The two consolidated cases concerned negligence claims against the County of Hawaii: one alleging that a hospital employee negligently mismatched blood for a paying patient who died from the resulting reaction, and the other alleging that a park caretaker negligently allowed a beach bonfire that severely burned a child. The trial court had distinguished between "governmental" functions (park maintenance, immune) and "proprietary" functions (hospital operation for fees, not immune). On appeal the court held that the traditional governmental-proprietary distinction no longer controls municipal tort liability. It ruled that the county owes a duty of ordinary care both when operating a hospital and when maintaining a public park, regardless of whether the activity generates revenue or is imposed by statute, and therefore affirmed the order allowing the hospital suit while reversing the dismissal of the park suit.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued the Treasurer of the Territory of Hawaii (along with others) seeking payment from the land registration assurance fund for the alleged loss of his interest in Honolulu property. The plaintiff claimed the loss stemmed from the land court examiner's negligence in failing to note on the certificate of title that he was a minor at the time of inheritance and registration in 1939, despite having used adult names and representations in transactions including mortgages and a power of attorney. The trial court ruled for the defendant treasurer, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the statutory claim against the fund requires the plaintiff to first exhaust remedies against other parties and to demonstrate an absence of his own negligence, but evidence showed the plaintiff's negligence in the registration process, and he had not pursued available remedies such as repudiating the deed as a minor.
In this case, plaintiffs sought to quiet title to a parcel of land in Honolulu against the adjoining defendant's claims to ownership of a disputed 1,854-square-foot corner area and to a roadway easement for vehicular access across plaintiffs' property. The trial court dismissed both parties' title claims to the disputed area and ruled for the defendant on the easement, but the Supreme Court reversed. The court held that neither party established clear title to the disputed parcel and that the defendant failed to prove a prescriptive easement, as the evidence showed the roadway use began as permissive, involved rent payments for nine years, and included an agreement to remove an obstructing stone, all of which prevented the adverse, non-permissive use required for prescription.
This case involved a lawsuit by the widow and minor children of Joseph Kamanu, who was killed in a tunnel cave-in while working for the defendant employer on a public construction project; the plaintiffs sought damages under a claimed Hawaiian common-law right of action for wrongful death, including loss of support and companionship, plus punitive damages. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the Workmen's Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy and barred other claims. The court sustained the dismissal, holding that although Hawaii recognized a common-law wrongful death action distinct from English common law, the Workmen's Compensation Act's language and purpose expressly excluded all other remedies for employees and their dependents in work-related injuries. The reasoning emphasized the Act's clear text making compensation rights exclusive, its goal of substituting predictable liability for litigation, and a related statute confirming that dependents could not pursue employer actions outside the compensation scheme.
The case involved plaintiffs suing defendants Johnson and Mimura, as individuals and an alleged unregistered partnership doing business as Johnson Soil Company, for breach of an oral then written contract to rent a trailer for six months after plaintiffs paid $600 but received neither the trailer nor a refund. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found a partnership existed between the defendants, that Mimura was bound by the contract, and awarded plaintiffs $5,200 in damages including lost profits from a separate hauling contract with Clarke-Halawa Rock Company that plaintiffs could not fulfill without the trailer. On appeal by Mimura only, the court affirmed, holding there was conclusive evidence of the partnership and Mimura's participation, and that consequential damages for lost profits were recoverable because the defendants knew at contracting that plaintiffs intended to use the trailer for the specific hauling job and could not readily obtain a substitute.
This case was a dispute between a lawyer and a doctor client over payment for legal services rendered in defending a malpractice suit. After the lawyer billed $5,000 (later reduced to $2,500), the client sent a $450 bank draft marked "paid in full," referencing a prior $50 retainer and asserting it completed the fee under their alleged agreement; the lawyer cashed the draft but claimed a remaining balance. The court held that cashing a check tendered in full payment of a disputed claim constitutes an accord and satisfaction, as the recipient has only two options: return the check or accept it with the attached condition. The judgment for the lawyer was reversed on this ground, rendering it unnecessary to decide whether substituting the lawyer for his collection agency as plaintiff was proper.
