William B. Gunter

This case involved Hugh Don Smith, who was convicted in 1972 on multiple criminal charges and initially sentenced to consecutive terms; after an escape from custody led to dismissal of his direct appeal, he pursued habeas corpus petitions challenging his convictions on constitutional grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas court, after a five-day hearing, found violations of due process under the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions and granted Smith a new trial. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the issue of ineffective assistance during trial could be raised in habeas proceedings even if a direct appeal had been forfeited due to escape, and that the habeas judge's conclusion was supported by the record. The court did not reach other issues raised in the appeal. Dissenting justices argued that escape should waive constitutional claims.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by plaintiff Turner against the City of Adel and Marable-Pirkle, Inc., an electrical contractor, after Turner was injured in 1973 when his equipment contacted an energized ground wire on a city-owned utility pole. Marable-Pirkle had performed voltage conversion work on the pole in 1965 as an independent contractor. The trial court granted summary judgment to Marable-Pirkle, ruling that a 1968 Georgia statute barred claims against parties involved in the construction of improvements to real property more than eight years after substantial completion. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did not apply because the work on the utility pole—replacing transformers and equipment—did not qualify as an improvement to real property under the statute's terms, which contemplated structures occupiable by owners for their intended use.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This case involved an appeal by an employer seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant in an employment contract against a former employee. The covenant barred the employee from engaging in any building, developing, or selling of real estate in two Georgia counties for five years after leaving the company. The trial court held the covenant unenforceable and denied injunctive relief, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that the covenant was overly broad because it prohibited all of the employee's prior job functions—including loan processing, general management, bookkeeping, and sales—exceeding what was necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests and violating state constitutional and statutory rules against restraints of trade.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved an appeal from a contempt judgment against appellant Brooks for refusing to testify in a criminal proceeding after the trial court issued an order compelling his testimony under Georgia's Immunity From Prosecution Statute. The order included language limiting use of the testimony against him but also contained a paragraph stating he would not be required to produce evidence usable in other courts. Brooks argued that the statute and order failed to grant adequate 'use and derivative use' immunity, rendering it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states. The Georgia Supreme Court interpreted the statute as providing the required immunity protections consistent with federal precedent, held it constitutional, vacated the contempt judgment, and remanded for deletion of the conflicting paragraph and further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff seeking to cancel a deed transferring real estate from a father to his son, reserving a life estate, claiming it was fraudulent to hinder collection of a future judgment from a prior car accident. The trial court, after a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, denied the plaintiff's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence supported the jury's resolution of issues regarding fraudulent intent, knowledge of intent, and insolvency, and that the jury instructions were proper without needing additional charges on burden shifting absent a request.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute between a car buyer and a dealership over an alleged breach of warranty concerning a cracked engine block in a used vehicle. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision, which had rested on a procedural ruling that a typographical error in the complaint constituted an admission in judicio barring the plaintiff's claim. The court determined that the breach of warranty issue had been tried on the merits by consent under the Civil Practice Act, so the pleading did not estop the plaintiff, but it affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff's evidence failed to show any warranty or defect at the time of sale, while the defendant's mechanic's affidavit explicitly established the absence of such a defect.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved John R. Andrew, who was charged and convicted by a jury of three misdemeanors under Georgia law: operating a motor vehicle without required insurance, without a valid license tag, and without a valid safety inspection sticker. Andrew appealed, arguing that the mandatory insurance requirement violated due process, infringed on his First Amendment rights because paying premiums conflicted with his religious beliefs, and exceeded the state's police power. The court rejected these constitutional challenges, citing supporting precedents from other states, found the trial evidence sufficient to sustain the verdicts, and affirmed the convictions. The jury charge was also upheld as it was not properly excepted to and contained no error.

criminal lawreligious liberty

The case involved the conviction of the appellant for the murder of David Dunn on December 26, 1974, in Richmond County, for which he received a life sentence. The prosecution presented evidence including testimony from an accomplice granted immunity, who described the appellant shooting the victim at close range with a sawed-off shotgun, matching footprints from the scene to shoes found in the appellant's home, and items like a shotgun and pistol observed in his car. The appellant denied committing the murder and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the lack of corroboration for the accomplice's testimony, and the admission of a police officer's non-expert comparison of the shoes and footprints. The court held that the evidence was sufficient, the officer's testimony was admissible as an opinion from an experienced investigator with visual comparisons provided to the jury, and other claims regarding evidence admission, jury instructions, and a motion to suppress were without merit, leading to affirmance of the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose when MacDougall petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in State of Ga. v. MacDougall. After the issues were briefed and orally argued, the Supreme Court examined the full record. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals' judgment was correct. It therefore affirmed that judgment without further elaboration.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jones v. Burton, plaintiffs sought to partition a tract of land into separate parcels for the stipulated owners but the trial court instead ordered the entire tract sold with proceeds divided among the owners. After the judge announced this decision from the bench, plaintiffs attempted to file a voluntary dismissal, which the court struck as untimely under Code Ann. § 81A-141(a) because a judge's announcement of judgment precludes dismissal even before formal entry. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that once the trial judge announces a decision terminating the case, voluntary dismissal is no longer effective, and it disapproved contrary prior rulings. The court also upheld the denial of partition in kind based on the evidence presented. The topics are property and procedure.

propertyprocedure

This case involved class actions by residential property owners in Atlanta and Fulton County challenging 1975 and 1976 property tax assessments, claiming that local officials had selectively reappraised only their properties in a way that violated state constitutional requirements for uniform taxation and equal protection. The taxpayers sought declaratory and injunctive relief to block collection of taxes based on the revised assessments, without disputing that their properties were valued at or below fair market value. The trial court ruled for the taxpayers and enjoined the assessments, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disputes should have been resolved through the statutory arbitration process for contesting valuations rather than through equity jurisdiction in court. The court reasoned that the arbitration procedure provided an adequate remedy at law, including the ability to raise uniformity issues and appeal to a jury trial, and that policy favored resolving such tax controversies through established local statutory mechanisms.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case involved a father's attempt to enforce visitation rights with his children through a contempt citation against the mother, based on a 1972 divorce decree that incorporated a separation agreement providing for reasonable visitation at mutually convenient times. The trial court dismissed the citation, ruling that the visitation provisions were too vague and indefinite to enforce. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the dismissal and remanded the case, reasoning that since the court had previously approved and ordered compliance with the visitation terms, it should hear evidence to determine if there had been a denial of reasonable visitation rights rather than deeming them unenforceable by contempt.

family law

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for armed robbery, where the appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting certain identification testimony, in allowing cross-examination of defense witnesses about their failure to report an alibi defense to law enforcement, and in denying a motion for a new trial. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that all contentions lacked merit. It reasoned that the identification evidence was not improper and drew no objection at trial, that the questioning of witnesses did not violate the appellant's constitutional rights and also drew no objection, and that the trial transcript contained ample evidence to support the jury's verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over custody of a minor child between the child's maternal grandparents and his divorced natural parents, following a 1974 divorce judgment that awarded custody to the father with visitation to the mother. The grandparents initially relied on an invalid juvenile court order to obtain possession of the child and sought to modify the divorce decree in superior court, which ultimately awarded them custody until the child turned 14. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed that judgment, holding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction because there was no transfer from superior court, and that the record contained no finding or evidence that either natural parent was unfit as required to overcome parental custody rights under Georgia law.

family lawprocedure

Little v. State was an appeal from convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault, raising three issues: whether the evidence supported the verdicts, whether the trial court's jury charge on alibi was improperly burden-shifting, and whether the charge on the desirability of the jury reaching a verdict was proper. The court reviewed the trial transcript and found adequate evidence to support the convictions. It determined that the alibi instruction, viewed in the context of the full charge, did not shift the burden to the defendant. The court also upheld the instruction on jury deliberations as consistent with prior case law. The judgment was affirmed with no errors found.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Georgia Code Ann. § 26-507(c) is constitutional; the statute bars a state prosecution if the defendant was previously convicted or acquitted in federal court for the same conduct arising from concurrent jurisdiction, unless each prosecution requires proof of a distinct fact. The defendant had pleaded guilty in federal court to crimes from a bank robbery and then sought to bar his subsequent Georgia prosecution for the same acts under the statute. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional on the ground that it improperly surrendered the superior courts' exclusive jurisdiction over felonies. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the provision is a valid procedural bar rather than a jurisdictional statute and therefore does not violate the state constitution's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to superior courts. The court accordingly sustained the plea in bar and set aside the state convictions.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a dispute over title to real property in which Mrs. Davis filed an in rem action to quiet title based on her claimed adverse possession since 1949 and to cancel a chain of recorded deeds ultimately vesting title in Edgewater Ranches, Inc. After a prior appeal, the case went to trial and a jury returned a verdict for Mrs. Davis on title, damages, and fees. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the judgment and granted a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in submitting the adverse possession issue to the jury. The core reasoning was that Mrs. Davis's own testimony admitting rent or debt payments to record title holders (the Radfords and Dickson) established permissive rather than adverse possession, which cannot support a prescriptive title claim under Georgia law.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether Georgia courts were required to give full faith and credit to a Florida divorce judgment that granted a divorce, awarded custody and child support to the wife, and gave the husband title to the Florida marital home, despite the wife having left Florida before the action and being served via Florida's long-arm statute while residing in Georgia. After the Florida judgment, the wife filed a separate action in Georgia seeking alimony and a half-interest in the Florida real estate. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the full Florida judgment was entitled to full faith and credit because the couple's prior marital domicile in Florida established sufficient contacts for in personam jurisdiction over the wife, and the out-of-state service satisfied due process. The trial court's partial recognition of only the divorce portion was therefore reversed.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a non-judicial foreclosure sale of real property in Georgia. The owner (Gunter) and second-lien holder (Cole) sued to set aside the sale by the first-lien holder (Tucker Federal), the resulting deed to the purchaser (Roupe), and the writ of possession, arguing that the low purchase price made the sale grossly inequitable. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the foreclosure was properly noticed and conducted under state law, the second-lien holder was not entitled to additional notice, and inadequacy of price alone does not justify setting aside a sale under precedents like Giordano v. Stubbs.

propertyprocedure

The case involved representatives of two newspapers seeking access to files maintained by a sheriff regarding inmate deaths in jail. The trial court ruled in favor of the sheriff, but the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the files qualified as public records under the relevant statute because they were prepared and maintained in the course of operating a public office. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to balance the public interest in disclosure against non-disclosure, particularly distinguishing between ongoing and concluded investigations.

free speechcriminal law