Paul Farthing

This case involved whether striking employees in the pattern shop at Caterpillar Tractor Co.'s East Peoria factory were eligible for unemployment compensation benefits under the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act. The court decided that the strikers were not entitled to benefits. The core reasoning was that the Act disqualifies benefits for unemployment due to a labor dispute causing a work stoppage at the factory where the employee worked, the strikers were voluntarily unemployed, and the pattern shop did not qualify as a separate establishment because it was a specialized department within the same premises rather than a commonly separate business.

labor & employment

This case involved a dispute among the heirs of Jackson Gregory over the partition of his 160-acre farm and personal estate after his widow, Luella Gregory, renounced his will. The sister and some nieces and nephews sought partition, with the widow filing a cross-complaint also seeking partition and the appointment of a trustee for any contingent remainders. The court held that the remainders created by the will were contingent rather than vested because the will specified distribution to brothers and sisters 'then living' after the widow's death, making it impossible to identify the takers or their shares until that time. As a result, the interests could not be partitioned immediately, and the decree was modified on appeal to sequester the life estate, appoint a trustee to manage the property or sale proceeds during the widow's lifetime, and defer distribution until her death in accordance with the will's terms.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case concerned Samuel Miner's conviction for burglary in Cook County, where he was tried alongside others and found guilty, with one co-defendant acquitted. On appeal, Miner challenged the indictment as unconstitutional and illegal, claiming its title violated the state constitution's single-subject rule and that the habitual criminal clause tried him for two offenses at once. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the indictment was valid, as the constitutional provision applied only to legislative acts, not indictment titles, and the habitual clause merely enhanced the burglary charge based on a prior conviction rather than alleging a separate crime. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction.

criminal law

This case was an appeal by school district trustees from a circuit court order approving a foreclosure sale of 12 parcels of real estate for unpaid taxes from 1929-1939 totaling over $28,000 and denying the trustees leave to object to the $12,000 winning bid. The court held that the trustees were not proper parties entitled to notice or to file objections, as the statute requires tax foreclosure suits to be brought solely in the name of the People of Illinois by the State's Attorney, with the districts being only potential beneficiaries of proceeds. It further determined that no revenue question was presented to support direct supreme court jurisdiction, since there was no dispute between a taxing authority and a taxpayer, and therefore transferred the case to the Appellate Court.

taxespropertyprocedure

A. George Miller, Inc. operated a photographic studio and disputed assessments by the Director of Labor for unemployment insurance contributions on amounts paid to models from 1937 to 1939. The Director found the company liable, the circuit court affirmed, and the appeal raised whether the models qualified as employees under the Unemployment Compensation Act. The court held that the models performed services for an employing unit within the Act's definition of employment, which is not limited to common-law master-servant relationships. The models failed to satisfy all three conjunctive exceptions in section 2(f)(5) because they were subject to direction and control and their work occurred within the usual course of the studio's business. The judgment affirming the Director's decision was therefore upheld.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a partition action filed by Ann S. Thomas, who held an undivided one-third interest in real estate in Cook County, Illinois, against co-tenant Virginia Reed Farr, who held the remaining one-third interest subject to a 99-year lease on part of the property. The lower court ordered partition by sale of the entire property free and clear of the lease, with proceeds to be distributed according to ownership shares. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that partition was available because there was no implied agreement among the co-tenants not to partition, but the sale must be made subject to the existing lease on the relevant interest. The court reasoned that a lease by one co-tenant operates separately on that share, merger had terminated the lease only as to the portion acquired by the lessees, and any distribution of sale proceeds must equitably account for the lease's effect on the relative values of the leased and unleased shares rather than treating all interests identically.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a real estate installment contract in which the seller had previously waived monthly payments but later demanded full payment of all amounts due, including taxes, within a short period after notice. The court held that the seller's subsequent declaration of forfeiture was improper because the time allowed for payment was unreasonable and the buyer was denied additional time requested to cure the default. As a result, the buyer was entitled to treat the contract as wrongfully terminated by the seller. The concurring justices concluded that the buyer's cross-complaint therefore properly stated a cause of action and should not have been stricken.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a property owner who sued the City of Chicago for $1,275 in costs incurred to shore up his building during construction of a subway and ventilating shafts in the adjacent street, claiming the work caused subsidence that damaged his property. The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the expenses qualified as compensable "damage" under the 1870 state constitution's provision requiring just compensation when private property is taken or damaged for public use, even absent a physical invasion of the land, because the construction interfered with the owner's right to undisturbed use and enjoyment of the property. It reasoned that the addition of the word "damaged" in the 1870 constitution expanded protections beyond the 1848 version, allowing recovery for substantial consequential harms from public improvements where common-law remedies would have applied absent statutory authority, and that mitigation costs reasonably incurred to prevent greater loss could be recovered as a diminution in property value.

property

The case involved a dispute over the calculation of death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the widow and minor children of John B. Calkins, who was killed in a mining accident while employed by Mielke Brothers Coal Company. The Industrial Commission awarded $5000, which the circuit court confirmed, and the coal company sought review. The court affirmed the award, holding that annual earnings should be computed under section 10 of the Act by using the stipulated seven-hour workday to determine a daily wage of $5.75, multiplying by the agreed 200-day minimum for the year, and then applying the statutory multiplier of four. This approach followed subsections (e) and (g) of section 10, which base earnings on the hours commonly regarded as a day's work and adjust the multiplier when an employer does not operate a full 300 days annually.

labor & employment

This case involved an appeal by Clarence Huizenga from a municipal court judgment requiring him to pay $516.82 in taxes and penalties under Illinois's Retailers’ Occupation Tax act for sales made between 1933 and 1938. The Department of Finance had issued a corrected assessment after Huizenga failed to file required returns, notified him of the deficiency, and finalized it when he did not request a hearing or seek review; the Department then sued in debt to collect. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Huizenga could not collaterally challenge the assessment in the debt action because he had not pursued the statutory writ of certiorari within twenty days, making the Department's findings final on both law and fact except for jurisdictional issues. Precedents established that the act's review process was the exclusive means to contest such determinations, and the Hoffman case did not render the assessment void merely due to the passage of the two-year record-keeping period.

taxesprocedure

The case involved Joseph Albanese, who was convicted by a jury in Cook County of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal based on a prior robbery conviction. Albanese appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting four revolvers into evidence that were not shown to have been used in the robbery and that there was a variance between the indictment, which alleged the money was taken from the victim's person, and the proof showing it was taken from his presence. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that any error in admitting the guns was harmless because the defendant's guilt was clearly established by witness testimony and his own admissions, and that the evidence of money taken from gaming tables in the victim's presence was sufficient to prove robbery under the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned judgment creditors who obtained an execution sale of debtors' farm property to satisfy a judgment, without first setting off the debtors' homestead exemption on the improved parcel where they resided. After the sale but before the redemption period expired or a sheriff's deed issued, the debtors moved in the original action to set aside the sale and cancel the certificate of purchase. The court decided that the trial court had authority to grant the motion and remedy the irregularity, reversing the judgments below and remanding with directions to allow the motion. It reasoned that courts retain power to control their process and correct errors in execution sales while proceedings remain pending, as established by prior Illinois cases distinguishing situations where a deed has not yet issued.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over a railroad switch track constructed on part of Fourteenth Street in an industrial district, where Greenlee Foundry Company sought a mandatory injunction against Borin Art Products Corp. to remove the track, asserting it constituted an improper private use of public property that the foundry could challenge. The majority granted relief to Greenlee, but this dissenting opinion contends that the track was built to railroad specifications, approved by the Commerce Commission and city, and integrated into the public rail system, rendering it open to public use under established precedent. The dissent reasons that only public authorities may challenge the validity of a street-use ordinance and that a private abutting owner lacks standing to seek injunctive relief absent proof of special damages different in kind from those to the general public, which Greenlee failed to establish given its alternative access routes. It further notes that prior condemnation and ejectment rulings cannot be expanded to authorize this collateral attack by a party whose fee interest is untouched.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether a plaintiff in a civil trial could question prospective jurors about any financial or other interest in the defendant's insurance company, based on an affidavit filed by counsel alleging the company's involvement in the defense and its local presence. The majority opinion held that the inquiry was not properly supported and distinguished the facts from earlier precedent, effectively limiting such voir dire examinations. Dissenting justices argued that the circumstances closely paralleled Smithers v. Henriquez, where a similar sworn affidavit was deemed sufficient to allow the questions without requiring pre-trial investigation of the jury pool, and that the ruling would undermine fair jury selection in cases involving mutual insurers. The dissent emphasized that the affidavit demonstrated good faith and that denying the right would impose unreasonable burdens or risk biased panels. Justices Farthing and Wilson dissented on these grounds.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether holders of special assessment bonds or vouchers must be joined as necessary parties in a municipality's foreclosure action on the lien of a special assessment under the Local Improvement Act. The circuit court overruled the defendant property owner's motion to dismiss for lack of necessary parties and entered a default judgment, which the defendant appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute expressly vests the lien and the right to foreclose in the municipality alone, which acts as trustee for the bondholders. The court reasoned that the Act does not grant bondholders a right to sue or be joined, that requiring joinder of often-numerous bondholders would impose an unreasonable burden, and that no evidence showed the municipality was acting in bad faith or with adverse interests.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over attorneys' liens claimed by lawyers on a judgment or settlement in a damages action against a railroad company, where the funds had been paid into court and then withdrawn by a guardian appointed for an infirm plaintiff. The majority opinion upheld the validity of an order transferring the attorneys' lien to the money held by the guardian. The dissenting judge disagreed, reasoning that Illinois common law and the Attorney's Lien Act do not create a lien on money already paid to the plaintiff or into court, that precedents such as Story v. Hull confirm the lien does not attach to the fund itself, and that a circuit court lacks authority to enter an order affecting such a lien in an action in rem.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved John W. Murray seeking to enjoin the Village of Skokie from exchanging a $1000 special assessment bond for ten $100 bonds under a 1941 village ordinance that permitted such substitutions with adjusted credits for prior payments. The trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding the ordinance as constitutional, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing entry of an injunction. The court reasoned that allowing the exchange would enable circumvention of pro rata distribution rules for collected special assessment funds established in prior cases like Friedman v. City of Chicago, thereby impairing Murray's contract rights under the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions by reducing his share in installment collections from other bondholders.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Margaret Brown, who was convicted by a jury in Cook County of larceny after allegedly stealing a woman's coat from a Waukegan store and selling it in Chicago. Brown challenged the conviction on grounds that the corpus delicti was not established, a store stock-book record was improperly admitted, and certain statements at trial were prejudicial. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the oral confession was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence including the buyer's testimony, the coat's identification, and Brown's own statements to police, that any error in admitting the stock record was harmless, and that objections to the statements had been sustained with no reversible prejudice shown.

criminal lawprocedure

Plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago to enjoin enforcement of a 1938 zoning amendment that reclassified their lot from an apartment district to a residence district, barring use of the building as a two-family dwelling. The circuit court granted the injunction, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. The court held that the restriction was arbitrary and unreasonable as applied because the ordinance permitted auxiliary uses such as roomers and boarders, allowed various non-residential R-2 and R-4 uses on the lot due to its adjacency to nonconforming uses, and the surrounding area already included apartments and mixed development; the change would not alter the building's exterior or affect neighboring values. The decision rested on due-process and confiscatory-taking grounds under the state and federal constitutions.

property

The case concerned a dispute over ownership of oil and gas rights in a 40-acre tract in Lawrence County, Illinois, following a 1920 voluntary partition of 215 acres among the heirs of James Updike. The plaintiffs, some of the heirs, claimed that the partition deeds had severed the oil and gas rights from the surface, so that a 1928 mortgage by one heir (W.E. Updike) on the tract without any reservation conveyed only the surface, and subsequent foreclosure and sale to the defendants Mark and Cassie Smith did not transfer the oil and gas interests. The court held that the partition left the heirs as tenants in common of the oil and gas rights, and that W.E. Updike's mortgage of the land by government description without reservation conveyed both the surface and his undivided one-fifth interest in the oil and gas. The core reasoning was that a deed conveying land without exception passes all interests below the surface unless an intent to retain them is expressed, and the cited precedents on severance did not apply because they involved different facts about full ownership of the mineral rights. The court affirmed denial of the request to quiet title against the Smiths but reversed the dismissal of the complaint and remanded for an accounting of royalties held by the Ohio Oil Company.

property