The case concerned Edward McFadden, who was arrested in Illinois under a Governor's warrant issued at Wisconsin's request for charges including possession of a machine gun for aggressive purposes and carrying concealed weapons. McFadden sought habeas corpus relief, arguing he was not a fugitive from Wisconsin justice, after federal agents had removed him from Wisconsin, taken him through Illinois and Minnesota, and later released him following an Illinois kidnapping prosecution. The criminal court dismissed the petition, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the U.S. Constitution's extradition clause, federal law, and Illinois statute, a person who commits a crime in one state and is later found in another is a fugitive regardless of how or why they left the demanding state. The court reasoned that McFadden failed to meet his burden of proving he was not physically present in Wisconsin at the time of the alleged offenses.
The case concerned two mutual insurance companies, one from Michigan and one from Ohio, both licensed in Illinois, that sought to enjoin Cook County from collecting taxes assessed on their 1930 net premium receipts under section 30 of the 1869 Fire, Marine and Inland Navigation Insurance Companies act. The companies argued that the statute did not apply to mutual insurers regulated by the 1915 Mutual Insurance act, that deductions for agency and general operating expenses should be allowed, and that the assessments violated due process and equal protection by discriminating against foreign corporations in favor of other insurers. The circuit court sustained demurrers and dismissed the bills for want of equity. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the applicability, deduction, and constitutional claims, holding that section 30 governs net receipts of foreign fire insurance agencies without expense offsets and does not create invalid classifications, but reversed the dismissals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
The case concerned a World War veteran who deposited the proceeds of a federal loan secured by his adjusted service certificate into a savings account at Stony Island State Savings Bank shortly before the bank failed. After the Auditor of Public Accounts appointed a receiver, the veteran filed an intervening petition seeking priority payment of his remaining $400 balance over other depositors, relying on federal statutes granting the United States priority in insolvency cases and exempting such loan proceeds from attachment or seizure. The trial court granted the preference, but the Appellate Court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that the deposit established an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship rather than a special deposit or trust, the federal priority statute did not apply because the United States was not a creditor in this context, and the statutory exemption against seizure did not bar the receiver from treating the account as a general claim since no legal process was directed at the veteran's funds.
In this case, the brother and sisters of a woman who died intestate sought partition of her Chicago real property, claiming an ante-nuptial agreement signed before her first marriage to the surviving husband waived all his rights to the estate. The parties had divorced after the first marriage and later remarried, living together until her death; the husband, as administrator, asserted rights including homestead, dower, and a fee interest. The court decided that the 1912 agreement governed only the first marriage and did not extend to the second, because divorce ended the prior marital relation, recording the document showed no intent regarding remarriage, and mutual assent to apply it anew was absent. Accordingly, the decree favoring the siblings was reversed, and the cause was remanded for entry of a decree granting the husband's claims under the cross-bill.
The case involved Turnverein "Lincoln," a nonprofit corporation organized for physical and mental improvement, seeking a property tax exemption for its Chicago buildings and land for 1931 on the grounds that the property was used exclusively for charitable, educational, and benevolent purposes under the Revenue Act. The board of appeals denied the exemption, finding the property taxable, and after review by the State Tax Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed that decision. The court reasoned that the organization was not primarily charitable because it derived income from profit-oriented activities such as leasing stores and a lodge hall, operating a restaurant, and charging fees to non-members for classes and facilities, and that any charitable uses were incidental rather than exclusive as required by the constitution and statute for tax exemption. Ownership by a nonprofit and some charitable activities were insufficient where the property was not devoted exclusively to such purposes.
The case People v. Callopy addressed whether Rule 27 of the Illinois Supreme Court, which bars trial judges from commenting on evidence or expressing opinions on the facts in criminal jury trials, violates the state constitution's guarantee that the right to jury trial as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate. The majority upheld the rule's validity. Justice DeYoung dissented, contending that English common law at the time of the constitution's adoption included the judge's power to comment on evidence and opine on facts as an essential attribute of jury trials, so long as the jury retained ultimate decision-making authority, and that depriving judges of this function fundamentally altered the constitutional right.
