The case involved a dispute over the assessed valuation of a shopping center for 1963 real estate taxes in St. Clair County, Illinois, where the property owner sought to enforce a lower assessment agreed upon by the Board of Assessors but rejected by the Board of Review. The circuit court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, setting the valuation at $194,234 and voiding the tax sale. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts showing compliance with statutory requirements for challenging assessments, such as filing a timely written complaint with the Board of Review, and that declaratory relief was inappropriate without payment under protest or other equitable grounds.
In People v. Engel, J. Edward Jones sought to intervene after Sigmund Engel's criminal conviction by filing a petition in the criminal court claiming ownership of $5,550 seized from Engel by the sheriff, based on an alleged assignment for legal fees, and demanded a jury trial to resolve competing claims. The criminal court denied Jones leave to file the petition, and Jones pursued review by writ of error directly in the criminal case. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the writ, holding that a writ of error in a criminal case is limited to reviewing the record as it existed at the time of the defendant's conviction and sentence, whereas this post-conviction dispute over money ownership constituted a civil proceeding outside the scope of the criminal case. The court further rejected the argument that the writ could be treated as an appeal under the Civil Practice Act or court rules, as no right to review by writ of error existed in this context.
In Tarr v. Hallihan, licensed dentists sued to enjoin the Illinois Department of Registration and Education from holding hearings on charges of professional misconduct under the Dental Practice Act, arguing that the statute's procedures denied due process because an employee of the department filed the complaints, the director could influence the dental committee, and the charges lacked specificity. The superior court dismissed the suits, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that an employee filing charges does not establish bias in the committee, that the charges sufficiently informed the dentists of the alleged violations in the language of the statute, and that the ten-day notice requirement for a stay was not at issue in the case so its constitutionality need not be addressed. The decrees were therefore affirmed.
This case involved an appeal from a circuit court decree foreclosing a lien on a special assessment levied against lands in the Lower Salt Creek Drainage District for construction of a drainage system under the Levee Act of 1879. The appellants argued that the contractor had not completed the work, resulting in no benefits to their property, and sought to introduce evidence of that fact in the foreclosure proceeding as their first opportunity to challenge the assessment. The court affirmed the foreclosure decree, holding that the prior confirmation judgment was conclusive on the question of benefits, that the landowners had a prior opportunity for a jury trial and appeal on benefits under the Levee Act, and that they were estopped from denying liability after failing to seek mandamus to compel completion of the work over seven years while bonds were issued and sold in reliance on the assessment proceedings.
The case involved a claim by Steve Salahub, a brass moulder employed by Central Pattern & Foundry Co., for compensation under the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act for permanent total disability due to advanced silicosis. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits after finding that Salahub’s last exposure occurred on November 30, 1936, satisfying the statute’s sixty-day post-effective-date requirement, and the circuit court confirmed the award. The employer appealed, contending that Salahub had been discharged earlier, that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because the employer had not elected coverage under the Act, and that section 25 of the Act was unconstitutional. The court affirmed, reasoning that the Commission’s factual finding on the date of discharge was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the employer’s election and constitutional challenges were raised too late or resolved by precedent, and that the statutory exposure period did not require the disease to have been contracted within those sixty days.
The case involved Harrison Parker, who was convicted of criminal contempt in Cook County court and sentenced to ten days in jail for writing two lengthy, inflammatory letters to a sitting grand jury. The letters accused various public officials, a newspaper, and its executives of conspiracy, perjury, bribery, and related crimes, while offering evidence and warning of pressure on the jury. Parker appealed, claiming among other things that the conviction violated his constitutional right to free speech, and argued that citizens have a right to voluntarily inform grand juries of crimes. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that unsolicited written communications to a grand jury, especially those containing prejudicial accusations, constitute contempt because they tend to impede or obstruct the jury's fair and impartial discharge of its duties, and that a denial of intent does not justify the conduct.
