Robert C. Underwood

This case concerned a special grand jury investigation into the unauthorized disclosure of confidential juvenile court transcripts to Chicago newspapers, which quoted a judge's remarks from closed hearings. The circuit court granted a special prosecutor's request to compel reporter Rob Warden to identify his source, overriding his statutory reporter's privilege under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that order on direct appeal. It held that no compelling public interest justified divestiture because the disclosed information involved only the judge's statements made in open court and did not reveal the identities or conduct of any juveniles protected by the Juvenile Court Act. The court further noted that alternative sources of the transcripts existed within the State's Attorney's office and that the privilege serves important First Amendment interests in newsgathering.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case involved defendant Charles Henry Thurman, who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and armed violence after shooting and killing a customer outside his tavern following a disturbance; he claimed the shooting was accidental while defending himself. The circuit court sentenced him to 13 years in prison, but the appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial, finding error in the jury instructions. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that the omission of "lawful justification" language from the issues instruction on involuntary manslaughter was reversible error because evidence supported both recklessness and self-defense, and jurors needed clear guidance on the affirmative defense despite its presence in the definitional instruction. The court reversed the remand for armed violence, as that offense cannot be based on involuntary manslaughter, and remanded solely for a new trial on the involuntary manslaughter charge. The decision addressed waiver rules but found the instructional defect affected fundamental fairness.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Sherry Lynne Mitchell's convictions on two counts each of attempted murder and aggravated battery of a child for repeatedly beating her 16-month-old daughter, causing life-threatening injuries and permanent disabilities. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the appellate court's judgment, upholding the aggravated battery convictions and sentences while vacating the attempted murder convictions, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The core reasoning focused on the sufficiency of evidence establishing great bodily harm for the battery counts, the propriety of the sentences, and whether defense counsel's performance rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, with the majority concluding that the convictions for aggravated battery were supported despite concerns about counsel's competence.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Charles Albanese was convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Lake County of the arsenic-poisoning murder of his mother-in-law, Marion Mueller, and was sentenced to death following a separate sentencing hearing under the Criminal Code. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. The court held that the State's circumstantial evidence sufficiently proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including proof of financial motive and additional incriminating facts such as the defendant's prior denial of possessing arsenic, his related convictions, and schemes involving cellmates and implicating others. The court further ruled that evidence of the defendant's financial problems was properly admitted because it was accompanied by other incriminating evidence, and that evidence of other crimes did not deny him a fair trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case addressed whether a spouse's settlement and release of a personal-injury claim from a car accident bars the other spouse from pursuing an independent action for loss of consortium. The court established a general rule requiring that loss-of-consortium claims be joined with the impaired spouse's action whenever possible to avoid double recovery of damages for support and related losses, with dismissal required absent proof that joinder was not feasible. However, it held that the wife could proceed with her separate claim here because her loss-of-consortium suit and divorce proceedings were already pending with an injunction against settlement proceeds at the time of the husband's release, and the defendant settled with knowledge of those actions. The court affirmed the appellate decision reversing the trial court's dismissal, while directing that the jury be instructed to exclude allegations of lost support and medical expenses already covered in the husband's settlement.

torts & liabilityprocedurefamily law

The case involved a breach of contract claim by Archer Daniels Midland Company against Edward Barth for failure to deliver soybeans as agreed. After the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, with the formal order filed on October 6, 1982, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider on September 20 and a notice of appeal on January 28, 1983. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of the appeal, holding that the motion to reconsider was untimely under Rule 272 because it was filed before the signed judgment order, and thus did not extend the 30-day period for filing the notice of appeal. The court reasoned that judgments become final and appealable only upon entry of the signed order, and an untimely post-judgment motion has no effect on appellate jurisdiction, rejecting arguments based on revestment or constructive refiling.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In People v. Newell, the defendant was convicted of burglary on an accountability theory following a jury trial in Hancock County circuit court, based solely on the testimony of one accomplice who received immunity in exchange for his statement implicating the defendant. The appellate court reversed the conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court held that the uncorroborated accomplice testimony was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because it was directly contradicted in material respects by the testimony of two other accomplices, all three witnesses were convicted felons, and there was no other corroborating evidence linking the defendant to the offense.

criminal law

This case concerned the disposition of real estate transfer tax revenues collected in Illinois counties from August 1978 to May 1979 under a statute that required counties to retain half the proceeds, a provision later held unconstitutional as creating an impermissible fee office. Plaintiffs sought either refunds to the individual taxpayers who paid the tax or transfer of the retained funds to the state treasury. The court held that the state was entitled to the funds because the statute validly imposed a 50-cent-per-$500 tax on transfers, with the unconstitutional retention not affecting the state's claim to the full amount collected. The decision rested on prior precedents treating diverted tax revenues as belonging to the state treasury rather than requiring refunds to payers, and a subsequent statute relieving counties of any repayment obligation was noted as confirming the outcome. A related appeal from Lake County was dismissed on procedural grounds for lack of a required finding of appealability.

taxesprocedure

The case involved Brian J. Frey, who was convicted after a bench trial in Peoria County of driving under the influence stemming from a 1981 car accident that also led to reckless homicide charges against him. The appellate court ordered a new trial, concluding that the record did not establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Frey's right to a jury trial on the DUI count. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that decision and reinstated the conviction, holding that the waiver was valid. The court reasoned that the record reflected repeated references to a bench trial in orders and discussions, defense counsel's explicit statements of waiver in Frey's presence, the parties' agreements and stipulations for trial before the judge, and Frey's lack of objection despite being advised of his rights and present during relevant proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a disciplinary proceeding against attorney Marshall I. Teichner, who represented Helen Escobedo in claims following the death of her long-term partner, including a group life insurance policy, workers' compensation, and a products liability suit. The Administrator charged Teichner with overreaching by charging an excessive fee on the insurance proceeds, dishonest conduct, and commingling and converting client funds. After hearings, both the hearing panel and Review Board found the charges proven and recommended disbarment, noting Teichner's prior two-year suspension for solicitation. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed and ordered disbarment, reasoning that the misconduct demonstrated insensitivity to ethical standards that warranted removal from the profession to protect the public and maintain professional integrity, even considering the timing of prior discipline.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the parents of a 17-year-old boy killed in a car accident after a truck driver, acting for his employer, passed other vehicles unsafely in fog and forced the son's car off the road. The defendants admitted liability under negligence and willful-and-wanton counts, leaving the jury to decide damages under the Wrongful Death Act, Survival Act, and Family Expense Act. The Illinois Supreme Court held that parents of a minor child may recover damages for loss of society as part of presumed pecuniary loss, but reversed the verdicts because the trial court admitted irrelevant evidence of the driver's failure to stop and gave inconsistent jury instructions on conscious pain and suffering. The court affirmed the appellate decision and remanded for a new trial limited to damages on the wrongful death and survival counts.

torts & liabilityfamily law

The case involved defendant Donald Dillon, Jr., who was stopped for a burned-out license plate light, arrested on an outstanding bond forfeiture warrant, and later found with cocaine in his wallet during an inventory of his belongings at the police station. The circuit court suppressed the evidence as an unconstitutional search, and the appellate court affirmed, finding no authority for an inventory search without proof of impending incarceration. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was justified either as incident to a lawful arrest under state statute or as a valid inventory search. The court reasoned that probable cause existed based on the verified warrant, that officers were not required to credit the defendant's claims about the warrant, and that precedents such as Illinois v. Lafayette and United States v. Robinson supported the objective reasonableness of examining the wallet's contents at the station.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant whose probation was revoked was entitled to credit against a subsequent prison sentence for time served on probation after a revocation petition and arrest warrant were issued. Defendant Lester Goodman had been sentenced to probation for taking indecent liberties with a child; after the state filed a revocation petition alleging battery, his probation was revoked and he received a five-year prison term. The Illinois Supreme Court held that section 5-6-4(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections requires credit for time served on probation unless the trial court orders otherwise, and that the tolling provision in section 5-6-4(a)(3) serves only to retain jurisdiction over the probationer rather than to deny credit. The court reasoned that the statutory language and considerations of fairness supported crediting the post-warrant period, while trial judges retain discretion to deny credit in cases of delay.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Kellick, the defendant was convicted by a jury of murdering his 15-year-old half-sister and sentenced to death following a separate sentencing hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the applicability of a statutory aggravating factor for the death penalty based on the victim's age under 12, considering amendments to the law that took effect around the time of the offense. Although statutes generally operate prospectively, the court identified legislative intent for retroactive application of the version requiring the victim to be under 12. Since the victim was 15, the death sentence was vacated while the conviction was affirmed, and the case was remanded for a new sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Robin Wayne Owens, who was convicted by a jury in Will County of murdering George Kallai and sentenced to death. The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed challenges to the admission of Owens's confessions obtained during police interrogation and to the trial court's limits on cross-examining a key prosecution witness, David Toliver, about potential bias from pending criminal charges. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the confessions were properly admitted after a valid Miranda waiver and that any restriction on cross-examination regarding Toliver's legal situation was not prejudicial given other impeachment evidence. The decision emphasized that the evidence supported the jury's findings despite conflicts in testimony about the interrogation process and Toliver's credibility.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1980 Illinois divorce decree that incorporated a settlement agreement requiring the husband to pay the wife unallocated maintenance and child support for 60 months, with payments specified as non-modifiable except upon the wife's death. After the wife's remarriage, the husband petitioned to end the payments and repeatedly sought a change of venue to avoid the judge who had handled prior post-decree matters in the same case; the trial court denied both the venue motions and the modification petition. The appellate court reversed on venue grounds, treating each post-decree petition as a new proceeding that entitled the husband to an automatic change of venue. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the trial court, holding that post-decree petitions in an ongoing dissolution case do not reset the venue statute and that the parties' agreement validly precluded modification under sections 502 and 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The core reasoning was that repeated venue changes would nullify the statutory limit of one change per litigant and that the Act expressly permits agreements to limit or preclude modification of maintenance terms.

family lawprocedure

This case involved the criminal prosecution of 15-year-old James Hicks, Jr., who was transferred to adult court and convicted by a jury of rape, deviate sexual assault, and heinous battery for sexually assaulting a 9-year-old girl and pouring boiling water on her, causing severe permanent burns and disfigurement. The appellate court reduced the heinous battery conviction to aggravated battery on the ground that boiling water was not a caustic substance under the statute, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed that reduction and reinstated the original conviction while affirming the consecutive sentences imposed. The court reasoned that the defendant had waived any challenge to whether boiling water qualified as caustic by failing to raise the issue at trial, where medical testimony treated it as such, and that the sentencing judge's detailed findings adequately demonstrated that consecutive terms were necessary to protect the public. The court also upheld the overall sentence structure without requiring resentencing on all counts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a minor, T.W., charged with retail theft in a petition under the Juvenile Court Act, where the trial court granted a continuance under supervision despite the State's Attorney's objection and ruled that the statutory requirement for prosecutorial consent violated separation of powers. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that section 4-7(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act, which conditions a continuance under supervision on the absence of objection by the State's Attorney, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine in the Illinois Constitution. The court reasoned that the provision is analogous to a prior case, People v. Phillips, involving executive consent for drug-treatment programs, as it merely allows the executive branch to direct that traditional delinquency proceedings continue rather than encroaching on core judicial functions. It further noted that courts retain authority to impose similar outcomes, such as conditions of probation, once proceedings resume. The cause was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Roanoke Agency, an Illinois corporation formed before 1971, could amend its articles of incorporation to authorize nonvoting shares of stock. The Secretary of State refused to file the amendments, citing section 8 of the Transition Schedule to the 1970 Illinois Constitution, which preserved cumulative voting rights for shareholders of pre-1971 corporations. Roanoke sought judicial review, and the circuit court ordered the Secretary to accept the filings. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1970 Constitution reflected a shift in public policy that rendered cumulative voting rights waivable by unanimous shareholder consent, thereby permitting the issuance of nonvoting stock. The court reasoned that the new constitution eliminated the prior mandatory cumulative voting requirement and left such matters to legislative and private determination for existing corporations.

business & regulatory

This case was a disciplinary proceeding against six Illinois attorneys, including Kane County State's Attorney Eugene Armentrout and assistants, who forged signatures on petitions to qualify a statewide advisory referendum on tax and spending limits for the 1978 ballot. The attorneys, after collecting some valid signatures at a county fair, participated in 'roundtabling' sessions to fabricate thousands more names from voter lists and phone books, with Armentrout also falsely notarizing the documents; the conduct was charged as violating professional rules against fraud and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the forgeries undermined democratic processes and discredited the legal profession, leading to suspensions for Armentrout and Petersen plus censures for Grodner, Presbrey, and Weir (with a separate censure for Truemper). The core reasoning was that lawyers, especially those in public office, must uphold honesty in electoral matters rather than engage in or direct fraudulent petition practices.

electionscriminal law