In this workers' compensation case, Dan Hustead suffered a total and permanent disability from a work-related injury in 1930 while employed by H. E. Brown Timber Co., but an initial summary award by the Industrial Accident Board granted him only $40 based on reports indicating a minor, temporary injury. Hustead later filed a new application for full benefits, which the board granted; the district court reversed on jurisdictional grounds, holding that any further relief required a petition showing a change in condition under I.C.A. sec. 43-1407 rather than a separate proceeding. Hustead then filed such a petition, and after hearings the board awarded compensation for total permanent disability, a decision upheld by the district court. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the prior district court judgment was not res judicata because it addressed only the board's lack of jurisdiction over the new application and did not resolve the merits, and that the evidence supported a change in condition permitting modification of the original award.
This case concerns an application for a writ of review after the district court denied a motion to dismiss an appeal from the justice's court and overruled a demurrer, remanding the matter for trial. The Idaho Supreme Court granted the writ, reversed the district court's order, and instructed it to dismiss the appeal from the justice's court. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because an order sustaining a demurrer is not appealable without a final judgment and because no appeal bond was filed. Plaintiff had no other plain remedy by appeal or prohibition since the case had already been remanded.
The case involved a challenge to a city's general ad valorem tax levied on all property within its limits to cover shortfalls from unpaid special assessments in an improvement district and to guarantee related municipal bonds. The dissenting opinion concluded that the tax was valid and did not violate due process under the federal or state constitutions. The reasoning stressed that general taxes differ from special assessments, follow standard statutory procedures for notice and collection that satisfy due process, apply uniformly without discrimination, and serve a public purpose even if they incidentally benefit private parties. The dissent maintained that no additional individualized notice was required beyond the usual tax levy process and that the majority had misapplied due process principles.
The case involved owners of farm property who obtained a mutual fire insurance policy on outbuildings from Bingham County Farmers' Mutual Insurance Company and claimed that the company's secretary orally agreed to add coverage for their dwelling without a new written application once an existing policy expired. After the dwelling was destroyed by fire and the company denied liability for lack of a written policy, the plaintiffs sued the company and secretary for negligence in failing to issue the policy. The trial court entered a verdict against the company (but not the secretary), and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the mutual company's organization under statutes requiring written policies only for signing members did not exempt it from the established rule allowing tort recovery for an agent's negligent failure to issue an agreed policy, as the agent had violated company bylaws without fault by the member.
The case involved Fred Copenbarger's conviction for second-degree murder, where the prosecution's evidence included the defendant's admissions to police claiming self-defense along with physical facts suggesting the victim was shot in the back. On appeal, the court examined jury instructions regarding the statutory presumption of malice under C.S. sec. 8952, which shifts the burden to the defendant to prove mitigation or justification once a homicide by the defendant is shown, unless the state's proof tends to indicate manslaughter or justification. The court held that the instructions contained reversible error in applying this presumption and the burden of proof, particularly given the exculpatory elements in the state's case, and therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court also addressed but did not find error in the admission of certain experimental evidence on gunshot wounds.
The case involved a dispute among former stockholders and officers of the Consumers Oil Company over the handling of assigned accounts receivable that served as a 90-day guaranty under a 1929 asset sale contract to the Utah Oil Refining Company. Schlieff, as a statutory trustee, alleged conversion against multiple defendants after the Utah company reassigned the accounts to related entities for collection, claiming the transfers were unlawful and entitled him to the accounts' face value. The court held that the assignments for collection purposes did not constitute conversion, as they were consistent with the original guaranty arrangement and involved no wrongful dominion inconsistent with the owners' rights, and affirmed dismissal as to Bistline, Tarr, and the collection entities. It reversed and remanded only as to the Utah Oil Refining Company, directing the trial court to settle the full accounting of collections, offsets, and amounts due under the contract.