The case involved James Ballard, who pleaded guilty to attempted manufacture of a controlled substance pursuant to a plea agreement that included dismissal of other charges and a sentencing recommendation cap. After failing to appear for sentencing and remaining at large for nearly three years, Ballard moved to withdraw his guilty plea upon recapture, but the district court denied the motion due to prejudice to the prosecution and sentenced him to a fixed 15-year term. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered after proper inquiry by the trial court, and that denial of withdrawal under I.C.R. 33(c) was not an abuse of discretion.
This case involved a condominium lot owner who sued the homeowners association after it settled claims for unpaid assessments against a bank that had foreclosed on multiple lots in the development, rather than pursuing full collection through litigation. The magistrate court awarded the association delinquent assessments and attorney fees while denying fees to the plaintiff, and the district court affirmed on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the judgments, reasoning that the association's decisions to negotiate and settle were reasonable given uncertainties over the bank's liability due to the priority of its deeds of trust and potential offsets for maintenance costs, and that the plaintiff had not shown the association breached its duties. The court also addressed related claims regarding the enforceability of the covenants post-foreclosure and the plaintiff's standing in the matter.
In this case, International Equipment Service (IES) leased an industrial building from Pocatello Industrial Park Company (PIPCO) under an agreement requiring PIPCO to maintain the roof, with both parties waiving recovery rights to the extent of insurance coverage. After PIPCO employees damaged IES property during roof repairs, the insurer AFI paid IES and sued PIPCO as subrogee for negligence. IES had unpaid rent discharged in bankruptcy, which PIPCO sought to offset against any damages. The trial court allowed the setoff of the discharged rent debt plus interest against the jury's negligence award to AFI, resulting in no recovery for AFI, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that bankruptcy discharge bars affirmative collection but permits equitable setoff where claims accrued pre-bankruptcy and subrogation creates mutuality of parties.
The case involved a worker's compensation claim by Harry Horner against his employer Ponderosa Pine Logging and its insurer for benefits related to a heart attack he suffered in July 1981 while working as a logger in high-altitude terrain in Idaho. The Industrial Commission denied the claim, finding that the claimant's work did not cause the heart attack. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed this decision, reasoning that medical evidence from cardiologists indicated the heart attack resulted from a pre-existing coronary artery disease process rather than the physical labor or altitude, although the work may have precipitated symptoms like angina. The court noted that the Commission was not required to accept the opinions of the claimant's attending physicians over other expert testimony.
This case involves a claim for unemployment compensation by Donald Cornwell, who was terminated from his position as a deputy sheriff with the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office after improperly entering a private residence while on duty. The Industrial Commission denied his request for benefits, finding that he had been discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment under Idaho Code § 72-1366(e). The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the denial, noting that the factual findings were undisputed and that the commission correctly applied the statute to determine that Cornwell's actions constituted misconduct. The court emphasized its limited review to questions of law in such appeals.
In Farber v. Howell, plaintiffs sought a deficiency judgment after purchasing property at a deed of trust sale for less than the amount owed on a promissory note from defendants. After defendants' attorneys withdrew with an order requiring them to appear or appoint new counsel within twenty days, plaintiffs obtained a default order without the required notice, later amended their complaint to add attorney fees, and secured a default judgment when defendants did not respond. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to set aside the judgment. It held that the first default order was voidable for violating I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)'s three-day notice requirement to parties who had appeared, the withdrawal order lacked language waiving further notice, and the duty to answer the amended complaint did not eliminate the notice obligation.