Thomas J. Moran

The case arose from the dissolution of a two-partner law firm, after which the former partners disputed the division of fees earned on pending cases and the allocation of post-dissolution overhead expenses. Plaintiff sought an accounting, while defendant counterclaimed for fees from cases each partner handled individually after dissolution. Following a bench trial, the trial court adopted the formula proposed by plaintiff's expert for calculating overhead credits and ordered defendant to prepare an accounting using that method; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that defendant had waived his objection to the expert's testimony under Rule 220 by proceeding after deposition, and it approved the overhead formula as consistent with equitable partnership principles under the Uniform Partnership Act, though a partial dissent argued the formula's 50% multiplier should be removed to fully reimburse the winding-up partner.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether a new political party's failure to include candidates for judicial offices on its slate violated the 'complete slate' requirement of section 10-2 of the Illinois Election Code, potentially disqualifying all of its candidates from the ballot in Cook County. After the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the issue, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the statute's language requiring petitions to list candidates for offices up for election. The court held that the requirement applies to judicial positions and invalidates an incomplete slate. Its reasoning centered on resolving statutory ambiguity through the plain meaning of the Code's provisions governing new party nominations, without addressing constitutional questions left open by the federal remand.

elections

The case concerned a dentist sanctioned by the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation for using terms such as 'family dentistry,' 'total comfort,' and 'quality' in his advertising, in alleged violation of the Dental Practice Act. Ardt sought administrative review in circuit court, challenging the sanctions and the constitutionality of the advertising rules on First Amendment grounds, and obtained a stay of the penalties despite a statutory provision that appeared to bar stays during review. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling, holding that circuit courts possess authority to grant stays in such cases and that an unqualified ban on 'family dentistry' was unconstitutionally overbroad, while upholding prohibitions on the other terms as permissible restrictions on potentially misleading commercial speech. The core reasoning rested on the Administrative Review Law's grant of equitable powers to courts, the limits of commercial speech protection under the First Amendment, and the distinction between false or deceptive advertising and protected professional promotion.

free speechhealthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In People v. Ward, defendant Jerry Ward was tried and convicted in Cook County of two murders, armed robbery, and possession of a stolen vehicle arising from the February 1986 shooting of Bruce Herd and beating death of Pamela Williams during the theft of Herd's car, after which he received a death sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence on direct appeal. The court rejected numerous claims of error in the guilt phase, including evidentiary admissions, due process issues, jury procedures, sufficiency of the evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel; it likewise rejected challenges to the sentencing hearing and found the Illinois death penalty statute constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Scadron Enterprises, which sought to erect a large off-premise billboard near an interstate highway in Des Plaines, Illinois, after obtaining a state permit under the Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act but being denied a local building permit because the city's ordinance prohibited signs visible from limited-access highways. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified questions to the Illinois Supreme Court on whether the Act preempts home-rule municipalities from regulating or banning such signs. The court held that the Act does not preempt home-rule authority and that municipalities may impose stricter rules, including total bans, on outdoor advertising within 660 feet of covered highways. The reasoning rested on the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which preserves concurrent home-rule regulatory powers unless the legislature specifically limits them, and found no such express preemption or conflict with federal highway funding conditions under the Beautification Act.

business & regulatorypropertyfederal power

In People v. Emerson, the defendant, convicted of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and aggravated arson stemming from a 1979 armed robbery and stabbing incident that resulted in one victim's death, appealed the circuit court's dismissal without an evidentiary hearing of his post-conviction petition seeking relief from his death sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial, along with challenges to the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute, were barred by res judicata or waiver because they had been or could have been raised on direct appeal. The court reasoned that exceptions to res judicata did not apply, as the claims lacked new facts not previously considered and the performance of counsel must be evaluated based on the circumstances at the time rather than by comparison to prior proceedings, and that prior rejections of similar constitutional challenges to the statute precluded reconsideration.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Lowe, consolidated with People v. Nasser, defendants were convicted after bench trials of nonviolent offenses including theft (Lowe) and arson, perjury, and secured creditor violations (Nasser), and trial courts ordered them to pay restitution to their victims as a condition of probation. The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections authorizes restitution only for victims of violent crimes or for all victims. The court affirmed the restitution orders, holding that the statute permits restitution in all criminal cases because its plain language and purpose of compensating victims and rehabilitating offenders apply without distinction based on violence; although defendants waived the issue by agreeing to restitution at sentencing, the court reached the merits to resolve conflicting appellate decisions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a claimant seeking judicial review of a Board of Review decision denying unemployment benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act must name the Director of Employment Security as a defendant in the complaint. After being discharged and denied benefits for misconduct, plaintiff Leonard Stone exhausted administrative appeals and filed for review in circuit court, naming only the Board and his employer; the Board moved to dismiss on that ground. The circuit court allowed an amendment to add the Director and reversed the denial of benefits, and the appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Director need not be named, reasoning that section 1100 of the Act expressly adopts the Administrative Review Law, under which only parties of record to the administrative proceeding must be made defendants, and that the Act's provision deeming the Director a party does not override the Review Law's naming requirements.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether a Will County grand jury could issue subpoenas to two uncharged individuals, Tony Marquez and John Romo, compelling them to appear in lineups and provide physical evidence including blood standards, head and pubic hair samples, fingerprints, and palm prints. The circuit court quashed the blood and hair-pulling portions of the subpoenas on fourth amendment grounds but upheld the rest, a ruling that the appellate court modified in part. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the state constitution and relevant statutes require a showing of probable cause before a grand jury may subpoena hair samples, because individuals retain a privacy interest in the integrity of their bodies that exceeds the public-exposure exception applicable to fingerprints or lineups; it further required relevance and individualized suspicion for lineup appearances and fingerprint demands, reversing the lower courts to that extent and remanding the matter.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this case, defendants William and Brett Villarreal were charged with resisting and obstructing peace officers and aggravated battery after they physically interfered with officers attempting to arrest a third person, Upson, inside the defendants' home without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to quash their arrests and dismiss the charges, finding a Fourth Amendment violation, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the appellate judgment, reversed the trial court, and remanded, holding that individuals may not use physical force to resist or obstruct an arrest of themselves or another, whether lawful or unlawful. The court reasoned that specific statutes prohibiting resistance to police officers prevail over general self-defense provisions, and evidence of the defendants' actions cannot be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful entry under the exclusionary rule, as self-help remedies would disrupt law enforcement. The decision emphasized that courts, not citizens, determine the legality of police actions.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a defendant convicted of criminal trespass to land after he refused to leave the private cart-control area of a Dominick’s grocery store while soliciting signatures for a political petition. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the conviction, holding that the store’s invocation of the trespass statute did not violate the free speech or free and equal elections provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The court reasoned that the store was private property that did not function as a public forum like a company town, there was no state action or invidious discrimination, and the defendant could have solicited signatures on the adjacent public sidewalk instead.

free speechcriminal lawelectionsproperty

The case involved defendant John Pasch, who was charged in Cook County with two counts of murder and one count of aggravated kidnapping after he shot and killed his landlord Leslie Shearer, shot and killed a police officer during a subsequent standoff, and held Jean Wiwatowski hostage. Following a jury trial, Pasch was convicted on all counts, found eligible for the death penalty based on statutory aggravating factors, and sentenced to death plus a 15-year prison term for the kidnapping. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed dozens of issues concerning pretrial motions, jury selection and instructions (including on insanity and guilty but mentally ill verdicts), evidentiary rulings, the conduct of the sentencing hearing, victim-impact evidence, and challenges to the constitutionality of the Illinois death-penalty statute. The court affirmed the convictions and death sentence, holding that the trial proceedings were fair, the evidence supported the verdicts and eligibility findings, and the statute did not violate due process or other constitutional provisions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Spitz v. Goldome Realty Credit Corp., plaintiffs brought a class action against defendant Goldome Realty Credit Corporation, a subsidiary service corporation of a federally chartered savings and loan, alleging that the defendant failed to provide the written notice required by the Illinois Mortgage Escrow Account Act about borrowers' option to pledge an interest-bearing deposit instead of establishing a tax escrow account. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds that the state Act was preempted by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Act and related regulations. The circuit court granted the motion, but the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that federal regulations preempt state laws on the operations of federal savings associations but do not extend to service corporations in this context, as the relevant federal escrow provision applies only to associations and creates no direct conflict with the state requirement.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a police officer, Clifford Launius, who was discharged by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of Des Plaines after leaving his assigned post at the police station during heavy flooding on August 14, 1987, without permission to check on his family and property. The officer had requested leave multiple times, been denied, and then remained away for over 12 hours, assisting neighbors instead of returning to duty despite his shift ending at 3 p.m. The board found he abandoned his post and refused to perform duties, ordering discharge; the circuit court affirmed, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for a lesser sanction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the board's findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that discharge was neither arbitrary nor unrelated to the needs of the police service. The core reasoning centered on the officer's sworn duty to protect the public, his failure to communicate or return promptly, and the board's discretion in imposing discipline for such misconduct.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, defendant George Ronald Brigham was convicted after a jury trial of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver, and unlawful possession of a firearm. He filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his trial attorney had been removed from the Illinois master roll of attorneys for failing to pay annual registration dues, and also claiming ineffective assistance for failure to tender lesser-included offense instructions. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding waiver and no prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, but the appellate court reversed on the counsel issue and ordered a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that an attorney's removal from the master roll solely for nonpayment of dues does not automatically violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the attorney was admitted to the bar and presumed competent, and it remanded the case for consideration of the remaining issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Irving Ramey, who was convicted by a jury in Cook County of murder, home invasion, aggravated unlawful restraint, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle in connection with the killing of Derrick Quincy Wilkinson during a home invasion and robbery, and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, Ramey challenged numerous aspects of his trial and sentencing, including the State's use of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons, speedy trial issues, the admission of hearsay and other evidence, prosecutorial conduct, and jury instructions at both the guilt and death penalty phases. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and non-capital sentences, holding that the trial was free of reversible error, but vacated the death sentence on the ground that the eligibility-phase instructions failed to require the jury to find that the defendant acted with the requisite intent or culpable mental state, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

In Maple v. Gustafson, plaintiffs sued defendant for negligence after a car accident in which defendant's vehicle pulled out and stopped in front of plaintiffs' car, causing a minor collision. The trial court directed a verdict on defendant's negligence but left issues of proximate cause and damages to the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which the trial court denied; the appellate court reversed and remanded solely for determination of damages. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that it had improperly applied the standard for judgment n.o.v. instead of the manifest weight standard for a new trial, and that the jury's verdict was supported by evidence from defendant's expert witness that plaintiffs suffered no injuries from the accident. The court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the post-trial motion and remanded for consideration of other issues.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This consolidated case addressed whether Illinois school districts must collectively bargain with teachers' unions over decisions to reduce staff for economic reasons and over the development of teacher evaluation plans under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board had found the reduction-in-force decision non-mandatory but its impact mandatory, and had required bargaining on evaluation plans; the appellate court reversed on the reduction-in-force decision. The Supreme Court adopted a balancing test to determine mandatory subjects of bargaining, weighing the direct benefits to employees' wages, hours, and terms against the burdens on the employer's core managerial authority and public responsibilities, and concluded that neither the reduction-in-force decision nor the evaluation-plan development qualified as mandatory bargaining subjects.

labor & employment

This consolidated Illinois Supreme Court case involved five defendants convicted of robbery, burglary, or residential burglary who were sentenced as Class X offenders based on two prior felony convictions. The defendants appealed their enhanced sentences, arguing insufficient proof in the record of the timing and sequence of their prior felonies as required by the Class X sentencing statute. The court held that the State was not required to prove Class X eligibility beyond a reasonable doubt and that defendants had waived any objections to the sufficiency of the presentence reports or proof by failing to raise them at sentencing hearings. In four cases the records were deemed adequate to support the Class X findings through inference or lack of dispute, leading to affirmance of those sentences, while one case was remanded solely to correct a restitution order. The court declined to address double jeopardy issues because no resentencing hearings were ordered.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Henry Burke sued 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart for negligence by its employees and the City of Chicago for willful and wanton conduct by its police officers after an altercation in the store led to Burke being dragged and dropped, resulting in permanent quadriplegia. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that Burke was not contributorily negligent as to the City and instructed the jury accordingly, leading to a $7,487,000 verdict against both defendants, with a 32% reduction applied only to the award against Rothschild’s. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that a plaintiff's negligence cannot reduce damages for a defendant's willful and wanton misconduct and that one joint tortfeasor cannot benefit from a setoff based on the plaintiff's negligence toward the other tortfeasor, as the plaintiff's conduct was not a proximate cause of the City's injuries and personal defenses do not extend between joint tortfeasors.

torts & liabilityprocedure