This case involved an appeal from a conviction under C.S. sec. 8438 for knowingly buying or receiving stolen personal property for the defendant's gain or to prevent the owner from regaining possession. The defendant challenged the information as duplicitous for alleging both statutory intents conjunctively, argued that evidence was obtained through an unlawful search of a barn owned by his mother, and claimed a variance because the proof might support burglary or larceny instead. The court held that the statute creates a single offense that can be charged with both intents, that the mother's consent validated the search given the defendant's subservient possession, and that evidence of receiving at least some of the property after it was stolen supported the conviction without variance. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.
This case involved a workers' compensation claim brought by the state on behalf of the Industrial Accident Board to recover $1,000 after an employee of Clearwater Timber Co. was killed in a train collision while driving to work across a public railroad crossing. The district court denied the claim, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that the fatal injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment because the employee was traveling on a public highway and crossing over which the employer had no control, and the risk was one shared by the general public rather than a hazard peculiar to the job. The opinion distinguished cases involving private ways or employer-invited routes and followed the majority rule that public-road dangers do not qualify for compensation absent special circumstances making the exposure abnormal. The judgment in favor of the employer was therefore upheld.
The case involved a Montana building and loan association seeking to foreclose a first mortgage on Idaho real estate after default on monthly payments under a note that included interest and premium. The second mortgage holder defended and cross-claimed, alleging the contract was usurious under Idaho law and seeking to apply prior payments to principal only. The court held that a junior lienholder has standing to raise usury due to statutory rights to redeem the property and subrogate to the senior lien. It ruled the note was governed by Idaho law rather than Montana's and was usurious because the effective interest rate exceeded ten percent, but found the second mortgagee could not recover or offset prior interest payments made by the original borrowers. The judgment was modified to eliminate interest on the remaining principal and reduce attorney's fees from $370 to $200.
The case involved an appeal from a conviction as a persistent violator of the Prohibition Law, challenging the denial of a motion in arrest of judgment, the denial of a motion for new trial, and the admission of evidence from a search warrant. The court affirmed the judgment, ruling that the motion in arrest was untimely under statute and not properly raised on appeal from the judgment alone, while the appeal did not encompass the motion for new trial. On the evidence issue, the court held that objections to the search warrant and resulting evidence were not made in a timely manner, as the defendant knew of the search from the outset but waited until mid-trial to raise concerns about its validity or return. The court further found sufficient evidence supported the verdict and that the trial court acted within its discretion in permitting the state to briefly reopen its case to introduce proof of a prior conviction.
This case involved an appeal from a trial court's order denying a motion for new trial after the court had granted judgment to defendant Lewiston National Bank at the close of the plaintiff's evidence in a non-jury trial. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the motion was premature and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The core reasoning was that, under C.S. secs. 6887, 6888, and 6890, the "decision" that starts the ten-day period for filing a new trial motion in a court-tried case is the written findings of fact and conclusions of law, not an earlier oral announcement granting judgment; precedents confirmed that premature motions fail to comply with the statutory requirements.
The case concerns the application of the statute of limitations to an action seeking recovery on a promissory note, specifically addressing when the limitations period begins and whether it was tolled or restarted by certain actions. The opinion agrees that the period started running from the date of the note and that interest payments made by White did not suspend the statute as to defendant Kasiska. It differs, however, by finding that letters in the record amounted to an adequate acknowledgment of the debt sufficient to prevent the limitations period from expiring before suit was filed, and therefore concludes the judgment should be affirmed.
