This case involved an appeal from the dismissal of a bill seeking to set aside a deed executed by Eliza F. Sampson conveying 106 acres of real estate to Ida Pfeil shortly before Sampson's death. Appellants, who were devisees and heirs under Sampson's will, alleged the deed was made without consideration due to undue influence, mental incapacity, and a confidential relationship between grantor and grantee. The circuit court dismissed the bill for want of equity after hearing evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a fiduciary relationship existed at the time of the deed based on the confidence reposed by the enfeebled grantor in the grantee, which shifted the burden to the grantee to prove the transaction was fair and free of undue influence—a burden she failed to meet. The court remanded with directions to enter a decree setting aside the deed in accordance with the bill.
The case involved Harlan A. Kingsbury, a bank officer and director, who was indicted and convicted by a jury in Tazewell County for willfully making a false written statement about the bank's condition to the Auditor of Public Accounts, in violation of state banking law; the alleged falsity concerned unreported liabilities on certain mortgage notes that the bank had indorsed after selling them. Kingsbury was sentenced to one to ten years in prison, while a co-defendant was acquitted, and he appealed the conviction. The court reversed the judgment, holding that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the indorsements created an enforceable liability on the bank (as opposed to a prior repurchase obligation), and that improper prosecutorial arguments had likely inflamed the jury's passions rather than leading to a fair verdict based on the proof.
The case concerns the Super-Power Company of Illinois's petition to condemn a 250-foot-wide easement strip and four tower sites on the Sommers farm for a high-voltage electric transmission line, pursuant to Illinois Commerce Commission authorization, with the landowners filing a cross-petition seeking additional damages to the remainder of their 158-acre farm operated as a unit. A jury viewed the premises and awarded $28.12 for the land taken plus $2,533.02 in damages to the easement strip, resulting in a county court judgment authorizing entry upon payment. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the jury gave no weight to the company's uncontradicted valuation evidence, that damages were not limited to proper direct elements, and that an instruction erroneously allowed the jury to disregard testimony of witnesses on one side due to perceived bias or other factors.
This case arose during the liquidation of the Chicago Lawn State Bank in the superior court of Cook county, where the county collector filed petitions seeking a preferred claim for approximately $206,000 in undistributed 1929 tax deposits held by the bank, and the Constitution Indemnity Company, which had paid $101,240 on a surety bond for the collector, sought to be subrogated to those rights and to intervene as a party defendant. The superior court sustained demurrers by the receiver and collector to the indemnity company's intervening petition to join as a defendant and dismissed the petition. The Illinois Supreme Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal under section 118 of the Practice Act because the question presented was purely procedural—whether the company could intervene in the pending claims—rather than involving any right to preference, subrogation, revenue, or direct state interest, as no adjudication on the merits had occurred. The court therefore transferred the cause to the Appellate Court for the First District.
The case involved the State of Illinois seeking to collect unpaid property taxes from Spurgeon Mercantile Company, a corporation operating stores across multiple states, based on an assessment by the Cook County board of assessors that included the company's capital stock valued at $10,000 along with office furniture and cash. The circuit court entered judgment only for the taxes on the furniture and cash, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to award the full amount. The court reasoned that the board of assessors had authority to assess the capital stock without prior notice, that no fraud was alleged, and that the company could not challenge the assessment's validity or method in a tax collection action after failing to file a complaint with the board of review. The opinion emphasized that any objections to overvaluation or procedural irregularities in the assessment must be raised before the review board rather than as a defense in debt proceedings for delinquent taxes.
In this case, Lester Robinson was convicted of larceny as bailee after receiving a $1500 check from Carl Nemeth as security deposits for his sons' employment with a company controlled by Robinson, failing to return the funds when the sons left their jobs, and the trial court sentenced him to one to ten years in prison. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction on writ of error. The court held that no bailment existed because the parties intended and understood the money to be used in the business or treated like a bank deposit that would earn interest, creating a debtor-creditor relationship rather than one of bailor and bailee. As a result, the evidence did not support a finding of guilt for larceny as bailee of the check or funds.
