Thomas R. Fitzgerald

The case was a wrongful death action stemming from a 1999 scaffolding accident at a power plant that killed Michael Ready; after settling with some defendants including the employer Midwest and general contractor BMW, the plaintiff proceeded to trial against scaffolding subcontractor United. The trial court excluded evidence of the settling defendants' conduct under section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure and rejected United's sole proximate cause defense and jury instruction, resulting in a verdict finding United 65% at fault. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the prior precedent in Ready I required exclusion of such evidence for apportionment purposes and that the sole proximate cause theory was not supported on the record.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defamation lawsuit brought by Wright Development Group, LLC against John Walsh after Walsh told a local newspaper reporter at a public meeting in an alderman's office that his condominium association had sued the 'Wright Development Group' or 'Wright Group' over construction issues and a needed loan. Walsh argued his statements were protected from suit under the Citizen Participation Act, which immunizes acts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to participate in government. The trial court denied immunity, the appellate court dismissed Walsh's appeal as moot, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Act applied to Walsh's statements made during and immediately after the public forum on condominium development issues. The court reasoned that the statements were made in connection with efforts to influence government action on developer misconduct and thus fell within the Act's protections for citizen participation.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with felony driving while license revoked after a police officer stopped his vehicle based on a registration check showing a revoked license, even though the officer knew an RDP had been issued but did not know its terms and observed no traffic violation. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence, finding the stop unlawful for lack of reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving outside the RDP. The appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court held that under the Vehicle Code, an RDP is a statutory defense rather than an element the state must disprove, so an officer may lawfully stop a driver with a revoked license without first verifying the RDP's specific terms.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to Steven J. Rauschenberger's eligibility to run as a Republican candidate for State Senator in the 2010 primary election, based on his having voted a Democratic ballot in the 2009 consolidated primary. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that Rauschenberger was eligible and his nomination papers were valid. The core reasoning was that the Election Code's section 8-8 no longer imposes time-based restrictions on party switching for candidates, unlike prior versions or the Cullerton precedent, and Rauschenberger satisfied the remaining requirement that a candidate not participate in multiple parties' primaries simultaneously.

elections

The case involved the conviction of defendant Sandy Williams following a bench trial for two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery based on an attack on victim L.J. in 2000. The primary issues on appeal concerned whether an Illinois State Police forensic analyst's testimony about a DNA profile match—derived in part from a report prepared by a nontestifying analyst at Cellmark Diagnostics—lacked foundation or violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights as hearsay. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the analyst's independent expert opinion was admissible because the underlying report was not introduced for its truth and satisfied evidentiary standards, while also reversing the appellate court to uphold the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved consolidated appeals concerning six automobile accidents where drivers lacked valid licenses, and insurers Founders and Safeway sought declaratory judgments that their policies excluded liability coverage. The policies contained exclusions denying coverage for use of a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so. Trial courts granted summary judgment to the insurers finding no coverage, but the appellate court reversed in five cases after deeming the exclusion ambiguous. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the exclusion is unambiguous and enforceable, ruling that it applies to unlicensed drivers and does not violate the state's mandatory insurance laws because insurers may limit risks to those with valid licenses. The court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the appellate judgments, confirming no duty to defend or indemnify in all six cases.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Passalino v. City of Zion, property owners challenged a 1996 comprehensive zoning ordinance amendment by the City of Zion that rezoned their parcel and prohibited multifamily development, claiming that notice by publication in local newspapers under section 11-13-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code failed to satisfy federal due process requirements. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied and declaring the amendment void as to their property. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the small notices published in obscure community newspapers with limited circulation were not reasonably calculated to inform known or ascertainable property owners of the hearings affecting their interests. The court reasoned that due process demands more effective notice when owners' identities and addresses can be determined from public records, rather than relying solely on constructive notice through publication.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of statutory caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions under section 2-1706.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enacted as part of Public Act 94-677. Plaintiffs, a minor and her mother, sued healthcare providers for injuries sustained during delivery and sought a declaration that the damage caps violated the Illinois Constitution. The circuit court ruled that the caps infringed the separation of powers clause and invalidated the entire Act under its inseverability provision. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the caps were unconstitutional under its prior decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works and remanding for further proceedings.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

In this case, the defendant, who had pleaded guilty but mentally ill to first-degree murder and received a 20-year sentence, filed a pro se motion nearly two years later to withdraw the plea on grounds that he was unfit and the plea was involuntary. The trial court recharacterized the motion as a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, provided Shellstrom admonishments after delays, and summarily dismissed it as meritless within 90 days of docketing. The appellate court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the recharacterization process complied with statutory requirements despite the time taken, that any delays were not prejudicial and had legitimate bases, and that the dismissal occurred timely after proper admonishments. The court declined to impose a new time limit on the admonishment process via supervisory authority.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved two defendants who entered negotiated guilty pleas in Illinois circuit courts to various felony charges, including aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion, in exchange for specified prison terms. In their postconviction petitions, they claimed their pleas were invalid because they were not adequately informed that mandatory supervised release (MSR) terms would be added to their sentences, violating due process and depriving them of the benefit of their bargains. The trial courts dismissed the petitions as frivolous, and the appellate court affirmed, finding substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402 admonishments. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed those judgments, holding that the plea hearing records demonstrated defendants received sufficient notice of MSR as part of the applicable penalties.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether shipping charges on internet purchases of goods from Wal-Mart were subject to Illinois sales tax under the Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act and Use Tax Act. Plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart improperly collected tax on those charges for items like a trampoline, seeking damages, disgorgement, and injunctive relief on behalf of a class. The court held that the charges were taxable and affirmed dismissal of the complaints. It reasoned that delivery was an inseparable component of the online sale, making shipping part of the taxable selling price and gross receipts, even when performed by a third party, and rejected arguments that the charges were optional or separable services.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In People v. De Filippo, the defendant was convicted of forgery after submitting letters with false statements about his 1981 deputization date to obtain extra pension credits under the Sheriff's Law Enforcement Program, resulting in higher costs to the county. The trial court found him guilty on certain counts, but the appellate court reversed for insufficient evidence, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the forgery statute requires documents to purport to have been made by another, at another time, with different provisions, or by unauthorized authority, and the defendant's own writings containing false information did not meet these criteria.

criminal law

The case involved James Bannister, who was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for his role in a 1989 gang-related shooting that killed two people and was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. After an initial conviction was vacated based on a key witness's recantation, a new bench trial again resulted in convictions, relying in part on testimony from an accomplice who had entered a plea agreement requiring his testimony to be truthful and consistent with his prior statements to police and prosecutors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, concluding that the plea agreement did not violate due process because it emphasized truthful testimony rather than mandating a specific scripted version of events.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Klepper, the defendant was charged with felony disorderly conduct after falsely reporting to police that his neighbor had tried to run him over with a truck. After a bench trial, the circuit court convicted the defendant but ruled the felony statute unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, finding it punished the same conduct as a related misdemeanor false-report provision, and imposed a one-year probation sentence. The State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. The court reversed, holding that the felony and misdemeanor statutes do not share identical elements and therefore their differing penalties do not violate the proportionate penalties clause. The defendant remains convicted under the felony provision, with the probation sentence left intact.

criminal law

The case involved a 14-year-old minor, Samantha V., who was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for two counts of aggravated battery arising from her involvement in a group assault on another individual. The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the one-act, one-crime doctrine, which prohibits multiple convictions based on the same physical act, applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings. The court held that the rule does apply and that the two offenses were based on the same act, leading to the reversal of one delinquency finding and remand for the trial court to vacate one count, correct orders, and clarify probation conditions. The reasoning centered on precedents extending the doctrine to prevent double punishment for identical conduct, applying it identically in juvenile contexts as in adult criminal cases.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Laurence Lovejoy, convicted after a jury trial of the first-degree murder of his 16-year-old stepdaughter and sentenced to death based on statutory eligibility grounds. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence, remanding for a new trial. The core reasoning was that the prosecution committed a prejudicial discovery violation during trial by failing to timely disclose certain evidence, which impaired the defendant's preparation and right to a fair trial. The court addressed related claims of error in the guilt and penalty phases but ordered retrial primarily on this basis.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Michael Glasper was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder following a jury trial. On appeal, he argued that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to question prospective jurors about potential bias if he chose not to testify, as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) and the precedent in People v. Zehr. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that while the trial court's omission violated the rule, the error was not structural and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of the evidence, including eyewitness testimony and the defendant's confession. The court reasoned that Rule 431(b) questions are not constitutionally mandated and thus subject to harmless-error review rather than automatic reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) was required to issue permits to Outcom, Inc. for erecting two billboards along Interstate 64 in Caseyville. IDOT denied the applications because the site, which contained a radio tower and transmitter trailer on what was historically farm land, had not been continuously devoted to commercial or industrial activities since September 21, 1959, as required by the Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 and IDOT regulations defining qualifying "business areas." The circuit court and appellate court ruled in favor of Outcom and ordered the permits issued, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed those judgments and upheld IDOT's denial. The court reasoned that the radio facilities did not meet the statutory and regulatory definition of commercial or industrial use, which excludes transient or temporary activities, and that a broader interpretation would undermine the Act's purpose of limiting billboards along highways.

business & regulatoryenvironment

The case involved a FOIA request by Mark Stern for the employment contract of the superintendent at Wheaton-Warrenville Community Unit School District 200, which the district denied on grounds that it was exempt as part of the employee's personnel file under section 7 of the Illinois FOIA. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the contract is not exempt from disclosure, ruling that employment contracts deal with the expenditure of public funds and bear on the employee's public duties, making them public records under FOIA. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the appellate court's judgment, remanding the case to the circuit court for an in camera inspection to redact limited personal information such as social security numbers while requiring disclosure of the contract as a whole.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved petitioners Stanley Howard and Dana Holland, each of whom received a gubernatorial pardon specifically authorizing expungement of their criminal records under subsection (c) of the Criminal Identification Act. After circuit courts denied their expungement petitions, appellate panels reached conflicting conclusions on whether the statute gave trial courts discretion to deny such requests. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Act vests courts with discretion to grant or deny petitions, even when a pardon authorizes expungement. The Court based this on the statute's permissive language allowing a court order to be entered, combined with subsection (d)'s procedures for notice, objections, and court orders granting or denying relief.

criminal lawprocedure