Lott R. Herrick

The case involved defendant Corydon A. Black's conviction for the murder by poisoning of his divorced wife, with his punishment fixed at death by a jury in Cook County criminal court; he appealed, raising claims of insanity as a defense. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause, holding that prejudicial errors occurred at trial. The core reasoning was that a prosecution medical expert improperly formed and offered an opinion on the defendant's sanity based in part on hearsay reports from others without a hypothetical question, invading the jury's role, and that evidence of the defendant's unrelated prior criminal offenses and an accusation was erroneously admitted, which could have improperly influenced the jury's decisions on guilt and the death penalty in this capital case.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a $7,000 promissory note returned by William B. Polhemus to his nephew Joseph B. Polhemus in January 1934, less than two years before the uncle's death, was subject to Illinois inheritance tax as a transfer made in contemplation of death. The county court assessed a $420 tax on the transfer under the Inheritance Tax Act, which creates a prima facie presumption that gifts without consideration within two years of death are made in contemplation of death, and the nephew appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the tax, ruling that the statutory presumption is constitutional because it is rebuttable rather than conclusive and merely establishes a rule of evidence. The court further found that the evidence, including the donor's declining health and the timing of a revised will that treated the note as still part of the estate, supported the conclusion that the gift occurred in contemplation of death and not at an earlier date as the appellant claimed.

taxesproperty

The case concerned whether two parcels of real estate owned by Lake Forest University but rented to tenants rather than used for school purposes were exempt from 1933 general property taxes under the terms of the university's charter. The county court entered a judgment and sale order against the parcels for nonpayment. The supreme court reversed, reasoning that the 1869 charter amendment broadly exempted all property belonging to the corporate entity Lake Forest University, that this exemption formed a contract protected under the 1848 constitution, and that the charter language plainly covered the rented tracts without ambiguity or limitation to academic premises.

taxesproperty

The case concerned whether Rose Hunt Taylor, a stockholder in the insolvent Peoples State Bank of Ramsey, faced additional liability under the Illinois Constitution for holding six shares of bank stock from 1922 to 1930 and then a separate six shares from March 1930 until the bank's closure in 1931, as opposed to only one continuous holding of six shares. Creditors sued to enforce the constitutional super-added liability on stockholders for unpaid deposits incurred during their ownership periods, and the trial court imposed liability only on the later holding while the Appellate Court reversed to include both. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two holdings involved distinct portions of the bank's capital stock, even though the number of shares was identical, because the transfers were recorded and the constitutional liability attaches to each period of ownership separately. The court reasoned that the temporary transfer to her husband for director qualification purposes did not preserve identity of the stock for liability purposes, and her later acquisition from another shareholder created a new ownership interest subject to its own liabilities.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the county collector of Cook County seeking a judgment against property for 1934 delinquent taxes, with the property owner objecting to the validity of the county highway corporate tax levy of $1.7 million. The county court had sustained objections to $1,441,550.24 of the levy, finding issues with items for interest on prior tax anticipation warrants and notes and an excessive tax deficiency fund. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appropriation and levy ordinances sufficiently itemized purposes, distinguished amounts payable from the levy versus other sources, and complied with the Counties Act and Revenue Act requirements for detailing assets, liabilities, and estimates. The court reasoned that the levy for estimated interest on 1934 warrants was authorized, the ordinances provided adequate notice to taxpayers, and the tax deficiency fund objection was controlled by precedent in a related case, making the full levy valid.

taxes

The case concerned an action by the People of Illinois to recover an alleged unpaid balance of over $1.7 million in personal property taxes from Commonwealth Edison Co. for 1931 after the company paid a portion of the assessed amount. The county court entered judgment for the state, which included an additional sum for unpaid capital stock tax. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the judgment, reasoning that the assessor improperly failed to classify and itemize the company's tangible personal property into the statutorily required classes and instead lumped all valuations into a single "all other personal property" category, and that the county court exceeded its authority by adjusting the capital stock tax assessment, a function reserved to the State Tax Commission, which violated the company's due process rights.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case involved objections by property owners to the Cook County collector's application for judgment and sale of their property to satisfy 1934 delinquent taxes levied by the Chicago Board of Education. The objectors challenged the validity of the corporate levy, arguing that appropriations for interest on tax anticipation warrants were improperly treated as general liabilities rather than charges against specific anticipated taxes, failed to separately state interest amounts per year as required by the School Law, and that "Z" account appropriations for contingencies did not adequately indicate the funds from which they would be paid. The county court overruled the objections and entered judgment for sale, which the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the board's appropriation ordinance and supporting budget documents, including balance sheets and a classification manual, sufficiently segregated and identified the items by fund and purpose to meet statutory requirements, and that any minor errors or informalities did not affect the substantial justice of the tax under section 191 of the Revenue Law.

taxesproperty

The case involved relators, including subcontractors and assignees, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Village of Bradley to pay judgments obtained in 1932 for amounts due on a sewer construction contract funded by special assessments. The village had collected over $315,000 but diverted portions of the funds, and the circuit court had previously entered decrees establishing liens and awarding specific sums to the plaintiffs totaling around $35,000. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and affirmed the trial court's issuance of mandamus, reasoning that the special assessment collections formed a trust fund for contractors and subcontractors, the village could not evade its obligations by diverting the money, and technical challenges to jurisdiction or notices in the prior lien proceedings did not invalidate the unreversed decrees. The court directed the village to levy authorized taxes and apply surplus funds to the judgments after minimal necessary expenses.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved an employment agent licensed by the state who was convicted in municipal court for violating a 1935 statute by requiring an applicant to sign a promissory note with a confession of judgment clause and to assign wages as security for the agent's fee after placing the applicant in a job. The defendant challenged the convictions on constitutional grounds, arguing that the law unreasonably restricted her business practices. The court reversed the judgments, holding that the statute created an invalid classification by prohibiting employment agents alone from using judgment notes and wage assignments, which are lawful security devices available to all other businesses and professions. The opinion reasoned that the employment agency business is not inherently harmful to public welfare, so the discriminatory prohibition could not be justified as a valid exercise of the police power and violated due process and equal protection principles under the state and federal constitutions.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorycriminal law

In Kasbohm v. Miller, five sons sued their siblings to set aside two warranty deeds executed by their father in 1926 conveying Chicago and Des Plaines properties to one son and two daughters, alleging mental incompetence, undue influence, conspiracy, and fraud. The circuit court chancellor entered a decree for the complainants, overriding the master's report that found the grantor competent and the evidence insufficient to support the claims. The appellate court reversed, holding that the greater weight of the evidence showed the father had sufficient mental capacity to understand the deeds, no fiduciary relationship existed between grantor and grantees to shift the burden, and the complainants failed to prove fraud or undue influence in fact. The court noted the master's findings were advisory but emphasized that the record did not support voiding the conveyances. The decree was reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment upholding the deeds.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case concerned objections filed by a taxpayer to 1934 taxes levied by the newly formed Chicago Park District on his property in Cook County, after the district had consolidated twenty-two prior park districts. The objector argued that the new district lacked authority to levy taxes for 1934, claiming prior districts were required to make levies in the first quarter of their fiscal year and that any such levies could not be superseded. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the county court's judgment overruling the objections and ordering sale of the property. It held that the Consolidation Act transferred taxing power to the Chicago Park District without creating a hiatus, allowed the district to repeal or amend prior levies (except those backed by anticipation warrants), and permitted separate treatment of two old districts' levies to maintain uniformity; the district's September 1934 levy ordinance was therefore valid.

taxesproperty

This case involved a defendant convicted of murder in Cook County and sentenced to death who filed petitions claiming he had become insane after the judgment, seeking to stay execution and obtain a sanity trial under Illinois statute. The criminal court found him sane after a hearing, and the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed appeals challenging jurisdiction due to a pending U.S. Supreme Court appeal from the death sentence, jury selection methods, evidentiary rulings, and other procedural issues. The court held that the U.S. Supreme Court appeal did not divest the state court of authority over the ancillary insanity proceeding and found no reversible errors in the trial process or jury practices. It affirmed the sanity verdict, upheld the original death sentence, and directed that execution occur on October 15, 1937.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved objections by a property owner to 1934 county taxes in Cook County, Illinois, specifically challenging a .0175 rate for the county employees' annuity and benefit fund levied in addition to the statutory maximum county tax rate of .32, as well as a separate levy for a zoological park fund. The court held that the benefit fund tax was validly levied outside the county rate limit under the 1933 amendment to the Benefit Fund statute, which expressly stated it was in addition to taxes for other county purposes, distinguishing it from an earlier decision interpreting prior statutory language. The court further ruled that the zoological park tax levy was invalid because the appropriation ordinance failed to separate amounts for constructing versus maintaining the park, contrary to statutory requirements for detailed levies. The judgment was affirmed regarding the benefit fund tax but reversed as to the zoological park tax, with directions to sustain objections to the latter.

taxesproperty

This case involved a foreclosure sale of an apartment building in Chicago under a first mortgage trust deed, where a committee representing 78-80% of the bondholders purchased the property for $35,000 through a nominee, paying only a small cash portion for non-depositing bondholders while using unpaid bonds for the rest, resulting in a deficiency decree. A minority bondholder intervened to object to the sale and reorganization plan, seeking removal of the trustee and a higher bid to protect all interests equally. The trial court approved the master's report of sale, confirmed the plan, and denied intervention, but the appellate court reversed; on further appeal, the court held that the sale price was inadequate due to the committee's conflicting interest in acquiring the property cheaply rather than maximizing the price for all bondholders, ordered a re-sale, permitted the intervening petition, and affirmed the trial court's jurisdiction to supervise a proper reorganization plan.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a claim by Richard Grasty under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act for an eye injury sustained while tearing down a porch on a building owned by a defunct national bank, at the direction of Ben Sneeden, the federally appointed receiver. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation, which the circuit court confirmed, and the receiver challenged the award on appeal, arguing that as a federal officer he was not subject to state workers’ compensation laws. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the receiver, acting in the course of liquidating bank assets by maintaining and repairing real property, was amenable to the state act as a citizen of Illinois for purposes of suits and liabilities. The court reasoned that the compensation statute did not interfere with the receiver’s federal duties under the National Banking Act and that the award amount was properly calculated based on statutory earnings formulas for the type of work performed.

labor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute between Fred and Lena Berge over a 1928 separation agreement executed after their 1893 marriage. Under the agreement, Lena quitclaimed her interest in a farm (subject to a sales contract) in exchange for annual $600 payments for life from the farm's income, along with other property transfers, and she promised not to seek alimony or support. After the farm buyer defaulted and the land was reconveyed to a trustee for Fred, he refused the 1932 payment, claiming no income from the property. Lena sued to enforce the payments, cancel deeds, and impose a lien on the land. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decree in her favor, holding the contract void as against public policy because it relieved the husband of his legal duty to support his wife, and directed dismissal of the bill.

family lawproperty

The case involved a dispute between two banks over the distribution of foreclosure sale proceeds from real estate securing two equal bonds issued by the Kay Bee Company. Each bank held one bond as collateral for the company's separate primary loans, with the Ottawa bank owed more than the Morrison bank. The circuit court had directed pro-rata distribution based on the relative sizes of the banks' primary debts, which the Appellate Court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the banks must share the proceeds equally based on their ownership of the identical bonds until their primary debts are satisfied. The court reasoned that the bonds provided equal security interests that could not shift or give preference based on the varying amounts of the underlying debts.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned a foreclosure proceeding in which the chancellor set an upset price of $71,508.45 for the resale of the property after finding its market value to be $80,000 based on conflicting affidavits estimating values from $40,000 to $80,000. The dissenting opinion concurred that the chancellor possessed the authority to fix an upset price and that the chosen amount fell within the range of the evidence. Applying the same deference given to jury verdicts on property valuation issues, the dissent reasoned that the chancellor's finding should stand in the absence of material error, passion, or prejudice and therefore concluded that both the Appellate Court judgment and the superior court order should be affirmed.

property

This case concerned the constitutionality of Illinois's Permanent Registration law, enacted in 1936 by a special session of the General Assembly called by the Governor while an earlier special session was still pending. The plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought to enjoin the city of Chicago from spending funds to administer the law, arguing that the state constitution's provision on convening special sessions limited the Governor to a single purpose and barred additional sessions until the first one adjourned. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the constitution's language on the Governor's power to call sessions on "extraordinary occasions" permits multiple sessions and does not restrict the power to one use or a singular purpose; therefore, legislation passed within the scope of a valid call is constitutional.

elections

The case involved the Chicago Bar Association bringing an information against respondent Goodman, a non-lawyer, for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by operating businesses that solicited and handled thousands of workers' compensation claims on a contingent fee basis. Goodman would negotiate settlements with employers or insurers, prepare and file petitions with the Industrial Commission, present evidence at hearings before arbitrators, and handle appeals to the full commission, only occasionally involving licensed attorneys for complex matters. The court held that these activities constituted the practice of law both in and out of court, that the judiciary has inherent authority to regulate such practice and punish violations as contempt, and that a prior municipal court conviction did not create estoppel because it addressed different issues. The court denied Goodman's motion to strike and plea of estoppel, found him guilty of contempt, and imposed a $500 fine plus costs.

criminal lawlabor & employmentprocedure