This case involved Hawaii public employee unions challenging Governor Linda Lingle's executive order imposing three-day-per-month furloughs on state workers, including teachers, to reduce labor costs; the unions claimed the order violated constitutional rights to collective bargaining, retirement benefits, and separation of powers. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the circuit court had erred in addressing the claims directly, ruling instead that the Hawaii Labor Relations Board possesses exclusive original jurisdiction over disputes arising under HRS Chapter 89 governing public-sector collective bargaining. The court reasoned that allowing plaintiffs to recast statutory labor issues as constitutional claims would frustrate the legislative intent to have the expert administrative agency decide such matters first, following its precedent in HGEA v. Lingle, and therefore vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case.
This case arose when Hawaii Governor Linda Lingle issued an executive order imposing furloughs on state employees to address a multi-billion-dollar budget shortfall caused by the global financial crisis. The Hawaii Government Employees Association sued, claiming the furloughs violated collective bargaining rights under the state constitution and constituted an unlawful unilateral change under HRS § 89-9(d). The circuit court ruled for the union and enjoined the plan, but the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated that judgment. The court held that the Hawaii Labor Relations Board possessed exclusive original jurisdiction over the statutory prohibited-practice claims, and that the lower court should have allowed the Board to resolve those issues before addressing any constitutional questions. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that jurisdictional ruling.
This case involves a motion for reconsideration filed by defendant Lawrence Corder in the Hawaii Supreme Court, seeking review of the court's November 19, 2009 opinion. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. A majority of the justices, including Nakayama, Duffy, and Recktenwald, ordered the denial without further elaboration. Justices Acoba and Moon dissented, indicating they would have granted the motion.
The case involved Lawrence Corder's conviction for two counts of violating an extended order for protection issued against him. The Intermediate Court of Appeals had vacated the convictions, finding that the family court abused its discretion by denying Corder's request for a bill of particulars without considering whether it was needed to prepare for trial and avoid surprise. The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the family court did not abuse its discretion because the charging complaint identified the specific protective order, dates, and underlying police reports, copies of which had been provided to Corder in discovery, sufficiently informing him of the alleged conduct. The court reasoned that this information allowed Corder to prepare his defense without additional particulars.
The case involves an application for a writ of certiorari filed by Sunstone Realty Partners XIV, LLC against Kona Village Realty, Inc. in the Hawaii Supreme Court. The court dismissed the application without prejudice because the Intermediate Court of Appeals had not yet entered its judgment on appeal, which is a prerequisite under Hawaii Revised Statutes § 602-59(a) and HRAP Rule 36(b)(1). The dismissal allows the petitioners to refile the application after the judgment is entered, in accordance with the timing rules in HRAP Rule 40.1(a). This ruling ensures that certiorari petitions are filed only after the intermediate appellate process is complete.
This case concerns an application for a writ of certiorari filed in the Hawaii Supreme Court in a matter styled In the Interest of A.W. The court dismissed the application without prejudice because no judgment on appeal had yet been entered by the Intermediate Court of Appeals. The dismissal rests on Hawai`i Revised Statutes § 602-59(a) and Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 36(b)(1), which require entry of that judgment before a certiorari application may be filed. The order notes that the petitioner may refile within the 90-day period allowed by HRAP Rule 40.1(a) once the judgment is entered.