This case involved criminal charges against the chief justice of the Chicago municipal court for alleged conspiracies to obstruct justice and defraud the county and city, as well as malfeasance related to the vacation of judgments and forfeiture of bail bonds. The defendant filed verified pleas in bar asserting that the acts were judicial duties performed honestly and in good faith, exempting him from indictment, and after the prosecution joined issue with answers denying good faith, the trial court heard evidence, sustained the pleas, and discharged the defendant. The Appellate Court reversed, treating the pleas as motions to quash and directing retrial under pleas of not guilty. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and affirmed the discharge, holding that the factual issues of honesty and good faith had been fully litigated and resolved in the defendant's favor, making a retrial on the same facts under a not guilty plea a violation of double jeopardy, and that the People had no right to appeal since the ruling was not based solely on the sufficiency of the indictments.
In Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., the plaintiff, a construction worker, sued Commonwealth Edison and its engineering consultant Sargent & Lundy after being injured when a scaffold broke and fell during remodeling work at an Edison power plant; the scaffold had been erected by the plaintiff's employer under contracts that required compliance with the Illinois Structural Work Act (Scaffold Act). The trial court directed a verdict for Sargent and a jury found for Edison, judgments that the Appellate Court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed both judgments and remanded for a new trial, holding that the Act imposes liability on those who retain the right to supervise or control the work (even if not exercised), consistent with the statute's text and common-law principles, and that the trial court had wrongly quashed a subpoena for relevant documents. The court rejected the argument that only those who physically erect a scaffold can be liable under the Act.
This case involved a school board seeking to enjoin a union and its members, who were custodial employees, from striking and picketing schools in support of demands for a collective bargaining agreement. The trial court denied the injunction and dismissed the complaint, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to grant the injunction. The court held that public employees have no right to strike against a governmental employer, making the strike unlawful, and that peaceful picketing undertaken to support such an unlawful strike could be enjoined because it was not equivalent to protected free speech. The decision emphasized that the picketing disrupted school operations, including attendance, deliveries, maintenance, and transportation, thereby interfering with the state's constitutional duty to provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools. The court distinguished precedents protecting picketing by noting the overriding public interest in uninterrupted education and the unlawful purpose here.
In People v. Cullotta, the defendant was convicted by a jury in Du Page County of burglarizing a television shop, with the conviction affirmed by the Appellate Court. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the judgments, holding that the evidence failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The core reasoning centered on the vague and uncertain identification of the defendant by police officers based on fleeting views from moving patrol cars under poor conditions, the lack of corroboration for an alleged accomplice statement implicating the defendant, and the presence of plausible alibi evidence.
This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Barbara Sanders against Johnson & Johnson for a back injury sustained while lifting a heavy roll of gauze at work on September 6, 1961, which allegedly caused sciatic neuritis and permanent partial loss of use of her right leg. The Industrial Commission denied benefits on the ground that claimant failed to prove an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment, but the circuit court reversed that decision and reinstated the arbitrator's award. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that the Commission's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence because claimant's testimony about the work incident was corroborated by co-workers, supported by uncontradicted medical opinions on causation, and consistent with her compensation claim despite some inconsistencies in symptom reporting to company personnel.
In Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., homeowners sued a gas utility for property damage from a 1962 explosion caused by a break in an underground gas main. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiffs under a res ipsa loquitur theory of negligence; the appellate court reversed, holding the doctrine inapplicable. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the trial judgment, ruling that the res ipsa doctrine applied because the gas main was under the defendant's management and control and the break would not ordinarily occur absent negligence. The court further held that the inference of negligence remained for the jury to weigh against the defendant's evidence of annual inspections and possible third-party interference, and that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.