Alfred Budge

In Stearns v. Strom, the plaintiff, suing as a special administrator, failed at trial to prove his qualifications under Idaho Code Ann. § 15-366 by showing that his appointment remained valid and unrevoked. The defendant moved for nonsuit under Idaho Code Ann. § 7-705(5), which the trial court granted; the resulting judgment included the phrase “without prejudice,” from which the plaintiff appealed. The dissenting opinion concludes that the statute renders any such dismissal a bar to refiling the same claim, rendering the added phrase surplusage that formed no part of a valid judgment and therefore provided no basis for appeal. The dissent further notes that a 1931 statutory amendment changed prior practice allowing nonsuits without prejudice and urges dismissal of the appeal.

procedure

The case involved a property owner who sought a writ of mandate to compel the county treasurer to accept payment of back taxes and issue a redemption deed for land acquired by the county via tax deed in 1936. The trial court quashed the writ, but the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that the owner's redemption rights were governed by the 1935 version of the relevant tax statute (sec. 61-1023, I.C.A., as amended by Chapter 101, Sess.Laws 1935) rather than the 1947 amendment. The court reasoned that redemption procedures and timelines are determined by the law in effect when the county obtained title, the 1947 changes were not retroactive under Idaho Code section 70-101, and the county still held the property subject to redemption at the time of the owner's application. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the writ.

propertytaxesprocedure

In State v. Kenworthy, the defendant was convicted of grand larceny for stealing saddles, blankets, and other items from the Palmer Implement Company store. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the information, arguing it failed to allege ownership by a legal entity capable of owning property and did not adequately describe the stolen items. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that under state statutes like sec. 19-1315, I.C.A., and relevant precedents, it was sufficient to allege ownership in the company name without specifying its corporate or partnership status, and any variances did not prejudice the defendant. The court also upheld the jury's rejection of the defendant's explanation for possessing the property, finding sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a default judgment entered against the defendant circus company that included an award of punitive damages, followed by the trial court's decision to vacate the default and allow the case to proceed on the merits. The opinion concurs that the punitive damages portion of the judgment is void because no such damages were alleged in the complaint itself, only in the prayer for relief, depriving the court of jurisdiction to award them. It dissents from the reversal of the order vacating the default judgment, reasoning that default judgments are disfavored and that the trial court has broad statutory discretion under sec. 5-905, I.C.A., to set them aside for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect when shown by affidavits, with the policy favoring resolution on the merits and deference to the trial court's exercise of that discretion absent clear abuse. Numerous prior Idaho decisions and analogous Montana authority are cited to support upholding the trial court's action in granting relief.

procedure

The case concerned whether a foreign life insurance company authorized to do business in Idaho owed state income tax on profits from selling real estate acquired through mortgage foreclosures in 1943 and 1944. The court held that the company was not liable for income tax on those profits. The decision rested on a specific statute defining gross income for life insurance companies as limited to interest, dividends, and rents arising in Idaho, which had not been amended or repealed by later general income tax provisions. The court rejected the state's argument that the tax was an excise or that general amendments imposed liability on real estate sales, noting that life insurance companies are specially regulated and that the statute tracked federal law excluding capital gains.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a tort action by one brother against another alleging unauthorized sale and conversion of cattle originally derived from a heifer purchased by the plaintiff as a minor, with the proceeds retained by the defendant. The court affirmed judgment for the defendant, ruling that the statute of limitations barred the claim. The core reasoning was that the defendant had exercised peaceable, open, notorious, and exclusive possession of the cattle under claim of right for a period exceeding the statutory limit following a 1934 foreclosure sale and related events, which started the limitations clock and transferred superior title to him despite the disputed origins of ownership.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure