Hiram K. Undercofler

Johnny Prather was convicted in Coweta County of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after evidence showed he shot and killed Bruce Roberson and wounded bystander Thomas Thornton during an argument at a tavern. He received a life sentence for the murder and concurrent four-year terms for the other offenses. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the jury evidence met the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard and that introduction of Prather's prior felony conviction was proper because it was a required element of the firearm possession offense under the statute, unlike in recidivist proceedings where such evidence relates only to punishment.

criminal lawguns

The case involved the dismissal of felony-murder indictments against three defendants who were attempting a burglary when the homeowner shot and killed one of their fellow would-be burglars in defense of person and property. The State appealed, presenting an issue of first impression under Georgia law: whether the felony-murder statute applies when the intended victim, rather than a participant, causes the death of one of the felons. The court affirmed the dismissals, reasoning that the statute's key phrase requiring that the defendant "causes" the death is ambiguous as to indirect causation and therefore must be construed strictly against the State.

criminal law

The case addressed an apparent conflict in Georgia criminal law precedents concerning the presumption of sanity when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity in a murder trial. Earlier decisions like Handspike v. State had held that evidence overcoming the presumption, without contrary proof of sanity, would render a guilty verdict unauthorized, while later cases such as Moses v. State allowed juries to reject expert or lay testimony on sanity and rely on the basic presumption of sanity. The court reviewed distinctions between special pleas of insanity (addressing competency at trial) and general pleas (addressing sanity at the time of the offense), along with related presumptions following prior insanity adjudications. It concluded that Handspike had been overruled sub silentio by subsequent rulings and expressly overruled it, reaffirming holdings in Gilbert v. State and Moses v. State that jurors may find an accused sane even without positive testimony of sanity. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Higdon pleaded guilty to burglary and received a two-year probated sentence based on the mistaken belief that he was a first offender. After he began serving the sentence, the trial court discovered his prior record, revoked the probation due to his silence about past convictions, and resentenced him to five years in confinement. Higdon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the lower court. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that denial. The court held that once a defendant begins serving a sentence, it may not be increased.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a suit to establish paternity of an illegitimate child conceived in Georgia and to obtain child support from the nonresident alleged father, who was served by mail under a Georgia statute. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of Code Ann. § 74-302(a), found proper service and residency facts, determined the appellant was the father, and issued a support order. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute satisfies due process requirements under the minimum contacts standard from International Shoe Co. v. Washington because the child was conceived in the state while both parents were residents. The court also noted supporting evidence including the appellant's admissions on the birth certificate and a prior guilty plea to abandonment.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned the procedural requirements for filing materials in support of a motion for summary judgment under Georgia law, specifically whether depositions and similar items of which the opposing party had notice must meet the same 30-day pre-hearing filing deadline as affidavits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the application of Code Ann. § 81A-156(c) and to address the validity of a prior Court of Appeals decision. The court held that only supporting materials on file at least 30 days before the hearing may be considered, approving the rule from Benton Bros. Ford Co. v. Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. while disapproving a contrary holding below. It reasoned that the statute ensures due process by giving the respondent a fair opportunity to respond, though trial judges or stipulations can extend deadlines for flexibility. The judgment was affirmed because the complaining party had relied on the untimely deposition, resulting in no reversible error.

procedure

AAA Plastering Company, a subcontractor on a hospital construction project, filed a mechanic's lien against the property after its subcontract with general contractor TPM Constructors included a clause waiving the right to file such liens. TPM sued to cancel the lien, and the trial court granted partial summary judgment in TPM's favor, holding the lien invalid and ordering it stricken from the records. AAA appealed, arguing that the relevant statute required the property owner to prove any waiver and that the clause's language did not qualify as a valid waiver. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the general contractor as promisee could enforce the subcontract's lien waiver provision and that the clause expressly waived AAA's lien rights under Code Ann. § 67-2001(2), distinguishing it from prior precedent with different contract language.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a suit for malicious prosecution brought by a former summer employee against his employer after the employer obtained an arrest warrant for theft by taking of several items from an apartment complex, with the criminal case later being nolle prossed. The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury question is not presented and no liability arises for malicious prosecution where probable cause existed for theft of at least some of the items, even if not for all. The court reasoned that malicious prosecution actions are disfavored under public policy favoring reports of apparent guilt to authorities, and that the existence of probable cause—assessed by the conduct of a reasonable person—is a matter for court determination rather than a jury. It reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals opinion holding otherwise and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

criminal lawtorts & liability

The case involved Marvin Dwayne Borden and Ellis Ray Cole, Jr., who were convicted of robbing and murdering Devero Payne at a grocery store after they and accomplices planned and carried out the crime, including stabbing and slashing the victim to prevent identification. They appealed their twenty-year robbery and life imprisonment sentences, primarily challenging the denial of their motion to suppress statements and evidence obtained after warrantless arrests, on the ground that the arrests lacked probable cause. The court affirmed the convictions, finding that probable cause existed based on reliable information from an attorney who had consulted with an accomplice, directed officers to the crime scene where the body was found, and provided the defendants' location, along with the officers' corroboration and the totality of circumstances. Other claims, including challenges to the prosecutor's closing arguments, were rejected as unpreserved, harmless, or consistent with the law.

criminal lawprocedure

In Walker v. State, the defendant, convicted in 1977 of armed robbery and murder and sentenced to consecutive life terms, appealed the denial of his extraordinary motion for new trial and motion for acquittal. These motions claimed that nearly two years of delay in preparing the trial transcript and inaction by his appointed counsel violated his rights to effective assistance of counsel, due process, and a speedy trial. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motions. It reasoned that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy appeal, though due process may be implicated by substantial delays in the appellate process, and held that the appropriate remedy was to grant an out-of-time direct appeal, which it ordered expedited with new appointed counsel. The affirmance was without prejudice to any due process claims Walker might raise in a retrial if the direct appeal resulted in reversal.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Hoyt Douglas Blanchard, Jr.'s conviction for the murder of Monroe Bishop, his former father-in-law, after Blanchard shot him at a fruit stand following his release from a mental hospital; Blanchard was sentenced to life imprisonment and appealed on multiple grounds. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia to support the jury's verdict. The court rejected claims of a sequestration violation, ruling that it affects only credibility rather than admissibility of testimony; found any improper references to financial support harmless given the overwhelming evidence; upheld the admission of Blanchard's statements after a Jackson-Denno hearing as voluntary; determined discovery issues did not prejudice the defense; and concluded there was no error in denying funds for an additional psychiatrist absent a special plea of insanity.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hobbs v. Ware County, residents of the Riverside Park subdivision sought to enjoin the county from opening a street shown on a 1906 subdivision plat that had never been opened or used by the public, though parts of the land had been used for private driveways and other purposes. The trial court denied temporary injunctive relief, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that recording the plat raised a presumption of express dedication to the public, that the county had accepted the dedication through limited improvements and maintenance (with acceptance of any part implying acceptance of all streets on the plat), and that no prescription could run against the county even after seventy-five years.

property

The case concerned the validity of an in terrorem clause in Nelson T. Levings' will, which would forfeit any beneficiary's interest if they challenged the will's probate or validity. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the clause was invalid under Code Ann. § 113-820. The statute voids such clauses unless the will includes a specific limitation over of the forfeited interest to another person, and the court held that the will's general language directing disposition as if the beneficiary had predeceased the testator did not meet this requirement. The clause was strictly construed, consistent with prior precedents like Broach v. Hester, because it lacked named beneficiaries or a clear gift over to the residuum.

property

Strickland v. State involved the appeal of convictions for three murders and three aggravated assaults, along with death sentences for the murders, raising multiple claims of error primarily concerning the defendant's mental competency to stand trial. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the psychiatric evaluation was not a critical stage requiring counsel's presence, that the trial court properly submitted the competency issue to a special jury based on conflicting evidence including psychiatric reports and lay testimony showing Strickland understood the charges and could assist counsel, and that various procedural challenges to voir dire, pleading, and grand jury matters lacked merit or factual support. The court further found the evidence sufficient to support the aggravating circumstances for the death penalty under applicable standards and that the sentences were not disproportionate to similar cases.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Knowles, the defendants challenged their convictions on appeal, arguing that the court reporter's inability to certify a fully accurate transcript of a composite wiretap tape played at trial violated their due process rights by preventing adequate appellate review of the evidence. The Court of Appeals had agreed and granted a new trial, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision. The court held that the existing record—including the admitted composite tape, the State's transcription of it, live witness testimony about the recordings, and cross-examinations—was sufficient for the appellate court to assess the sufficiency of the evidence. The opinion emphasized that the tape was generally understandable, inaccuracies were addressed at trial, and the materials allowed full review without a completely certified transcript.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a criminal defendant's plea of double jeopardy after his first trial ended in a mistrial. The mistrial followed a contempt citation and jailing of his counsel during a dispute over which case would proceed, which the Court of Appeals had previously found was due entirely to unfair actions by the trial court and prosecutor. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the conviction from the second trial and granted the motion in bar. It held there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial that would allow an exception to double jeopardy, as the State could not benefit from its own fault in creating the situation. The court also ruled that a defendant's citation of cases in a written request to charge does not incorporate or waive objection to additional language taken from those cases by the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a criminal defendant is required to object at trial to evidence that was the subject of a motion to suppress which had already been overruled by the court, when the facts remain the same. The Georgia Supreme Court held that no such objection is necessary and reversed the Court of Appeals. The court reasoned that the motion to suppress proceedings already fulfill the purposes of an objection by apprising the trial court of the issue, allowing it to rule, and perfecting the record for appeal. It adopted similar logic from prior cases on motions in limine, noting that requiring a renewed objection would serve no purpose and could unduly burden the court or highlight the evidence. The court distinguished prior cases where the motion was not ruled on or where there was an affirmative waiver at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns whether a trial court must instruct the jury on an affirmative defense of justification when raised by the evidence, even without a defendant's written request to do so. The Court of Appeals had held that no such charge was required absent a request, citing precedent on lesser included offenses. The Supreme Court clarified that affirmative defenses are governed by different rules, under which the trial court must present the defense to the jury if raised by the evidence, though a specific charge is unnecessary if the case is fairly presented overall. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to assess whether the jury charge here met that standard.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned MARTA's attempt, through DeKalb County, to use quick-take eminent domain to acquire a noise and vibration easement over Sycamore Square condominiums whose structures resonated at 16 hertz from subway trains passing in a nearby tunnel, causing perceptible vibrations, secondary noise, and claimed structural damage. The trial court enjoined the condemnation as a misuse of power and for lack of necessity and also enjoined MARTA from operating trains above 18 mph on nuisance grounds. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state constitution and eminent-domain statutes permit a condemning authority to acquire a property interest (fee or lesser estate) but do not authorize the purchase of a mere right to damage property without taking such an interest; because the attempted condemnation was invalid, the nuisance injunction remained available. The court further noted that new industry vibration standards showed levels exceeding perceptibility thresholds and that less costly mitigation options had been rejected by MARTA.

propertytorts & liability

The case Brooks v. Braziel is a cross-appeal from an expedited election contest previously decided in Braziel v. Brooks on October 7, 1980. The Georgia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot on January 15, 1981, because the general election had already occurred. The core reasoning is that the passage of the election date rendered the underlying dispute nonjusticiable, leaving no live controversy for the court to resolve.

electionsprocedure