Jacob W. Wilkin

The case involved a dispute over a surety bond issued by Central Lumber Company guaranteeing contractor M. Rafferty's performance on a contract with the Kelters to build three houses for $8,400. The Kelters sued the company after Rafferty defaulted, seeking recovery for extra costs to complete the work, and the company defended on grounds including lack of proper bond execution, that the bond was ultra vires its corporate powers to buy and sell lumber, and that the owners had failed to withhold payments as required. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the bond was within the company's implied powers because it was executed to secure lumber sales to the contractor, that evidence supported a breach and the amount of damages, and that procedural objections regarding pleadings were without merit.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the priority of liens on real property in Chicago, where appellant Mann sought to foreclose on a trust deed mortgage he held, while appellee Jummel claimed a superior lien under a later trust deed on the same property. The trial court granted Mann's foreclosure with Jummel in second position, but the Appellate Court reversed to award Jummel first lien and Mann second. On appeal, the court affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that Mann's failure to record the assignment of the notes or the extension agreement, combined with leaving the original debt appearing past due on the record, allowed Jummel to rely on a recorded release deed executed by the trustee after maturity. The core reasoning was that under the recording act, a subsequent purchaser like Jummel was protected by the presumption of payment from the release when the debt was past due, and Mann's negligence in protecting his interest meant he bore the loss from the trustee's fraud.

property

This case was an insurance dispute in which Robert F. Johnston sued Phoenix Insurance Company on a fire policy covering his dwelling and related property after the dwelling was destroyed by fire. The policy barred additional insurance without the insurer's written consent, and the company defended on the ground that Johnston had obtained other coverage without consent, rendering the policy void. Johnston replied that the company's general agent had waived the condition through correspondence and conduct after receiving notice of the additional policy. The trial court entered judgment for Johnston, which the Appellate Court affirmed on findings that the agent's silence after being informed of the other insurance amounted to waiver or estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agent's conduct after notice estopped the company from asserting the forfeiture.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether appellee Ferguson was a partner with McLeod in the business that McLeod later assigned for the benefit of creditors, which would bar Ferguson (and the bank standing in his place) from asserting a claim against the assigned estate. The court held that the March 10, 1888 agreement between Ferguson and McLeod created a partnership, reversing the lower courts' allowance of the claims. The opinion reasoned that the contract showed the parties' intent for each to act as a principal in the business and agent for the other: Ferguson was to advance capital, take general charge of operations, and receive a share of net profits (after deducting salaries) as compensation for both his services and the use of his money, rather than merely as a creditor or employee. The court applied the principle from Cox v. Hickman that sharing profits creates partnership liability when the recipient participates as a principal, not merely when profits measure compensation for a loan or services, and found the instrument as a whole established that proprietary relationship.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over the dissolution of a partnership, specifically the proper accounting of one partner's interest in firm assets including the value of good will. The master in chancery found a $5000 value for good will and reported on the firm's financial condition at dissolution based on available evidence. The circuit court affirmed the master's accounting except for the good will item, which it found had no value, but the appellate court reversed. The supreme court held that the circuit court's decree was correct, reasoning that the evidence showed no legally cognizable good will attached to the short-lived, unprofitable business and that procedural defects in exceptions did not warrant reversal under the statute.

business & regulatoryprocedure