Charles H. Thompson

This case involved an original petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company seeking to compel a Cook County circuit judge to dismiss, on forum non conveniens grounds, a Federal Employers' Liability Act wrongful death action arising from a train collision in New Mexico. The plaintiff administrator, appointed in Oklahoma and representing New Mexico residents, had refiled the suit in Illinois after an Oklahoma court dismissed an identical action on the same grounds; the only connection to Illinois was the railroad's business operations there. The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss, emphasizing the plaintiff's statutory right under the FELA to select a forum. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the mandamus petition, holding that the judge properly exercised discretion in upholding that choice absent a stronger showing of inconvenience. The core reasoning centered on the substantial nature of the plaintiff's forum selection right under federal law and the lack of sufficient factors justifying dismissal despite the defendant's claimed burdens.

procedure

The case concerned a damages award under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act to a railroad employee injured on the job, where a jury found the employee lacked capacity to sign a release and awarded $200,000; the Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether section 75(2)(c) of the Civil Practice Act required the Appellate Court to strike the remanding portion of its order upon the plaintiff’s motion and affidavit waiving a new trial, whether the Appellate Court could reweigh evidence in FELA cases, and related evidentiary issues. The court held that compliance with the statute makes striking the remand mandatory, enabling Supreme Court review, and that federal law limits state appellate review in FELA actions to checking for an evidentiary basis for the verdict rather than reweighing evidence, so the Appellate Court erred in setting aside the jury’s verdict.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case involved a dispute over a 1937 deed from Belle S. Boyce to her nieces conveying two tracts of land in Bloomington, Illinois; the deed included both a house tract and a barn tract, but Boyce later sold the house tract to the appellees in 1939 and 1946 via contract and warranty deed. The appellees sued to quiet title after discovering the prior deed, and Boyce filed a counterclaim seeking reformation of the 1937 deed on grounds that the house tract was included by scrivener error. The circuit court reformed the deed to exclude the house tract, finding that Boyce intended only to convey her interest in the barn tract. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that reformation was proper even without mutual mistake because the conveyance was a voluntary gift to the nieces as mere volunteers who had no knowledge of it at the time.

property

This case involved a partition suit filed in Cook County court over certain premises, in which Allen Crossley was initially named as a defendant. After Crossley's death, John Lee was substituted as a party defendant in his capacity as executor, sole heir, legatee, and devisee. Lee later petitioned to vacate the resulting decree of partition and sale, arguing that he had not been served with summons under the Civil Practice Act, had not authorized the attorneys who filed an answer on his behalf, and was thus deprived of due process. The court found that Lee had entered an appearance in the proceeding, as evidenced by his own testimony in the case and the unobjected-to testimony of the attorneys that they represented him. On this basis, the trial court's order striking Lee's petition was affirmed.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Edward F. Thomas, who was indicted in Winnebago County for armed robbery and rape. After a jury trial he was convicted on both counts and sentenced to consecutive prison terms. The defendant raised three claims on appeal: that he should have been discharged because he was not tried within four months of his arrest, that the prosecution failed to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the evidence was otherwise insufficient to establish guilt. The court rejected each claim, holding that the four-month speedy-trial period began only when the defendant was released from a mental hospital and served with the capias in 1948, that substantial evidence rebutted any presumption of insanity arising from prior commitments, and that the victim’s identification together with other corroborating proof was sufficient to support the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who was injured when he fell from the tailgate of a truck owned and driven by the defendant while selling produce; both the plaintiff’s employer and the defendant (who operated a cartage business) were covered by the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the plaintiff had already received benefits from his own employer. The defendant raised section 29 of the Act as a defense, arguing that it barred the plaintiff’s common-law negligence suit and transferred any rights to the employer. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 29 protects a third-party employer operating under the Act even when that employer personally performs the negligent act, because the injury arose in the course of the defendant’s business and the statutory scheme abolishes common-law liability in such circumstances.

labor & employmenttorts & liability