Norman F. Arterburn

The case concerned Donna Chadwick's conviction for second-degree murder of her twenty-one-month-old daughter, for which she received a sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years. On appeal, Chadwick argued that the trial court erred by allowing the state's main witness, a co-defendant who had entered an insanity plea in a separate proceeding, to testify without ordering a new psychiatric examination, and that the evidence was insufficient to show she inflicted the fatal injuries. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that a competency hearing with testimony from the witness and his counsel, along with prior psychiatric reports finding him competent, showed no abuse of discretion in permitting the testimony. The court further held that testimony from the witness describing Chadwick striking the child with a shoe, medical evidence on the cause of death, and other witness accounts provided sufficient evidence for the jury to convict despite conflicting testimony from Chadwick herself.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lester French, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder (while committing a kidnapping), kidnapping, armed robbery, armed rape, and carrying a handgun without a license, arising from a 1974 robbery of a grocery store in which the victim was abducted, sexually assaulted, and killed; he received a death sentence for the murder along with consecutive prison terms for the other counts. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. It rejected challenges to the constitutionality of Indiana's death penalty statute, holding that capital punishment is not cruel and unusual punishment per se under the Eighth Amendment or the state constitution, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedents such as Gregg v. Georgia, and that the statute's provisions for imposing the death penalty in specified circumstances (including killings during a kidnapping) satisfy due process requirements under the Fifth Amendment. The court also addressed evidentiary issues but upheld the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of testimony.

criminal law

The case involved Ernest Richard Tope's appeal from his 1975 conviction for first-degree murder and life sentence, based on the denial of his motion to correct errors. The court reviewed challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, including testimony from witnesses like an alleged accomplice and jailhouse informant, as well as the admission of autopsy photographs and the denial of a new trial motion supported by an affidavit about a potential alibi witness. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict, that the photographs were properly admitted without prejudice, that no exculpatory evidence had been improperly suppressed, and that the newly discovered evidence was merely impeaching and unlikely to change the outcome.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Carl W. Sanderson's 1973 petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 1966 guilty plea to first-degree murder, which resulted in a life sentence; he argued the plea was not knowing and voluntary due to his mental state and ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition after a hearing, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that denial on appeal. The court noted that Boykin v. Alabama did not apply retroactively, so specific constitutional advisements were not required, but applied a relaxed burden of proof for the ineffective counsel claim under prior precedent; it found no reasonable doubt as to counsel's effectiveness based on conflicting testimony resolved against the petitioner, along with evidence that counsel had secured a favorable venue change via plea agreement, and that psychiatric reports did not demonstrate the plea was involuntary. The court also rejected claims regarding the admission of a confession at the post-conviction hearing as non-prejudicial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Stephen Cheeks's conviction for two counts of armed robbery following a 1975 incident at a Kroger store in Indianapolis, where two men used guns to steal cash, food stamps, and a purse. Cheeks appealed the denial of his motion for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(A), the admission of evidence seized during a traffic stop and frisk, and the trial court's procedure allowing jurors to submit written questions. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that delays were attributable to the defense or agreed upon by Cheeks, waiving any speedy trial claim, that the stop, observation of the purse in plain view, and frisk yielding the stolen items were constitutionally permissible, and that the juror question procedure was within the trial court's discretion with no shown prejudice. The court found no error in any of the rulings and upheld the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Grady Thomas Bobbitt's convictions for commission of a felony (robbery) while armed and for inflicting injury during the commission of a robbery, arising from an armed holdup at a pharmacy in which a customer was shot. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the armed robbery sentence and conviction, holding that the armed robbery charge is embodied in the inflicting injury charge under prior precedent in Swininger v. State, so that separate sentencing constituted fundamental error. All other sentencing issues, including consecutive sentences and jury involvement, were rendered moot by this ruling. The court also addressed the sufficiency of evidence regarding the defendant's age for the armed robbery charge but did not reach a final determination on that point independent of the vacatur.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James Mitchell Brown's conviction for commission of a felony while armed with a deadly weapon based on his alleged participation in a 1975 liquor store robbery in Indianapolis. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and 20-year sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of a petition for change of venue. The court held that eyewitness identifications and other testimony provided substantial evidence of the defendant's identity and use of a weapon, without any need to admit the weapon itself into evidence, and that the venue petition was untimely filed more than two months after the not guilty plea. It further reasoned that withdrawn guilty pleas did not extend the Criminal Rule 12 deadline and that no hearing was required on the prejudice claim.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Frank C. Roberts, who was convicted in 1975 of armed robbery and inflicting injury during a robbery after attempting to rob a church chorus rehearsal in 1973, during which a participant was shot. Roberts appealed the denial of his motion to correct errors, primarily arguing that his pauper counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct adequate discovery, investigation, research, or plea negotiations. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on the merits, holding that counsel's informal access to the prosecution file and trial strategy choices did not constitute ineffective representation or prejudice the defendant, as no undiscovered evidence or viable alternatives were shown. The court also vacated the armed robbery sentence because it merged with the injury conviction. A concurrence agreed on the outcome but urged limits on deferring to counsel's strategy when it avoids reasonable alternatives.

criminal lawprocedure

In Montague v. State, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder after admitting to police that he had killed a man and leading them to evidence including a gun and the victim's body found via mud on his car; he was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15-25 years in prison. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home and car without a warrant, as well as certain jury instructions on self-defense and the consequences of an insanity plea. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the gun was voluntarily disclosed by the defendant's wife and the mud on the car was in plain view, so no unconstitutional search occurred, and that the jury instructions adequately covered the relevant legal standards without misleading the jury or omitting key points. The court further noted that the defendant had not shown prejudice from any alleged instructional deficiencies and that the trial court was not required to instruct on post-verdict procedures for an insanity finding absent an erroneous view of the law being given to the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Edward Parnell Johnson, who was convicted in 1974 of kidnapping, rape, and robbery after entering a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court found him sane at the time of the offenses based on testimony from three court-appointed psychiatric experts and lay witnesses who described his calm and controlled demeanor during and after the crimes. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the sanity finding. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that substantial evidence of probative value existed to uphold the trial court's determination and that an appellate court cannot reweigh conflicting testimony or credibility assessments.

criminal law

In Sims v. State, two defendants were jointly tried and convicted of first degree murder primarily based on their individual confessions to police, each implicating the other in the crime. The trial court denied motions for separate trials and instead admitted redacted versions of the confessions, replacing references to the codefendant with blanks or "X". The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that such redactions were ineffective and that admitting the statements in a joint trial violated the defendants' constitutional right to confront witnesses against them, as established in Bruton v. United States, requiring either effective deletion, exclusion of the statements, or separate trials.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Clyde Tinsley’s appeal from his conviction for second-degree murder and life sentence after he was identified by witnesses and apprehended near the murder weapon following the shooting of Marcellus Wilcox. Tinsley challenged the admission of three morgue photographs of the victim, arguing they were inflammatory due to visible autopsy incisions, and contested several jury instructions on self-defense, voluntary manslaughter, and evidence of flight. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the photographs were relevant to showing the wounds and not unnecessarily gruesome compared to prior precedents, that the challenged instructions were either approved in prior cases or properly supplemented by other instructions read as a whole, and that the circumstances supported an inference of flight for the jury to consider.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a defendant convicted of rape in Indiana after his trial was transferred from Benton County to Warren County because the crime occurred in the latter location. On rehearing, the defendant argued that a fatal variance existed between the charging affidavit, which named Benton County, and the evidence presented at trial showing the offense in Warren County, since the affidavit was never formally amended. The Indiana Supreme Court overruled the petition and affirmed the conviction, holding that the transfer statute implicitly amended the venue in the charge and that any variance was not material because it did not mislead the defendant in preparing his defense or create a double jeopardy risk. The court also noted that the issue had been waived by not being raised at trial or in post-trial motions until the motion to correct errors. The decision emphasized that the defendant was fully aware of the correct venue before trial and that court records would prevent any subsequent prosecution in the wrong county.

criminal lawprocedure

In Schuman v. State, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter for killing his wife; after multiple continuances and a psychiatric examination, he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He later petitioned for post-conviction relief, claiming the trial court violated Ind. Code § 35-5-3-2 by failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte despite evidence of mental health concerns, including requests for medical testing and a transfer for psychiatric evaluation. The Indiana Supreme Court agreed that the statute required such a hearing before accepting the plea but held that the error did not require reversal because the post-conviction record, including testimony from two psychiatrists, permitted a retrospective determination that the defendant had been competent to stand trial and plead guilty. The court therefore affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. One justice dissented on the retrospective competency determination.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Xavier Whittaker appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief after his 1970 convictions for first-degree burglary, armed rape, and armed robbery. Whittaker argued that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial, claiming he believed he was signing a continuance request and had not been properly advised by counsel. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, holding that Whittaker failed to meet his burden of proving the waiver invalid by a preponderance of the evidence. The court noted that the written waiver was straightforward, Whittaker had prior experience with jury rights from an earlier case, and the trial judge's credibility determinations could not be overturned on appeal absent unconflicting evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lonnie Deel, who was convicted of kidnapping and armed rape after abducting and assaulting a 16-year-old victim at gunpoint in 1973. Deel raised claims on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove his sanity at the time of the crimes and to support the armed rape conviction, that a prior statement was improperly used to impeach his testimony, and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for examination as a possible criminal sexual deviant. The court held the evidence sufficient to establish sanity and the use of the weapon during the crimes, found the statement properly admitted for impeachment, and determined that the denial of the deviancy examination was erroneous because applying a post-offense statutory amendment excluding rape convictions would constitute ex post facto legislation. Accordingly, the convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded to permit the examination under the prior version of the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

In Block v. State, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree burglary, theft, and rape, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony from the victim's sister recounting that the attacker had identified himself as "Jessie" and by denying a mistrial based on an alleged discovery violation. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statements fell within the res gestae or spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule because they were made under circumstances excluding deliberation or fabrication. The court further reasoned that no discovery order had been issued, the evidence was not exculpatory, the surprise was unavoidable, and the trial court acted within its discretion by treating the weekend break as an adequate remedy rather than granting a mistrial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Timm v. State, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury trial. He appealed the denial of his motion to correct errors, raising three main issues: that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was legally sane at the time of the crime, that the trial court erred in refusing several of his tendered jury instructions, and that his confession should have been suppressed as involuntary. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported the jury's sanity finding, that the refused instructions were either in excess of the permitted number, redundant of those given, or otherwise improper, and that the trial court's determination of voluntariness based on conflicting evidence could not be disturbed. The court applied established standards of review without reweighing evidence or assessing witness credibility.

criminal lawprocedure

In Lisenko v. State, the defendants were convicted under Indiana Code § 35-13-4-5 of entering a business house (the Indiana Carton Company) with intent to commit the felony of theft after they pried open a locked door at approximately 4:00 a.m., triggering a silent alarm, and were found inside by police with no employees present and no permission to enter. The Court of Appeals had reversed the convictions, but the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated that decision, and affirmed the trial court's judgment sentencing each defendant to one to five years imprisonment. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove the required intent element through circumstantial evidence, including the forced nighttime entry into a secured building, the defendants' lack of explanation, and their immediate surrender to police indicating consciousness of guilt. It reasoned that intent to commit a felony may be reasonably inferred from such circumstances and overruled its prior decision in Crawford v. State to the extent it conflicted with this holding. The Court also rejected the defendants' challenge to the charging information as untimely and lacking merit given the evidence presented.

criminal law

The case involved Richard E. Johnson’s appeal from his conviction for first-degree murder after he hired two men to kill Donald Stout in 1968, with the second trial resulting in a guilty verdict and life sentence. Johnson raised multiple claims of error, including improper cross-examination of witnesses, denial of a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, denial of discharge for violation of speedy-trial rules after a mistrial, refusal of jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, and inadequate preparation time for replacement counsel. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the cross-examination claim was waived for lack of objection, no record supported prejudice from publicity or inadequate preparation, a new speedy-trial motion was required after the mistrial, and instructions on time-barred lesser offenses were properly refused. The opinion applied Indiana criminal procedure rules and precedents to reject each contention.

criminal lawprocedure