William McKendree Morgan

This case involved a divorce action between a husband and wife, each of whom owned separate real property before marriage; the husband sought divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty, and the wife cross-complained on the same ground while also contesting property rights and seeking alimony. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, confirmed the parties' pre-marriage real estate as separate property, classified an 80-acre parcel purchased after marriage as the husband's separate property (subject to reimbursement of $2,000 in community funds used to pay a mortgage), divided the remaining community assets and debts equally, and awarded the wife temporary alimony of $110 per month followed by permanent alimony of $50 per month. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that income from separate property remains separate and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount or duration of alimony given the parties' circumstances and the statutory directive to consider their respective financial situations. The court rejected the wife's claim that the purchased land had become community property and found the alimony award adequate under the governing statute.

family lawproperty

This case arose from a head-on car collision allegedly caused by the defendants' negligent driving around a curve, which killed Jeannette Hepp and destroyed her husband's vehicle. Her surviving husband and one daughter sued the owners and driver of the other car for damages, including loss of companionship and funeral expenses under Idaho's wrongful death statute, while the other daughter was named as a defendant after refusing to join. The jury awarded the husband $10,525 and the daughter $1,500; on appeal, the defendants challenged jury instructions and claimed the verdicts were excessive. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the instructions correctly stated the law, that no prejudicial error occurred, and that the damage awards did not reflect passion, prejudice, or abuse of discretion.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a claim for workers' compensation by an employee injured while repairing buildings owned by his employer, Mrs. Smith, doing business as Blue Arrow Cafe. The Industrial Accident Board awarded compensation to the claimant, but the State Insurance Fund appealed, asserting among other points that the employment was casual and therefore excluded from coverage. Under Idaho Code Annotated sec. 43-904, casual employment is not covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Law unless the employer has elected in writing to apply the law's provisions. The court found the employment was irregular and contingent on uncertain repair needs, with the employee also working for others, and that no such election had been made. It therefore held the employment casual, reversed the award, and did not address the remaining assignments of error.

labor & employment

The case involved a workers' compensation claim filed after employee Kaonis died suddenly from heart failure while performing strenuous log-decking duties for Ohio Match Company following a period of inactivity. The majority of the court denied compensation on the grounds that the death was not shown to be caused by an accident arising out of employment. This dissenting opinion argues for reversal and an award, reasoning that under Idaho precedents an unexpected death during habitual but physically demanding work qualifies as a compensable accident if employment exertion aggravated a latent condition, and that proof of causation need only meet a preponderance standard rather than exclude all other possibilities.

labor & employment

In this case, a worker was injured when a saw log fell on him while he was loading a truck and sought workers' compensation benefits from a lumber company and its surety, along with related medical providers, alleging the injury occurred during his employment. The industrial accident board found that the worker was an independent contractor rather than an employee and denied the claim. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the board's order on appeal, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of independent contractor status based on conflicting testimony about who arranged the work and payment terms. The court further reasoned that independent contractors are not entitled to benefits under the state's workmen's compensation law.

labor & employment

The case involved a widow seeking workers' compensation benefits after her husband died in an accident on June 24, 1941, while working on cedar pole production for Cook Cedar Company. The Industrial Accident Board denied the claim after finding that the deceased was not an employee but part of a partnership acting as an independent contractor. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the evidence established the deceased and his partner entered an agreement to manufacture and deliver poles, received advances from the company for expenses and labor, employed other workers, and operated without company control over the work methods. Because the deceased was determined to be an independent contractor rather than an employee, no compensation was available under the workmen's compensation law. The court found it unnecessary to address other issues raised on appeal.

labor & employment

In Johnson v. Green, a laundry worker sought workers' compensation benefits after experiencing abdominal pain while lifting wet clothes on the job in March 1941, claiming it caused a new hernia at the site of prior surgical scars. The Industrial Accident Board denied the claim, finding the disability stemmed from a preexisting weak abdominal wall rather than any workplace accident, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the denial. The court explained that state law requires a claimant to prove a hernia resulted from an on-the-job accident, appeared suddenly and immediately afterward, did not exist beforehand, and was reported within thirty days, but the evidence showed neither a sudden onset tied to a specific incident nor causation by employment duties. The worker's testimony described pain after loading an extractor but did not establish the required elements, distinguishing the case from prior precedents where hernias appeared immediately after heavy lifting.

labor & employment

The case involved the interpretation of Idaho Code sections 14-405 and 14-406, which set inheritance tax rates on property transfers to lineal ancestors and similar beneficiaries. The court held that the statutes impose progressive rates applied to valuation brackets: two percent on the clear value up to $25,000 after exemptions, four percent on the excess value up to $50,000, and six percent on the excess value up to $100,000. The reasoning focused on the plain statutory language, which repeatedly refers to taxing the "excess" in each successive bracket rather than applying a single rate to the entire transfer. This interpretation resolved a disagreement over whether the higher rates applied only to amounts above the initial threshold or to the whole value once thresholds were crossed.

taxes

In Malcolm v. Hanmer, the court denied a petition for rehearing. Judge Morgan joined the denial order but disagreed with issuing an accompanying opinion on the petition. The core reasoning is that rehearing petitions often contain heated language from frustrated counsel after a loss, making further court commentary unnecessary unless the decision is being modified, as it risks perpetuating resentment without changing the outcome and that all parties should exercise caution in their words.

procedure

The case concerned liability arising from a traffic incident in which the appellant attempted to pass the respondent’s truck under particular circumstances. The main opinion stated that a driver attempting such a passage should be held to a high degree of care. In this concurrence, Justice Morgan agrees with the result reached by the majority but disagrees with any suggestion that the applicable standard requires more than the care a reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar conditions. He therefore concurs in the opinion provided the language is not interpreted to impose an elevated duty beyond ordinary prudence.

torts & liability

In this habeas corpus proceeding, Albert Bates challenged his imprisonment following a conviction for grand larceny as a persistent violator of law, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the magistrate had held him to answer only on the persistent violator charge rather than grand larceny. The court affirmed the denial of the writ and Bates's remand to custody. It reasoned that the district court was a competent criminal court with jurisdiction over Bates and the charged offense of grand larceny, that any irregularity in the magistrate's order was waived by not raising it via a timely motion to quash before plea, and that the persistent violator allegation affected only sentencing, not the existence of a crime.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether newspaper route carriers working under contracts with publishing companies like Idaho Times Publishing Co. qualified as employees under Idaho's Unemployment Compensation Law, requiring the companies to make contributions to the unemployment fund, or as independent contractors exempt from such obligations. The dissent concluded that the companies failed to satisfy the statutory exemption requirements, specifically that the carriers were customarily engaged in independently established trades or businesses, despite evidence of freedom from control. The core reasoning emphasized that the 1939 Unemployment Compensation Law provided a broader definition of covered employment than common law, placing the burden on the companies to prove all exemption elements, and that the evidence presented was insufficient to show the carriers operated independent businesses beyond their work for the publishers.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a lawsuit by Orissa M. George (later substituted by her guardian Myrtle H. Chamberlin) to void a deed of gift conveying real property and an accompanying contract, on grounds that she lacked mental capacity to understand the documents due to age, illness, and grief, and that the defendants knowingly procured them through fraud without consideration. The trial court, after hearing lay witness testimony on her condition, found her incompetent at the time of execution and entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint was legally sufficient, that non-expert opinion testimony was properly admitted, and that substantial evidence supported the findings of incapacity and lack of consideration despite conflicting evidence.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Paul Dehlin for injuries sustained while operating a wood saw in the yard of Lloyd Lumber Company. The Industrial Accident Board denied the claim against the company and its insurer, State Insurance Fund, but awarded compensation against Sid Shuck and Robert Foster, and later denied Shuck's motion for an additional hearing based on newly discovered evidence. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the board's order and award, directing it to reopen the case for further hearings. The court reasoned that the board has a duty to ensure all available material evidence is presented, including testimony from additional witnesses to conversations about insurance coverage and evidence regarding the ownership of the wood being processed, before determining liability.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether Carstens Packing Co. was required to pay unemployment compensation contributions for workers at its Idaho feed lots who fattened cattle, sheep, and hogs for market, some of which came from the company's Montana ranch and some of which were purchased locally. The Industrial Accident Board had ordered only a partial refund, treating services for purchased livestock as covered employment but exempting those for the company's own raised livestock as agricultural labor. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed and directed a full refund of the $2,023.39 paid under protest. It held that all the feeding and fattening work qualified as exempt agricultural labor under the Unemployment Compensation Law because the nature of the services performed, not the ownership history of the animals or the precise location of the feed lots, determines the classification.

labor & employmenttaxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns whether labor performed on vegetables and other produce, including items received by the appellant on consignment, qualifies as agricultural labor exempt from unemployment compensation taxes under state law. The opinion agrees with the Chief Justice except on the consignment issue, concluding that all described labor is agricultural and therefore not covered employment subject to the excise tax. The justice also addresses the court's jurisdiction over appeals from the Industrial Accident Board, noting serious doubts about its authority and the potential lack of binding effect in such cases.

labor & employmenttaxesbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a dispute over possession of real property in Blaine County, Idaho, following foreclosure of a mortgage. Florence L. Shepherd purchased approximately eight acres described in her initial deed from Leflang as Tax Lot No. 1421 (part of Lot 5), but the description omitted the portion containing her dwelling on Lot 6; after mortgaging the property to Merritt, she obtained a quitclaim deed from Leflang to correct the defect. Merritt foreclosed, Booth purchased the property at the sheriff's sale, and after receiving the deed she sought a writ of assistance for possession, which Shepherd resisted. The court affirmed the order granting the writ, holding that the quitclaim deed cured the original defect and that title acquired thereby inured to the benefit of the mortgagee as security for the debt.

property

This case involves a dispute over a 1939 Idaho law amending Boise City's charter to lower the fee paid to Ada County for assessing and collecting city taxes from 1.5 percent to 0.5 percent. The dissenting opinion contends that the amendment violates Article III, Section 19 of the Idaho Constitution, which bars local or special laws on the assessment and collection of taxes or the duties of county and city officers. The core reasoning rests on the existence of a prior general law (Idaho Code Annotated § 61-814) setting the 1.5 percent rate for all cities, making the charter-specific change an impermissible special law rather than a valid amendment. The dissent emphasizes that the 1901 general law and constitutional restrictions were intended to ensure uniform treatment for tax collection services across the state.

taxes

This case concerned a breach of contract action filed by E. V. Cleek against Virginia Gold Mining and Milling Company in Idaho state court. The company attempted to appear and file pleadings through a Utah attorney not licensed to practice in Idaho, with the name of a local Idaho attorney also listed on some documents; after the local attorney died, no replacement Idaho counsel appeared, leading the trial court to strike the filings, enter default, and award judgment to the plaintiff. The company later moved to vacate the default and judgment under statutes allowing relief for excusable neglect or attorney errors, and the trial court granted relief, but the Idaho Supreme Court reversed on appeal. The court reasoned that the company's officers had notice of the need for proper local counsel yet failed to act due to inexcusable negligence, and the relevant relief statutes applied only to licensed Idaho attorneys and parties without default. The decision emphasized that out-of-state attorneys cannot practice in Idaho without associating qualified local counsel.

procedure

This case involved a member of the Idaho House of Representatives who sought a recommendatory judgment from the state supreme court directing payment of a $5 claim for lodging and subsistence expenses incurred during the 1941 legislative session under Chapter 73 of the 1941 Session Laws. The court held that the plaintiff had no right to reimbursement and dismissed the action. The core reasoning was that the Idaho Constitution, Article III, § 23, limits legislative compensation to a maximum per diem of $5 per day for services plus mileage, with no provision for additional expenses; the appropriation act did not expressly grant any such right and could not be construed to do so without violating the prohibition on special laws under Article III, § 19. The court noted that the existing statute implementing the constitutional per diem remained in effect and governed all legislators.

procedure