Daniel P. Ward

The case involved Jimmy Ray Pitsonbarger, who was convicted in a bench trial of two counts of intentional first-degree murder and four counts of felony murder arising from the shooting deaths of Claude and Alta Brown during a burglary and home invasion in Peoria County. A jury found him eligible for the death penalty based on multiple murders and murders committed in the course of a felony, and after weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence determined that no mitigating factors precluded a death sentence, which the trial court imposed. On direct appeal, the defendant raised numerous challenges to the guilt phase, jury selection, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions on mitigating factors and mercy, the admission of unadjudicated conduct, and the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the intentional murder convictions and death sentence, holding that the evidence supported the verdicts, most claims were waived or foreclosed by precedent, and the statute was constitutional, while vacating the four felony-murder convictions because only two homicides occurred. The court rejected arguments that the burden-of-proof instructions or other procedures rendered the sentencing hearing unfair.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Primitivo Rivera, who was convicted in Cook County circuit court of possessing a stolen motor vehicle after he drove a car on a dealership lot without the owner's permission on November 19, 1985; he was stopped when the car hit a security cable at the lot entrance. The appellate court reversed the conviction, ruling that the defendant lacked exclusive control over the vehicle and had not removed it from the premises as required for theft. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the conviction, holding that the defendant exercised unauthorized control by starting and driving the car, which severed the owner's possession for an appreciable time even though the car remained on the lot. The court reasoned that under the Illinois Vehicle Code and theft statutes, a completed taking occurs when the offender obtains control without permission, regardless of whether the property is removed from the owner's premises or briefly possessed.

criminal lawproperty

In this case, Robin Wayne Owens, who had been convicted of armed robbery and murder and sentenced to death, appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. He claimed that the trial court should have held a fitness hearing to assess his ability to assist post-conviction counsel due to mental health issues, that no such hearing was authorized under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act or related statutes, and that his appointed post-conviction counsel failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) by not adequately supporting claims of ineffective trial counsel. The court held that the statutes do not require or permit fitness hearings in post-conviction proceedings to determine competence to assist counsel or fitness for execution when no date is set, and that due process and other constitutional claims did not mandate such hearings. It further found that post-conviction counsel had sufficiently consulted with the petitioner, examined the record, and presented evidence at the evidentiary hearing, satisfying Rule 651(c). The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., an employee sued his employer and a co-employee security guard for false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution stemming from two workplace incidents involving questioning about theft and a later arrest for trespass when the employee sought his paycheck. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employer under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and dismissed some counts against the co-employee for insufficient facts; the appellate court affirmed the employer’s dismissal and part of the co-employee dismissal but reversed on others. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act bars common-law tort suits against the employer even for intentional conduct by a co-employee acting within the scope of employment, that such suits may proceed against the co-employee individually, and that the complaint’s allegations of unlawful restraint without probable cause were sufficient to state claims for false imprisonment and false arrest.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved defendant Ronald Janis, who was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of a vehicle with its identification number removed. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress evidence obtained when police entered a gravel area behind his plumbing business without a warrant, arguing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy there; the trial court denied the motion, finding no such expectation, and he was convicted. The appellate court reversed the convictions, but the Illinois Supreme Court held that the gravel area was not within the curtilage of the home and thus not automatically protected, while also determining that the record was insufficient to decide whether the defendant had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. The court vacated both lower judgments and remanded for continuation of the suppression hearing with opportunity for additional evidence, after which the trial court could either suppress the evidence and grant a new trial or reinstate the convictions.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

In this criminal case, defendant Randy Mink was convicted by a jury in Lake County of unlawful possession and delivery of cocaine based on an undercover transaction. After the verdict, the trial judge granted a new trial on grounds that the State had failed to prove venue, but a different judge later reconsidered the order, vacated the new-trial grant, and reinstated the convictions and sentence. The appellate court reversed, holding that the new-trial order was effectively an acquittal and that double-jeopardy principles barred reconsideration. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the convictions, reasoning that the order was entered after the jury had already returned its verdict, so vacating it simply reinstated the existing guilty verdict without exposing the defendant to a second trial or further factual proceedings on the elements of the offense.

criminal lawprocedure