Joseph H. Goldenhersh

The case concerned Edward A. Loss III's petition for admission to the Illinois bar after the Committee on Character and Fitness recommended certification based on evidence of his rehabilitation from a history of juvenile delinquency, criminal convictions, drug use, and military discharge issues in the 1960s and 1970s. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied the petition, holding that it retains inherent authority to independently assess an applicant's good moral character and fitness despite committee approval under Supreme Court Rule 708. The majority concluded that Loss had not satisfactorily established his fitness due to the extraordinary circumstances of his past record and some discrepancies in his disclosures. A dissent argued that the court should defer to the committee's uncontradicted findings of rehabilitation and that the denial lacked a fair basis.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned an indigent defendant charged with DUI who sought appointed counsel for hearings on rescinding his summary driver's license suspension and obtaining a judicial driving permit under Illinois implied consent laws. The court denied the petition for a supervisory order, ruling that the defendant had no right to public defender representation at those proceedings. It reasoned that the hearings are civil in nature, limited in scope, and not critical stages of the criminal process, with no potential loss of liberty at stake. The court further held that the hearings are distinct from motions to suppress evidence and do not implicate due process, equal protection, or other constitutional requirements for counsel.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Robert Byron and codefendant Harold Bean, who were jointly tried and convicted in Cook County circuit court of the 1981 murder of Dorothy Polulach as well as related charges of armed robbery, home invasion, and conspiracy. Byron appealed the denial of his pretrial motion for severance, arguing that a joint trial with Bean prejudiced his defense. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed Byron's conviction and remanded the case, holding that the failure to sever deprived him of a fair trial because the weight of the evidence and witness credibility differed significantly between the two defendants, and Bean took a position adverse to Byron. The court distinguished this from mere disparity in evidence and found that the joint trial created undue prejudice not cured by other safeguards.

criminal law

The case involved defendant Donald R. Lego, who was charged in Will County with the murder of 82-year-old Mary Mae Johnson by stabbing and beating her, along with related felony murder counts arising from burglary and armed robbery. After a jury trial, Lego was convicted on all counts and sentenced to death following a hearing where the jury found an aggravating factor and no sufficient mitigating factors. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence in part, rejecting claims that pretrial media coverage required a venue change because most selected jurors had no prior exposure to the case and all affirmed their ability to decide impartially based on the evidence. The court also addressed other procedural and constitutional challenges to the trial and sentencing process. A partial dissent argued that errors in voir dire and the death penalty statute warranted reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of a driver killed when his vehicle was struck by a train at a railroad crossing protected only by a crossbuck. The plaintiff introduced testimony that the railroad's trains had a habit of failing to sound their whistles properly before reaching the crossing, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the defendant had not preserved for appellate review its specific objections to the admission of the habit evidence. The court noted that the objection at trial was limited to relevance and did not raise the arguments about eyewitness availability or insufficient foundation that were advanced on appeal.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved plaintiff Carlo Ferretti's claim for unemployment benefits after his discharge as a lathe operator, which the Illinois Department of Labor initially approved but later denied on grounds that he failed to actively seek work as required by section 500(C) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. The Board of Review upheld the denial following hearings, the circuit court affirmed, and the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that whether Ferretti was actively seeking work presented a question of fact but that the Board's adverse finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The court reasoned that Ferretti's undisputed testimony established 48 job contacts over the relevant period, along with explanations of limited opportunities in his field during winter months, which could not be disregarded.

labor & employment

The case involved defendant Susan Tosch, who was charged under section 11-1006 of the Illinois Vehicle Code with standing in the roadway to solicit rides or business. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding subsections (a) and (b) unconstitutional on the ground that the exemption for charitable solicitation created an arbitrary classification. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the statute was valid under equal protection and special legislation standards. The court applied rational basis review, concluding that the distinction between charitable solicitation (which serves public welfare) and solicitation for rides or business (which raises safety concerns) was rationally related to legitimate state interests in roadway safety.

criminal lawfree speech

The case concerned a dispute in which the Acting Director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Auditor General to audit public funds appropriated by the legislature to the Supreme Court and disbursed by the Administrative Office. The Auditor General had refused to perform the audits since 1978, citing concerns over selective or fragmentary audits and arguing that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction due to bias and due process violations. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Article VIII of the Illinois Constitution requires the Auditor General to audit all public funds of the State and that the appropriated funds at issue qualify as such. The court applied the rule of necessity to reject disqualification claims and distinguished the matter from a separate pending case involving audits of attorney registration and disciplinary funds.

procedure

This case was a personal injury lawsuit brought by plaintiff Alexander Joseph Osborne, Sr., against defendants Joseph E. O’Brien and O’Brien Steel Service, Inc., seeking damages for injuries from a 1981 collision on Detweiller Drive in Peoria, where the defendant’s car skidded on an icy downhill road across the center line and struck the van in which the plaintiff was a passenger. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the circuit court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial; the appellate court affirmed, as did the Illinois Supreme Court. The court held that the defendants had introduced sufficient evidence to create a jury question on whether the skid resulted from causes other than the driver’s negligence, including the lack of warning of icy conditions, the inability to exit the road once the hazard was discovered, and the fact that other vehicles also skidded, distinguishing the facts from earlier cases like Calvetti and Sughero where no such showing was made. The decision applied the Pedrick standard and left the negligence determination to the jury rather than deciding it as a matter of law.

torts & liability

In this case from the Illinois Supreme Court, Dino Titone was charged in Cook County with the murders, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping of Aldo Fratto and Tullio Infelise. Following a bench trial, Titone was convicted on all counts, with the armed robbery and kidnapping convictions merging into the murder convictions, and was sentenced to death after the court found no sufficient mitigating factors. The principal evidence came from witness Katherine De Wulf, who testified about her involvement in driving one of the vehicles and hearing Titone admit to the shootings. The court affirmed the convictions and sentence, determining that the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts and that certain evidentiary rulings, including the admission of a prior consistent statement by the witness, did not constitute reversible error.

criminal law

The case involved plaintiff Sally Stewart, who was injured when struck by a truck driven by Danny Rankovich, an emergency medical technician employed by defendant Village of Summit; after settling with Rankovich via a covenant not to sue that expressly reserved rights to pursue claims against others, Stewart sued the village under respondeat superior. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the village, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the covenant extinguished the derivative claim against the employer. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, reasoning that the covenant's reservation of rights against unnamed parties, combined with section 2(c) of the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, preserved the plaintiff's claim against the village rather than discharging it.

torts & liability

This case involved an insurance dispute where Hartford sought a declaration that its policy did not cover injuries from a chain-reaction accident caused by a hit-and-run driver, because the policy required direct physical contact with the uninsured vehicle. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' grant of summary judgment to the insurer, holding that indirect contact through an intermediate vehicle satisfied the 'hit' requirement in the uninsured motorist provision. The court reasoned that this interpretation aligned with the purpose of the Illinois Insurance Code's hit-and-run coverage and rulings from other jurisdictions, which recognize transmitted impact as fulfilling the physical contact condition to prevent fraudulent claims while providing protection.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Robert Kubat's appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition challenging his convictions for murder and aggravated kidnapping, along with his death sentence, based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that many of the claims were barred by res judicata from the direct appeal and that the remaining allegations did not satisfy the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington for showing deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court reviewed the trial evidence, counsel's decisions regarding witnesses, investigations, motions, and penalty-phase presentation, and concluded they did not constitute ineffective assistance warranting relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the public defender of Lake County was properly found guilty of indirect criminal contempt by the appellate court for failing to file timely briefs in two criminal appeals despite multiple extensions. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the contempt finding and remanded the matter, concluding that the show-cause order failed to adequately notify the attorney that he faced potential contempt charges and punishment. The court further held that the proceedings did not satisfy due process because they lacked a formal hearing where the respondent could present evidence, be represented by counsel, or cross-examine witnesses, as required in indirect criminal contempt cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs Joan and Ann Strzelczyk, who were injured as passengers on a CTA bus and sought medical expense reimbursements under two separate State Farm automobile insurance policies issued to family members, after the insurer had already paid the claims once under each policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the insurer, but the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that the policies permitted stacking of medical payments coverage because they contained no applicable exclusions or limitations on recovery for the same expenses, and the insureds had paid separate premiums for each policy. It reasoned that prior precedent allowed stacking of policies from the same insurer and required construing any ambiguity in favor of the insured, so that multiple benefits could be collected up to the actual expenses without an unstated indemnity limit.

business & regulatory

This case involves the dissolution of a 27-year marriage between a fireman and a circuit clerk employee in Coles County, Illinois, centering on the classification and division of the husband's vested interest in the Fireman's Pension Fund as well as an award of maintenance. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that the pension proceeds constituted marital property under section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and were subject to equitable distribution. The court reasoned that the pension represented deferred compensation acquired during the marriage, creating a presumption of marital property that was not overcome by the exemption language in section 4-135 of the Illinois Pension Code, which was intended to shield benefits from creditors rather than preclude division between spouses. The court also upheld the circuit court's award of maintenance to the wife for a period of 36 months, finding no abuse of discretion given the overall property division and the parties' respective incomes and needs.

family lawproperty

In People v. Crete, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer and sentenced to 10 years in prison; he filed a motion to reconsider the sentence within 30 days under section 5-8-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections, but the trial court did not rule on it within that period and dismissed it as untimely. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision upholding the sentence, holding that the statute's plain language requires not only filing the motion but also entry of any modifying order within 30 days of sentencing. The court reasoned that the provision creates a strict jurisdictional limit on the trial court's authority to reduce or modify sentences, distinguishing it from prior appellate interpretations and federal precedents that allowed filing alone to preserve jurisdiction. A dissent argued for a filing-deadline reading to avoid due process issues and align with federal practice under old Rule 35.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a real estate listing agreement between broker Eugene Hufford and property owner Harlan Balk for two nursing homes, under which Hufford claimed a 6% commission after the properties were leased to a tenant during the extended listing period. The circuit court ruled in Hufford's favor, awarding a commission based on the total rental amounts, finding that the contract language entitled him to payment if the properties were leased. On appeal, the appellate court reversed in part, holding that the agreement did not provide for a commission on leases and limiting recovery to the $1,000 minimum. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, reasoning that the contract's terms for commission on sale, lease, or rental were clear enough to cover the leases, or alternatively that the trial court's factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence if any ambiguity existed.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved the dissolution of the marriage between Sam P. Cannon and Marlene Cannon, where the circuit court ordered a division of marital property and awarded maintenance of $2,500 monthly plus health insurance for two years, subject to review. The appellate court dismissed the appeals, ruling that the order was not final and appealable because it reserved jurisdiction to review the maintenance award. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the order was final and appealable since the court had resolved all ancillary issues to the dissolution petition, including property division and maintenance, and the judgment was immediately enforceable. The provision for future review did not prevent the order from being final, as any modification would only affect future payments.

family lawproperty

In People v. Younger, the defendant was convicted of robbery in Cook County circuit court after an incident involving an assault on a victim and theft of his watch, keys, and car; he received a three-year prison sentence, the minimum for a Class 2 felony. The appellate court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence as an abuse of discretion, describing the event as a neighborhood teenage prank by a first-time offender and directing resentencing to probation with weekend incarceration. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the original sentence, holding that the trial court had properly reviewed the presentence report, considered statutory mitigating and aggravating factors, and exercised its discretion without abuse in determining that probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. The court also rejected arguments that the case was moot due to the defendant's parole status, noting that mandatory supervised release kept him under sentence. The decision emphasized deference to the trial court's sentencing judgment under precedents like People v. LaPointe.

criminal lawprocedure