The case was an appeal by Drew Terrell from his death sentence imposed after a resentencing hearing for the murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of 15-month-old Laura Hampton. The Illinois Supreme Court addressed 24 claims of error in jury selection, the eligibility phase, the aggravation and mitigation phase, and the sentencing itself, plus 10 challenges to the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. The court rejected all claims, finding no abuse of discretion in refusing specific voir dire questions, no procedural or evidentiary errors at sentencing, and no constitutional infirmities in the statute or its application. It therefore affirmed the death sentence, with one justice concurring specially on procedural default issues and another dissenting on the ground that the death penalty statute violates the state and federal constitutions.
The case involved an associate attorney, Alan Jacobson, who was terminated by his law firm after repeatedly reporting the firm's practice of filing consumer debt collection lawsuits in improper venues, which violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Illinois Collection Agency Act. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a licensed attorney employed by a law firm cannot bring a claim for retaliatory discharge against the firm. The court reasoned that the attorney's ethical duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct already protect the public policy against such illegal practices, making the tort remedy unnecessary and unavailable to attorneys in this context, consistent with its prior decision in Balla v. Gambro, Inc. regarding in-house counsel. The court reversed the lower courts and directed dismissal of the complaint.
The case involved Victor Ganus, an inmate already serving a life sentence for murder, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for killing fellow inmate Lucas Gonzales at Menard Correctional Center and sentenced to death based on aggravating factors including multiple murders and the victim's status as a prison inmate. Ganus filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase, primarily for failing to adequately investigate and present evidence that the murder was a gang-orchestrated hit rather than an act committed solely on his initiative, along with claims regarding mental health mitigation and allegedly false testimony by the prosecution. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief, applying the two-prong Strickland v. Washington test and concluding that Ganus failed to demonstrate deficient performance by counsel or resulting prejudice, while also finding certain claims waived for not being raised in the original petition.
The case involved two defendants who were convicted of driving with suspended licenses after their statutory summary suspensions for alcohol-related offenses under the Illinois Vehicle Code. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the suspension period under section 11-501.1 does not automatically terminate on the provisional reinstatement date but continues until the required reinstatement fees are paid. The court's reasoning centered on statutory construction of sections 1-203.1 and 6-208.1, which state that reinstatement of driving privileges occurs only after all appropriate fees have been paid and full privileges may not be restored until then, making payment a prerequisite for ending the suspension.
The case involved home purchasers suing an architectural firm and its owner for breach of contract, claiming they were third-party beneficiaries of an agreement between the firm and the home builder and that the delivered plans infringed another architect's copyright, causing settlement costs and other damages. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants after a bench trial, finding the plaintiffs failed to prove their case, and the appellate court affirmed. The supreme court affirmed on the grounds that the purchasers did not establish third-party beneficiary status under the contract and that a change order they signed with the builder unambiguously released the architectural firm, as a subcontractor, from all related liability. The court treated the release as a contract whose plain language controlled absent any asserted defenses like mutual mistake.
The case concerned whether Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc., which operated a community repeater to extend the range of two-way FM radios for multiple FCC licensees in exchange for monthly fees, was subject to the Telecommunications Excise Tax Act. The Illinois Department of Revenue assessed excise taxes on Gem's repeater services from 1985 to 1989, a decision upheld after administrative review. The circuit court reversed the assessment, but the appellate court reinstated it, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Gem was engaged in the business of making retail sales under the Act. The court reasoned that Gem controlled the service, received consideration directly from customers, and provided a taxable telecommunications service, while rejecting claims that the Act was unconstitutionally vague.