Philip J. Rarick

In Jensen v. Quik International, plaintiff Eric Jensen sued to rescind a franchise agreement with Quik under sections 5, 10, and 26 of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act of 1987 because Quik had failed to register with the Illinois Attorney General before selling the franchise, and Quik moved to stay the suit and compel arbitration under the agreement's broad arbitration clause covering claims of invalidity or illegality. The circuit and appellate courts denied arbitration, ruling that the registration requirement was a condition precedent so no enforceable contract (and thus no arbitration obligation) existed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that Jensen's statutory rescission claim was arbitrable because the clause expressly included disputes over whether the agreement was void or illegal, the Act's text and structure did not treat registration as a prerequisite to contract formation, and Illinois and federal policy strongly favor arbitration of such issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that holding.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a pretrial detainee found unfit to stand trial who was subject to a petition for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. The circuit court granted the petition after appointing an independent examiner from the Kane County Diagnostic Center, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute applies to pretrial detainees found unfit, that the independent examination must be performed by a qualified professional to satisfy due process, and that the detainee's criminal defense attorney was entitled to notice as a known agent under the statute's broad language. The court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the appellate judgment, finding a due process violation in the examination process but upholding the statute's applicability when properly applied.

criminal lawhealthcarecivil rights

The case concerned whether a 2001 court-approved consent decree granting specific visitation rights to the maternal grandparents of minor M.M.D. remained enforceable after the Illinois Supreme Court in Wickham v. Byrne (2002) invalidated the state's grandparent visitation statute as unconstitutional. The circuit court and appellate court both held that the preexisting agreement was not invalidated by Wickham. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the decree was a contractual consent order entered by agreement of the parties (including the father) rather than imposed under the statute, and that such provisions remain subject to modification only upon a showing of changed circumstances necessary to serve the child's best interests, with any modification required to respect the constitutional principles set forth in Wickham.

family law

Pierre Ferguson sued the City of Chicago for malicious prosecution, alleging police officers falsely arrested and charged him with misdemeanors after he reported an ambulance collision. The circuit court dismissed the complaint under section 2-619(a)(5) as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying criminal proceedings did not terminate—and thus the malicious prosecution claim did not accrue—until the 160-day speedy-trial period expired after the charges were stricken with leave to reinstate, making Ferguson’s filing timely.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over the modification of child support payments in a divorce proceeding under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The father received annual gifts and loans from his parents totaling $46,000 in addition to his $15,000 teaching salary, and the question was whether these qualified as "net income" for calculating support obligations. The circuit court and appellate court both determined that they did, increasing the father's monthly support from $250 to $1,000. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the Act defines net income as total income from all sources without excluding gifts, and the purported loans were not repaid, making them equivalent to income.

family law

This case concerned whether Richard Girot's due process rights were violated when the Municipal Officers Electoral Board, including the city clerk who received his petitions, decided objections to his mayoral candidacy based on petition binding requirements under the Election Code. The electoral board sustained the objections and removed Girot from the ballot, a decision affirmed by the circuit court. The appellate court determined that due process was violated by the board member's participation but found the error harmless, leading to the Illinois Supreme Court's review of the due process and harmless error issues.

electionscivil rightsprocedure

In People v. Lawton, Gary Lawton was found to be a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and committed to the Department of Corrections after being charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of children. He later filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to vacate the commitment judgment on grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court granted the petition, but the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court reasoned that section 2-1401 is unavailable as a vehicle for raising constitutional claims such as ineffective assistance in proceedings under the Act, which are civil in nature and do not require the state to provide post-commitment collateral review akin to postconviction relief in criminal cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned defendant Samuel Morgan's appeal from the circuit court's denial of his successive petition for postconviction relief, which asserted actual innocence of his 1983 convictions for two murders, rape, and aggravated kidnapping based on newly discovered evidence, specifically the recantation of eyewitness Elijah Prater's trial testimony. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court rejected the petition, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court reasoned that postconviction relief on a successive petition requires a showing of cause and prejudice, that the credibility of the recantation was for the trial court to determine after observing the witness, and that the trial judge's rejection of the recantation as not credible was not manifestly erroneous, rendering related due process and section 2-1401 claims unsustainable.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a defendant who had pled guilty to first-degree murder filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging errors in his plea and sentencing. After more than 90 days passed without court action, counsel was appointed, who then moved to withdraw under Anders procedures, asserting that the claims lacked merit; the circuit court granted the withdrawal and dismissed the petition sua sponte. The appellate court allowed the withdrawal if counsel complied with Rule 651(c) but reversed the dismissal as unauthorized after the 90-day period. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act permits withdrawal when counsel fulfills statutory duties and the record demonstrates the claims are frivolous, as occurred here where the defendant's allegations were contradicted by the plea proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Gerald Huddleston, who was convicted in the circuit court of Livingston County of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of children based on acts committed against three victims. The trial court ruled that the statutory provision mandating a sentence of natural life imprisonment for such convictions against two or more persons was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and imposed consecutive ten-year sentences instead. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was constitutional as applied because the severe psychological harm caused by sexual assaults on children justifies the penalty, which is proportionate when compared to other offenses like aggravated battery of a child, given the distinct purposes of the statutes and the nature of the injuries.

criminal law

The case involved defendant Lee Jones, who was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery after pleading guilty on remand following an earlier reversal of her convictions. She filed a pro se postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act challenging the lack of admonishments about consecutive sentencing, which the trial court summarily dismissed at the first stage as frivolous. On appeal, Jones raised new claims for the first time regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on double jeopardy grounds and violation of the one-act, one-crime rule. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that claims not included in the original postconviction petition are waived under section 122-3 of the Act and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal from a first-stage dismissal. The court reasoned that such waived claims may instead be pursued in a successive petition by satisfying the cause-and-prejudice test.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Illinois General Assembly and Governor violated the state constitution by suspending cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) to judicial salaries for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 through legislation. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that these actions were unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the COLAs had been established as part of judicial salaries by prior law and the Compensation Review Board's report, and Article VI, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution explicitly prohibits diminishing judges' salaries during their terms of office. The court ordered the Comptroller to issue warrants to pay the withheld COLAs for both years, emphasizing that economic considerations do not override constitutional requirements.

procedure

The case involved defendant Mary Braggs, who was charged with two counts of first-degree murder in Cook County but found unfit to stand trial due to severe mental retardation. Following a discharge hearing, the circuit court found the evidence sufficient to establish guilt and committed her to the Department of Mental Health. Multiple appeals focused on the admissibility of her statements to police, including whether she could validly waive Miranda rights and whether statements were voluntary given her mental impairment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal as modified, holding that statements made on June 25, 1993, must be suppressed because the defendant was incapable of knowingly waiving her Miranda rights, and remanded for further suppression proceedings limited to earlier statements and a new discharge hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned an eminent domain proceeding in which the Illinois Department of Transportation sought to acquire property owned by 151 Interstate Road Corp. and related trusts for a highway improvement project under the Eminent Domain Act. The property owners filed a traverse and motion to dismiss, contending that IDOT had failed to negotiate in good faith and had not complied with statutory prelitigation notice requirements. The circuit court rejected these challenges and granted IDOT immediate vesting of title, but the owners pursued an interlocutory appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court resolved a conflict among appellate districts by holding that the issue of good-faith negotiation may be raised on interlocutory review under section 7-104(b), affirmed in part, reversed in part on the merits of the negotiation issue, and remanded the matter to the circuit court.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a class action by retail consumer Saul Wexler challenging Public Act 91-38, which raised liquor taxes on manufacturers and importing distributors, authorized infrastructure spending, and funded school projects; Wexler claimed the law violated the Illinois Constitution's three-readings, single-subject, and uniformity clauses because the tax increase was passed on to him as higher vodka prices. The circuit court upheld the tax against the uniformity challenge but invalidated the act under the three-readings and single-subject rules, granting injunctive relief. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wexler lacked standing because he suffered no direct injury from the manufacturer-level tax and any potential benefit from invalidation would be speculative, as there was no interlocking tax mechanism requiring refunds or price reductions to reach retail consumers. The court distinguished prior precedent involving connected taxes and directed dismissal of the action.

taxesprocedure

The case consolidated two unrelated proceedings under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code involving petitions to involuntarily admit or extend admission of respondents Sam S. and Michelle J. to state mental health facilities. The central issue was compliance with section 3-807, which requires testimony at the hearing from at least one psychiatrist, clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist who has examined the respondent. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the testimony was insufficient for Sam S. because the witness had not personally examined him and relied only on records and staff conversations, but sufficient for Michelle J. because the witness had examined her in a group session within days of the hearing.

healthcareprocedure

This case involved defendant Melvin Henderson, who was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class 1 felony. The circuit court set deadlines for presenting negotiated plea agreements, but the parties engaged in ongoing discussions without reaching a final agreement, and no such agreement was ever presented to the court after the deadlines passed. The appellate court addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider a late plea, but the Illinois Supreme Court found no evidence that an actual negotiated plea agreement existed or was submitted. Consequently, the court declined to resolve the underlying legal issue and instead reversed the appellate court's judgment while affirming the circuit court's decision.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Eleanor Flowers, who pleaded guilty to multiple forgery charges in Will County and received a sentence that included five-year prison terms, restitution, and an order withholding 50% of her prison wages for court costs, exceeding the State's recommendation. Flowers filed a direct appeal without first submitting the postjudgment motion to reconsider the sentence or withdraw her plea required by Supreme Court Rule 604(d) within 30 days, leading the appellate court to dismiss the appeal; she later raised related claims in a postconviction petition. The Illinois Supreme Court held that she could not challenge the sentence's validity on appeal or through the postconviction proceedings because strict compliance with Rule 604(d) is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction, and claims that parts of the sentence were void did not confer authority on the appellate court to address the merits absent proper jurisdiction. The court therefore vacated the lower courts' judgments and remanded with directions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

This consolidated appeal involves three defendants convicted of first-degree murder and related firearm and drug offenses after trials featuring alleged prosecutorial misconduct and trial errors, following the precedent in People v. Blue. The appellate court had reversed all convictions based on cumulative error and Blue. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversals of Cowley’s and Parker’s convictions, finding their records sufficiently similar to Blue to show a pervasive pattern of misconduct that denied them fair trials, but reversed the appellate court’s decision in Johnson’s case, concluding that the prosecutor’s brief comments were cured by jury instructions, the evidence was not closely balanced, and there was no cumulative error or pervasive misconduct warranting reversal; the court remanded Johnson’s case for consideration of his ineffective-assistance claim.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the termination of T.F.'s parental rights to his daughter Andrea after the State filed petitions alleging sexual abuse and neglect, leading to findings that Andrea was a ward of the court and placed under DCFS guardianship. The circuit court adjudicated T.F. unfit and terminated his rights, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court failed to provide required admonishments under section 1-5(3) of the Juvenile Court Act about the risk of termination for non-cooperation with DCFS. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, determining that the lack of specific admonishments did not warrant reversal of the termination order. The court addressed mootness concerns by invoking the public interest exception but ultimately upheld the termination based on the record of proceedings.

family lawprocedure