Frank K. Dunn

The case involved Harrison Howard, who was convicted of murder in Cook County and sentenced to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the indictment was insufficient because the transcript omitted the year of the crime and misspelled the victim's name. The court permitted the Attorney General to correct the record by submitting an amended transcript showing the proper date of 1929 and the correct victim name of Ruben Sharfman. After these corrections, the alleged defects in the indictment no longer existed. The court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over whether income from civilian rentals of state-owned armories must be deposited into the Illinois State treasury under constitutional and statutory requirements or may instead be retained and spent directly for the benefit of National Guard units. The majority affirmed the superior court's decree upholding a special handling arrangement for the funds. In dissent, Justice Dunn reasoned that the armory rentals constitute state property received by state agents, that sections 7 and 23 of article 9 and related provisions require such moneys to enter the treasury (with the 1911 act then directing them into a special fund rather than general revenue), and that prior precedent such as People v. Lippincott confirmed the General Assembly's inability to divert state taxes or fees outside the treasury once collected. The dissent concluded that the lower court should have been reversed to enforce deposit and appropriation procedures.

taxesproperty

The case concerned a challenge by the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad to a county highway tax judgment of $1103.02 entered against its property in Shelby County, Illinois, for 1931. The railroad argued that the county board's tax levy was invalid because the resolution set the tax as a rate of twelve and a half cents per $100 of assessed valuation rather than stating a fixed dollar amount. The court held that the levy failed to comply with section 121 of the Revenue Act, which requires the county board to determine and separately state the specific amount of taxes to be raised for each purpose, and with precedents interpreting that requirement. Because a percentage-based levy does not provide the definite amount information mandated by statute, the judgment was reversed.

taxesproperty

This case involved a dispute over the title to real property in Chicago, where Wojciech Klus sought to register title under the Torrens Act, and John Bialek cross-claimed to have the title registered in his name, arguing that a deed to Klus was merely a mortgage securing a debt. Other defendants claimed interests based on prior judgments, executions, and sales related to a slander lawsuit against Bialek's wife. The circuit court decreed title in Bialek after an examiner's report. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that a prior circuit court dismissal for want of equity in a suit involving the same parties and issues on the same subject matter constituted a conclusive adjudication under res judicata, binding the parties regardless of the demurrer.

propertyprocedure

This was an ejectment action brought by Louise M. Augustus to recover possession of a specific lot in Chicago, with the defendant Gustaf E. Lydig raising the twenty-year statute of limitations as a defense based on continuous adverse possession. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, finding that the Thompson family had openly enclosed, cultivated, and occupied the lot along with adjacent lots since 1892 without interruption, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that actual occupancy and use of the property for over twenty years was sufficient to establish adverse possession under the statute, regardless of fence details, adjacent homestead ownership, or tax payment records, and that certain deeds offered by the plaintiff were irrelevant to rebutting the possession claim. The opinion rejected arguments that the possessors' connection to neighboring lots created any legal disability or insufficient enclosure.

property

The case concerned the construction of Addie M. Jones's will, which created a trust over the residuary estate (including an interest in a land sale contract) for the lifetime benefit of her nephew Frank Root, with directions to distribute the remainder after his death to Roy Decker (one-third) and the Clarks or their children (two-thirds). The circuit court held that the trustee Floyd Crego took no beneficial interest and that the portions of the residue not validly disposed of passed by resulting trust to the testatrix's heirs. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the will's language created the trust solely for the stated purposes, contained no indication that the testatrix intended Crego to receive any surplus beneficially, and that failure of the trust therefore caused the property to revert to the heirs rather than vesting in the trustee. The court rejected arguments that equitable conversion or other provisions altered this outcome.

propertyfamily law