Charles L. Weltner

The case involved residents of Brunswick, Georgia, seeking to block the city from conveying dedicated public park land to a church, arguing that such alienation of park property required specific legislative approval beyond general municipal powers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, finding no factual disputes and ruling that OCGA § 36-37-6(c) permits a municipality to trade or swap property when deemed in its best interest, with no exemption for parks. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that the statute's authorization for property trades applies to dedicated park lands, as the code reorganization did not alter prior substantive law or impose additional restrictions, and historical legislative acts confirm the General Assembly's role in granting such authority. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretation principles, emphasizing that the plain language of the trading provision controls absent any indication of legislative intent to preserve common-law barriers.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a railroad worker who sued his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for job-related injuries, resulting in a jury verdict awarding him $1,000,000. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's judgment upholding the verdict. The majority reasoned that the size of the award, combined with elements of the plaintiff's closing argument, indicated the jury had been influenced by a desire to punish the defendant, which is an improper basis for damages under FELA since only compensatory awards are permitted.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involved a recall petition filed against a county school board member under Georgia's Recall Act of 1989, with the trial court reviewing the legal sufficiency of the petition's grounds and facts as required by statute. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that four of the five allegations—violations of school board policy, the Open Meetings Act, a federal desegregation order, and failure to pursue state funds—were legally insufficient because they consisted of conclusions rather than reasonably particular facts. However, the allegation that the board member failed to prevent out-of-county or out-of-district students from illegally attending county schools was deemed adequate in form to support a recall election. The court's review was limited to the legal sufficiency of the alleged facts as to form, without assessing their truth or allowing evidentiary hearings, leading to a partial affirmance and reversal with directions to expunge the insufficient allegations.

electionsprocedure

The case involved whether prior testimony from a workers' compensation proceeding could be used to invoke the contradictory testimony rule against a party in a related personal injury lawsuit. The Supreme Court of Georgia decided that the rule from Prophecy Corp. applies to any contradictory testimony by a party, regardless of the proceeding in which it was given, reversing the Court of Appeals' limitation to testimony in the actual case. The court reasoned that testimony remains testimony irrespective of its origin and remanded the case for application of the rule without that restriction.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether a neuropsychologist could offer expert opinion testimony on the cause of organic brain damage allegedly resulting from exposure to the pesticide Aldrin in a personal injury action against an exterminator company. The trial court struck the psychologist's affidavit, ruling that causation of a physical disorder required medical expertise beyond the psychologist's qualifications. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, holding that the practice of psychology is statutorily limited to mental and nervous disorders and does not extend to diagnosing or opining on physical conditions or medical causation. The court relied on the statutory definition of psychology, which excludes the practice of medicine, along with precedent limiting expert opinions to the witness's field of expertise and the trial court's discretion in qualifying experts.

proceduretorts & liability

In Sellers v. Nodvin, the trial court dismissed the defendants' appeal for failing to file the transcript of evidence within the required time under OCGA § 5-6-48, finding the delay both unreasonable and inexcusable due to the appellants' pattern of seeking delays. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the Court of Appeals had applied the correct standard for determining if a delay is unreasonable. The Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal, because the uncontradicted evidence showed the late filing did not delay transmission of the record to the appellate court and there was no showing of prejudice to the appellee or other factors that would render the delay unreasonable under the criteria from Galletta v. Hillcrest Abbey West. The Court reversed the dismissal, emphasizing that filing deadlines are not jurisdictional and that appeals should be decided on the merits when reasonable to do so.

procedure

This case concerned the enforceability of an alleged oral settlement agreement reached in a divorce proceeding. The court determined that the oral agreement was not enforceable because the existence of the agreement itself was in dispute. Relying on precedent from Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co. and LeCroy v. Massey, the opinion explained that while attorneys have apparent authority to enter oral agreements, a writing is required to establish the agreement's existence when that fact is contested between the client and attorney. As a result, the purported settlement order was vacated and the judgment reversed.

family lawprocedure

Glen Weems was convicted of felony murder and three counts of aggravated assault after shooting and killing a seven-year-old child and wounding three others during a drive-by shooting stemming from a drug dispute. The trial court imposed a life sentence plus a term of years. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and rejected other claims of error, but remanded the case for a hearing on whether the prosecution's use of all ten peremptory strikes against Black jurors violated Batson v. Kentucky. The court reasoned that recent developments, including Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. and its own decision in Tharpe v. State, required the trial court to apply additional scrutiny to determine if the strikes were racially neutral, rather than relying solely on the final jury composition.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Keith Leroy Tharpe's convictions in Jones County for malice murder and two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, for which a jury imposed the death penalty after finding three statutory aggravating circumstances. Tharpe appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, raising multiple claims including challenges to the Unified Appeal Procedure, denial of access to jury records, alleged improper communications with jurors, change of venue, and racial discrimination in the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky. The court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the evidence was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, that no reversible errors occurred in the trial court's handling of procedural or constitutional issues, that the prosecutor provided adequate race-neutral reasons for strikes, and that the death sentence was not disproportionate. The opinion reviewed the facts of Tharpe blocking the victims' vehicle, shooting his sister-in-law, kidnapping and raping his wife, and subsequent events leading to his arrest.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

Cochran was convicted of felony murder after a jury found that he and a co-defendant assaulted the victim, during which a handgun discharged and killed him. On appeal he claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel, citing counsel's appointment only two weeks before trial, failure to file any motions or jury-charge requests, lack of witness interviews, and only 45 minutes of client consultation. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that these omissions constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington and were so pervasive that prejudice could be presumed without a particularized inquiry, following Ross v. Kemp. A dissent agreed counsel was deficient but would have required the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that better preparation would have changed the outcome.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of driving under the influence based on a blood alcohol level of .22 percent and following too closely, after the jury received a charge that recited all four subsections of the DUI statute including those relating to drug influence for which no evidence was presented. The trial court declined to clarify the charge despite the jury's expressed confusion during deliberations about the multiple DUI counts and the content of Count 1. The Georgia Supreme Court held that reversal was required on the DUI conviction because the overbroad charge permitted the jury to convict on an evidentiary theory not supported by the record and was therefore confusing and misleading, while affirming that providing written jury instructions to the jury was not reversible error and rejecting prior suggestions that the practice should be prohibited.

criminal law

The case concerned a foreclosure sale under power in a security deed following the grantor's default. The grantee mailed proper notice of the sale to the grantor as required by OCGA § 44-14-162.2, but the trial court ruled that lack of actual receipt invalidated the process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that compliance with the mailing requirement alone satisfies the statute and that actual receipt by the grantor is immaterial to the grantee's right to foreclose. Prior law had required only publication notice, and the 1981 statute added the mailing step without mandating proof of delivery.

propertyprocedure

The case involved James Earl Van Alstine, who was convicted by a jury of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after shooting and killing Hal Abercrombie during a gunfight that occurred while both were driving on an interstate highway. Van Alstine appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, and the trial court's jury instructions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction under the Jackson v. Virginia standard and that the jury charge contentions lacked merit. On the ineffective assistance claim, the court followed precedent requiring an evidentiary hearing when the issue is first raised on appeal by new counsel who did not participate in the motion for new trial, and therefore remanded the case to the trial court for such a hearing while affirming the judgment of conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of L.G. Gilstrap for child molestation and aggravated child molestation, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admissibility of similar transaction evidence and reversed the conviction. The court held that evidence of events from 31 years earlier was too remote to be admissible, drawing on the rationale underlying statutes of limitations to protect against defending against charges based on distant past acts. The opinion also noted concerns about the order in which the similar transaction evidence was presented to the jury but did not resolve that issue given the remoteness holding.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a tort action for bodily injury and wrongful death in which the jury awarded $1,500,000 in compensatory damages and $14,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court applied OCGA § 51-12-5.1(g) to reduce the punitive damages to $250,000 per plaintiff against each defendant. The Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted the statutory term “case” to mean that the $250,000 cap limits the maximum punitive damages awardable to any single plaintiff, regardless of the number of defendants or theories of recovery arising from the same occurrence. The court reasoned that this interpretation aligns with the statute’s language and purpose, while avoiding an incentive for plaintiffs to file multiple separate actions. It affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The Littletons sued a physician and hospital for the allegedly negligent delivery of their child, who died two days after birth, seeking damages including for the mother's emotional distress. In a prior decision, the court had ruled that emotional distress recovery is unavailable in a wrongful death action but may be pursued in a separate malpractice claim for injuries to the mother's person, limited to physical injuries and any consequential emotional distress from those injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants after finding no evidence of an actionable physical injury to the mother, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, clarifying that any recovery is confined to compensation for physical injuries resulting from the alleged negligence (such as prolonged labor and vaginal delivery if a C-section should have been performed) and related emotional distress, excluding distress arising from the child's injuries.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved Ronald Mickey Shivers, who was convicted by a jury of homicide by vehicle, serious injury by vehicle, and leaving the scene of an accident, and sentenced to a term of years. On appeal, Shivers argued that OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(4) in conjunction with related statutes was unconstitutionally overbroad, but the court declined to address this claim because a constitutional attack on a criminal statute cannot be raised for the first time in a motion for new trial. The court also determined that Shivers' remaining arguments concerning the admission of evidence lacked merit and therefore affirmed the judgment.

criminal law

The case involved recall petitions filed against two Henry County commissioners alleging that they committed malfeasance and misconduct by participating in closed meetings discussing the creation of a county police department, in violation of Georgia's Open Meetings Act. The commissioners sought judicial review, and the superior court issued a permanent injunction blocking the recall process after finding the petitions legally insufficient. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that a violation of the Open Meetings Act can constitute grounds for recall under the Recall Act of 1989 if it meets the statutory definitions of malfeasance or misconduct, but that the trial court's factual findings regarding the insufficiency of the petitions were not clearly erroneous under the applicable evidentiary standards.

electionsprocedure

The case involved Peter Paul Aman, who was convicted under Georgia law (OCGA § 16-12-100(b)(8)) for knowingly possessing materials depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Aman challenged the conviction on First Amendment grounds, arguing that private possession of such materials in his home was protected under Stanley v. Georgia. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, construing the statute narrowly to cover only photographic representations of actual minors and relying on Osborne v. Ohio to hold that the state's compelling interest in protecting children from exploitation justifies prohibiting possession. The court further determined that the state law did not violate the Supremacy Clause and that the underlying search and seizure were lawful.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involved Johnnie Dee Jones, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for stabbing Randall Garvin Reeves. Jones moved for a change of venue, arguing that excessive pre-trial publicity in Lincoln County prevented a fair trial. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that the motion should have been granted under existing precedent from Berryhill v. State. The court also announced a new, less restrictive standard for future death penalty cases, requiring a change of venue upon a substantive showing of likely prejudice from extensive publicity. Other claims of error were rejected as meritless.

criminal lawprocedure