28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Rosewell
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-12-03 · cited 11×
The case involved an Illinois corporation that held a long-term lease on downtown Chicago property and sought to enjoin the county collector from selling the property for unpaid 1974 real estate taxes of about $80,000, alleging gross overassessment and violations of the state constitution's uniformity, due process, and equal protection provisions. The plaintiff had filed parallel federal suits, explicitly reserved all federal constitutional claims for federal courts, and declined to pay any portion of the taxes under protest as required by statute for judicial review. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it lacked authority under the state constitution to adjudicate the issues because the plaintiff's strategy rendered any state-court judgment non-final and advisory in nature, effectively making the state courts a mere adjunct to the federal proceedings.
taxespropertyprocedure
Pechous v. Slawko
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-12-02 · cited 31×
This case concerned the validity of ordinances passed by the city council of Berwyn and the board of trustees of Oak Lawn, both home rule municipalities, that transferred to the legislative bodies the power to appoint and remove certain municipal officers such as the superintendent of streets, commissioner of public works, and city collector. The trial court ruled in favor of the mayors and clerks, holding that appointment and removal powers belonged solely to the executive, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed those judgments. The court reasoned that under sections 6(a) and 6(f) of article VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, a home rule unit may exercise powers pertaining to its government and affairs, but changes to the form of government or the manner of selection of officers require either referendum approval or authorization by state law, which the ordinances lacked. The court rejected arguments that home rule authority permitted unilateral legislative assumption of these powers and also denied the plaintiffs' requests for attorney fees against the legislators or municipalities.
federal power
Eisenberg v. Industrial Commission
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-11-24 · cited 12×
The case involved a claim by Edith Eisenberg for workers' compensation benefits after she was assaulted on a public sidewalk while walking to her car after leaving work at the Cook County Department of Public Aid. The Industrial Commission and lower courts denied the claim, finding that the injuries did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this decision, reasoning that injuries sustained off the employer's premises while traveling to or from work are generally not compensable unless the employee's presence there was required by her duties or she faced a hazard peculiar to her employment greater than that of the general public, which was not shown here.
labor & employment
Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-11-15 · cited 23×
The case concerned whether an employee could bring a civil damages action against his employer for alleged age discrimination in violation of the Illinois Age Discrimination Act after being involuntarily retired at age 56. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The court reasoned that the statute created only a criminal penalty for violations and stated that the protected right to nondiscriminatory employment "shall be protected as provided herein," which precluded implying a private civil remedy; it contrasted this with other Illinois anti-discrimination laws that explicitly authorized civil actions. A related contract claim was also dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-11-15 · cited 49×
This case involved two Chicago firefighters who were seriously burned while responding to a fire at a gas station, which started when an employee left a defective pump unattended, causing gasoline to overflow, and a driver then discarded a lit match. The plaintiffs sued the station owner, operator, and others for negligence in the pump's condition and related actions that caused the fire, seeking to extend premises liability to firefighters injured by the fire's origin. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, affirming summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that a landowner's duty to firefighters, as clarified from prior precedent like Dini v. Naiditch, is limited to negligence in maintaining the premises and does not extend to acts of negligence that cause the fire itself, treating firefighters as having assumed the risks of fighting fires under traditional licensee principles. The core reasoning emphasized distinguishing between hazards on the property and the initial cause of the fire, consistent with subsequent case law limiting liability in such scenarios.
torts & liabilityproperty
People v. Chambers
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-11-15 · cited 16×
The case involved two minor sisters convicted in Ogle County circuit court of violating Illinois' 1973 curfew statute after being found in a parked car at 1 a.m. without adult supervision; each received a $10 fine. The appellate court reversed the convictions, ruling the statute unconstitutionally infringed on minors' rights to travel and exercise First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding the statute constitutional because its prohibitions and exceptions provided adequate notice of prohibited conduct and did not delegate unfettered discretion to officers. The court reasoned that the curfew served legitimate interests in protecting minors and that terms like "responsible companion" and "supervised" were sufficiently definite when read in context with the listed exceptions for work and parental approval.
criminal lawcivil rightsfree speech
People v. Clark
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-11-15 · cited 42×
The case concerned a defendant convicted of forgery after police conducted an inventory search of his impounded car, discovering blank checks stolen from a former employer that prompted his confession to forging one of them. The trial court denied pretrial motions to suppress the evidence and confession, and the conviction was upheld by the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the inventory search was valid under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to South Dakota v. Opperman because it followed standard police procedure to protect property and avoid disputes, and was also reasonable under article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. The court rejected arguments that the search was a pretext for investigation or that state constitutional privacy protections required a different result. A dissent contended that the search violated both federal and state constitutional rights.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Mordican
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-10-01 · cited 34×
In People v. Mordican, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial in Cook County circuit court of unlawful use of a weapon for possessing a sawed-off shotgun and had his probation from a prior offense revoked, with the sentences to run consecutively. The principal issues on appeal concerned the admission of the shotgun into evidence based on a warrantless search that had been upheld in a prior armed robbery trial resulting in acquittal, and prejudicial references by the prosecutor to the armed robbery charge without mentioning the acquittal. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the conviction and probation revocation, holding that the defendant's failure to file a formal motion to suppress did not waive the objection and that collateral estoppel did not apply to bar relitigation of the search's validity because the prior acquittal provided no opportunity for appellate review of that ruling; the court also found the prosecutor's statements prejudicial. The case was remanded for a new trial.
criminal lawgunsprocedure
County of Champaign v. Anthony
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-10-01 · cited 3×
The case involved the County of Champaign seeking to recover over $10,000 spent on 24-hour protection for a kidnapping victim after the defendant, who had been released on bail pending trial for kidnapping, battery, and related offenses, was observed outside the grand jury room with weapons and other items similar to those used in the crime. The trial court dismissed the county's complaint seeking reimbursement on the theory that the defendant owed a duty not to impose protection costs on the public, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the complaint was properly dismissed because section 9 of article I of the Illinois Constitution guarantees that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, and the bail order entitled the defendant to release without additional retroactive financial obligations imposed by the county. The court reasoned that allowing such recovery would dilute or nullify the defendant's constitutional right to bail by subjecting him to undisclosed costs beyond those fixed by the court.
criminal lawcivil rights
City of Chicago Ex Rel. Cohen v. Keane
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-10-01 · cited 44×
The case involved a taxpayer lawsuit filed on behalf of the City of Chicago against alderman Thomas E. Keane and others, seeking an accounting of profits from an alleged scheme in which Keane used his position as Finance Committee chairman to identify urban renewal areas, purchase tax-delinquent properties through nominees, clear liens via city council action without disclosure, and resell some parcels to city agencies. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, reasoning that no public funds or property had been diverted since the City had not bought or sold the land in a way that directly impacted taxes. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a municipal taxpayer has standing to sue for profits gained through an officer's conflict of interest because recovery would reduce the tax burden, that the City itself had a cause of action for such profits regardless of whether all properties were sold directly to it, and that policy considerations against undisclosed self-dealing by public officials support the claim.
criminal lawtaxesproperty
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McManus
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-10-01 · cited 25×
This case concerned a dispute between two insurers over primary liability coverage for a pedestrian injury caused when John McManus drove a car owned by Joyce Martin. Martin had loaned the car to Sheila McManus with permission to use it; John took the car without direct permission from Martin but after previously using it with Sheila's approval. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Allstate, holding that the policy issued by United States Fidelity & Guaranty covered the accident because Martin's initial permission to Sheila extended coverage to John under the policy's omnibus clause. The court applied the initial-permission rule from Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., concluding that further permission from the first permittee is not required and that inquiries into the scope of that permission would undermine the rule's purpose of simplifying insurance coverage disputes.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Brown v. Kirk
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-09-20 · cited 51×
The case concerned tenants of the East St. Louis Public Housing Authority who sought a declaratory judgment that Illinois conflict-of-interest statutes did not bar them from serving as authority commissioners, or alternatively that such disqualification violated the equal protection clause. The circuit court denied relief, the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The court held that section 5 of the Housing Authorities Act applies to tenants because their continuing lease relationship constitutes an interest in the project, triggering the common-law prohibition on officials making decisions that could affect their personal interests; it also rejected the equal protection claim, noting the disqualification turns on tenant status rather than poverty and that federal policy statements do not override the state statute.
civil rights
People v. Butler
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-09-20 · cited 92×
In People v. Butler, a jury in St. Clair County convicted the defendant of two counts of armed robbery against separate victims during an incident in which he and an accomplice used a knife and gun to take money from the victims after stopping their car. The appellate court reversed one conviction, holding that the robberies stemmed from a single course of conduct and intent, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and affirmed both convictions along with the concurrent 8-to-15-year sentences. The court explained that robbery is defined as taking property from the person or presence of another by force or threat, and here the concerted threats and actions against both victims made each robbery a distinct offense, even if one robber primarily targeted each victim. The court also found evidence of the accomplice's flight admissible to establish the facts of the crime and companion's identity, and upheld the sentences as within the trial court's discretion based on the presentence report.
criminal law
Cornue v. Department of Public Aid
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-06-28 · cited 3×
This case involved 20 elderly individuals who transferred all their current and future assets to a not-for-profit old people's home in exchange for lifetime care, including housing, food, medical treatment, and burial. They applied for public assistance under the Illinois Public Aid Code, but the Department of Public Aid denied the applications, ruling that the life-care contracts met their needs. The circuit and appellate courts reversed, finding eligibility, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed those decisions, holding that the contracts rendered the applicants ineligible because they had resources for care, and the home's construction of a new infirmary did not create ambiguity or impossibility in performing the contracts. The court reasoned that the Public Aid Code and department rules explicitly bar eligibility for those who purchased lifetime care until assets are consumed, and the contracts were unambiguous.
healthcare
Processing & Books, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-06-28 · cited 12×
The case involved a complaint by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency against Processing & Books, Inc. and its subsidiary for causing air pollution through odors from chicken manure and incinerators at their egg-producing farm, in violation of section 9(a) of the Environmental Protection Act. The Pollution Control Board fined the respondents $3,000 and issued a cease and desist order after finding substantial interference with neighbors' enjoyment of life and property. The appellate court reversed the order on grounds that it failed to specifically address the four statutory factors bearing on reasonableness of emissions under section 33(c) and did not place the burden of proof on the Agency. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the "unreasonably" standard in the definition of air pollution requires only objective substantial interference rather than proof of all four factors by the complainant, and that the Board's findings and penalty were supported by the record.
environmentbusiness & regulatory
People v. Van De Rostyne
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-05-28 · cited 57×
The case concerned the State's right to appeal a trial court's mid-trial order suppressing the results of a breathalyzer test in a driving-while-intoxicated prosecution after the jury had been impaneled. The defendant had labeled his motion a 'Motion To Suppress' on grounds of improper test procedures, the trial court granted it, and then declared a mistrial when the State announced an appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Rule 604(a)(1) authorizes State appeals only from orders suppressing evidence obtained in violation of constitutional protections such as unlawful search or seizure, not from routine evidentiary exclusions, but that the defendant could not benefit from his own mislabeling of the motion. The court therefore affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the suppression and mistrial orders and remanded the case with directions to vacate those orders and proceed to trial.
criminal lawprocedure
Cammers v. Marion Cablevision
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-05-28 · cited 11×
In this case, landowners sued a cable television company for installing underground cable and an aboveground box on their property without consent, seeking a mandatory injunction for removal along with damages. The circuit court found a trespass and granted the injunction, but the appellate court reversed that remedy while remanding for damages, concluding the company had trespassed but an injunction was inappropriate. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, holding that a county permit to install cable along a public highway did not authorize encroachment on the plaintiffs' fee interest beyond the scope of the prescriptive easement, though the evidence showed part of the installation fell within the easement area. The court reasoned that the highway permit could not override the property owners' rights without condemnation or consent, but limited relief to damages rather than requiring removal.
propertytorts & liability
Auster v. Keck
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-05-28 · cited 21×
This case involved homeowners who purchased a house in 1969 and later sued its architects after ceiling collapses in 1972, alleging the collapses resulted from a faulty 1960 design that lacked a vapor barrier to prevent moisture damage. The suit was filed under a five-year statute of limitations for property damage claims, and the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the action accrued at the time of design and construction more than five years earlier. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling that the discovery rule applied and instead affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the defect remained undiscovered during the prior owners' entire period of ownership, leaving an unaccounted-for nine-year gap. The court concluded that the burden was on the plaintiffs to plead facts showing the claim was timely and that this case did not require deciding the applicability of the discovery rule to architectural malpractice.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Saragusa v. City of Chicago
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-05-14 · cited 59×
The case involved Margaret Saragusa suing the City of Chicago for damages after she fell into a hole in a sidewalk and suffered a broken hip. The circuit court awarded her $14,100, but the appellate court reversed, finding that her presuit notice to the city was defective under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act because it lacked her signature and the name of the treating hospital. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the plaintiff could maintain her action since she filed her complaint within six months of the injury and the city obtained information about the hospital through discovery, overruling prior precedent that treated notice as a strict condition precedent to suit.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Sohio Pipe Line Co. v. Industrial Commission
Illinois Supreme Court · 1976-03-29 · cited 17×
The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Billy Ray Gowler, a pipeliner for Sohio Pipe Line Co., who suffered a heart attack after a day of heavy physical labor carrying and laying pipe in February 1971. The arbitrator and Industrial Commission awarded permanent total disability benefits, which the circuit court confirmed, and Sohio appealed arguing lack of evidence that the injury arose out of employment and failure to provide timely statutory notice of an accidental injury. The court affirmed the award, reasoning that the claimant's symptoms at the end of the workday supported an inference that the heart attack began during work, that the employer received sufficient notice of the disability without undue prejudice, and that the submitted forms did not create an estoppel. The court remanded for corrections to the award amount to exclude periods when the claimant was paid and to credit sick pay plan payments.
labor & employment