unsolicited fax advertisements through its agent. The trial court denied her motion for class certification on the ground that determining whether each fax was unsolicited would require individualized inquiries, and the Georgia Supreme Court agreed after review. The Court held that the commonality requirement for class certification was not satisfied because some recipients may have had an established business relationship with Carnett's, which under FCC regulations would mean their faxes were not unsolicited. Hammond's proposed class included those recipients without excluding them, so the class members were not similarly situated with respect to the key element of a TCPA violation. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the denial of class certification.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involves Antonio B. Cochran, whose malice murder conviction was overturned on appeal, prompting the State to re-sentence him to life in prison solely on the remaining felony murder conviction. Cochran appealed the new sentence, claiming it was void because the trial court did not hold a pre-sentence hearing as required under OCGA § 17-10-2. The court affirmed the sentence, citing precedent from Williams v. State that the absence of such a hearing does not render a sentence void in non-death penalty cases. It further reasoned that felony murder carries a mandatory life sentence by law, so Cochran suffered no harm from the procedural omission.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Christopher Matthew Smith, who was convicted by a jury in Bartow County of malice murder, false imprisonment, armed robbery, and related crimes stemming from the 1995 shooting death of Ed Shockley during a crime spree that included robberies and thefts in Georgia and Florida. On appeal, Smith raised multiple claims, including that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify by referencing his lack of remorse, that the State failed to provide proper notice of its intent to seek the death penalty after re-indictment, that the grand jury evidence was insufficient, that a videotape of his arrest lacked proper chain of custody, and that his custodial statements were inadmissible due to an incomplete Miranda waiver. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the prosecutor's closing argument was a permissible inference from evidence of Smith's behavior rather than a comment on his silence, that any notice deficiencies were cured and not preserved for review, that grand jury sufficiency was not reviewable after a trial conviction, and that the videotape and statements were properly admitted under established evidentiary and constitutional standards.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Brian Keith Davis, who was convicted by a jury of malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and related firearm offenses stemming from two separate shooting incidents in 1993 that resulted in two deaths and multiple injuries. Davis appealed, arguing that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on inferring intent to kill from use of a deadly weapon, that the court should have severed the counts from the two incidents, and that his multiple firearm possession convictions were improper. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that any error in the jury charge was harmless because the evidence of malice was overwhelming, that the crimes were properly joined as part of a continuing crime spree rather than solely similar acts, and that the multiple possession convictions were valid because they involved different victims. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lowe's Home Centers suing General Electric for contamination from PCBs that affected Lowe's existing retail property and an adjacent parcel Lowe's planned to lease for a larger superstore. Lowe's sought tort damages including lost profits from the unbuilt superstore, but the Georgia Supreme Court addressed whether the economic loss rule permitted recovery of profits tied to property Lowe's did not own. The court held that a plaintiff may recover in tort only for lost profits associated with damage to its own property, not the property of others. This conclusion followed from longstanding Georgia precedent, such as Byrd v. English, which limits tort recovery to avoid indefinite liability chains, and from the fact that Lowe's held no ownership or sufficient property interest in the adjacent land after its lease agreement was canceled. Because the first certified question was answered in the negative, the court did not reach the second question concerning the new business rule.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved Roytrevious Morgan's conviction by a jury for malice murder after he shot and killed Marcell Malcolm during a dispute over missing automobile rims in Walton County. Morgan appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a jury instruction allowing inference of intent to kill from use of a deadly weapon, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not objecting to that instruction, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient for any rational trier of fact to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the jury instruction claim was waived and did not qualify as substantial error under OCGA § 5-5-24(c), that Morgan failed to show prejudice from counsel's performance given the overwhelming evidence of malice, and that no evidence supported a voluntary manslaughter charge because the shooting was not solely the result of sudden, violent passion from serious provocation.

criminal law

Pawnmart, Inc. sued Gwinnett County, claiming that County Ordinance No. 82-11, which requires pawnbrokers to keep records and obtain fingerprints, photographs, and sales receipts from customers, is preempted by state statutes under OCGA §§ 44-12-130 through 44-12-138. The trial court granted summary judgment to the County, finding no preemption, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that general state law authorizes local regulation through police powers to protect public welfare and expressly preserves local laws as cumulative, and that the ordinance does not conflict with state provisions on pawn tickets or disclosures. The court also rejected equal protection and due process challenges, finding a rational basis for the requirements and that the rules reasonably serve a legitimate purpose without unduly burdening pawnbrokers.

business & regulatorycriminal law

The case involved Calvin Hunt's appeal from his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, based on evidence that he shot and killed David Miller during an altercation involving mutual acquaintances. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions after reviewing the trial record. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. The court rejected challenges to in-court identifications, finding that such claims must be addressed through cross-examination rather than exclusion under Neil v. Biggers. It also determined that the prosecutorial misconduct claim was not preserved due to lack of objection, and that trial counsel was not ineffective because the challenged evidence and arguments were either admissible or not improper, with no prejudice shown.

criminal lawprocedure

In Lerch v. Lerch, a divorcing couple disputed the division of their marital home in Chatham County Superior Court. The husband had purchased the home prior to the 1994 marriage but executed a gift deed in 1999 transferring it to both spouses as tenants in common with right of survivorship. The trial court awarded the home entirely to the husband after classifying only half as marital property and applied the couple's prenuptial agreement to limit the wife's claim. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and remanded, ruling that the deed manifested an intent to convert the entire home into marital property that was not barred by the prenup and thus required a new equitable division.

family lawproperty

In Tanksley v. Parker, Sandra Tanksley challenged the probate court's decision to admit a copy of her mother's will to probate after her brother David Parker petitioned for it, filing a caveat in Athens-Clarke County probate court. The probate court, following a bench trial without a jury, found that the presumption of revocation under OCGA § 53-4-46 had been rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence showing the testatrix did not intend to revoke the will and that the copy was true, based on witness credibility assessments and interrogatory testimony from subscribing witnesses. On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that without a transcript the trial court's factual findings must be presumed supported by the evidence, and that written interrogatories satisfied requirements for witness testimony in probate proceedings. The core reasoning centered on statutory standards for rebutting the revocation presumption and deference to the trial court's credibility determinations.

family lawpropertyprocedure