Paul Neeley Brown

The EEOC sued Teleservices Marketing Corp. under Title VII on behalf of employee Babiker, alleging he was terminated from a telemarketing campaign due to his Sudanese national origin after a client complained about his accent and English. TMC moved for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issue of material fact existed on the discrimination claim. The court denied the motion, holding that evidence—including the supervisor's testimony that the client's issue was Babiker's accent, the fact that Babiker had been recruited back to the company earlier, and declarations showing others with non-American accents were not terminated—created triable questions on whether TMC's stated reason was pretext for unlawful discrimination.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved the United States suing Austin Two Tracts, L.P. to enforce a flowage easement on the defendant's 11.44-acre property by requiring removal of gravel, dirt, and fill material placed within the easement boundaries below 573 feet mean sea level, which was part of the Grapevine Dam and Reservoir project. The defendant admitted placing the material but filed a counterclaim seeking to modify or relocate the easement through equitable relief or reformation of the deed. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact regarding the easement's location or the placement of fill, and ordered removal of the material. It dismissed the counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that sovereign immunity barred reformation claims under the Quiet Title Act and other cited statutes without an express waiver.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

In this insurance coverage dispute, Mt. Hawley Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, custom home builder Steve Roberts Custom Builders, Inc., in an underlying lawsuit brought by homeowners whose driveway encroached on neighboring property due to the failure to secure an easement. The builder counterclaimed, seeking a declaration of coverage and penalties under the Texas Insurance Code. Applying Texas's eight-corners rule to the commercial general liability policy, the court held that the underlying petition alleged an occurrence resulting in property damage and that no policy exclusions applied, so Mt. Hawley had a duty to defend; the duty to indemnify was not yet ripe. The court also ruled that Mt. Hawley's refusal to defend triggered statutory penalties under Article 21.55. The motions were resolved accordingly, with the insurer's request denied and the insured's partial motion granted.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involved orthodontist Anthony Viazis, who invented and patented triangular brackets and alleged that the American Association of Orthodontists (AAO), Southwestern Society of Orthodontists, GAC International, and Leo Dohn conspired to punish him for comparative advertising of his product, leading to the breakdown of his exclusive distribution agreement with GAC. Viazis claimed this conduct violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by restraining trade in the orthodontic bracket market. The court granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law at trial. It reasoned that Viazis failed to present sufficient evidence of a conspiracy among the defendants or of actual harm to competition, as opposed to harm only to his own business interests, and that the AAO's code enforcement and related actions did not meet the legal standards for antitrust liability under precedents like Culberson v. American Medical International.

business & regulatory

The case involves a judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Administration's termination of supplemental security income benefits originally awarded to the plaintiff in 1980 due to mental impairment and seizures. The ALJ found medical improvement related to the plaintiff's ability to work, ending her disability status as of 1998, a decision upheld by the Appeals Council. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report recommending remand, determining that the ALJ should have recontacted the plaintiff's treating physician for clarification on his opinion against her ability to work, properly evaluated conflicting IQ and functional assessments from examining doctors, and obtained additional vocational expert testimony to address the plaintiff's limitations and lack of representation at the hearing.

federal powerhealthcare

The case concerned whether S&S Consolidated I.S.D. and two school employees violated the substantive due process rights of elementary student Jane Doe, who had a history of severe emotional disturbance, self-harm, and violent outbursts stemming from prior abuse, by wrapping her in a blanket to restrain her during behavioral incidents at school. The court held that the defendants' conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation under the circumstances presented. It further concluded that the plaintiff's related federal and state-law claims failed as a matter of law, including because school personnel were entitled to immunity under Texas Education Code § 22.051 and had no actionable duty to report abuse that they did not believe occurred. The opinion emphasized the student's documented needs for behavioral management and the absence of evidence showing the restraint was arbitrary or conscience-shocking.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned an attorney's unopposed motion for reconsideration of the denial of fees and expenses under 21 U.S.C. § 848 for work performed representing a death-sentenced petitioner in Texas state clemency proceedings after federal habeas corpus relief had been denied. The court granted the motion in part to correct its prior analysis but ultimately denied compensation. It reasoned that the statute's plain language and Fifth Circuit precedent limit authorization to federal judicial proceedings, not state clemency, and that identical terms in the statute must be given consistent meaning across contexts.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute between oil and gas companies and the Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas over the validity of mineral leases on tribal reservation lands, with the Tribe having filed suit in tribal court to declare the leases void due to execution issues or lack of federal approval, while also claiming misappropriation of resources. The oil companies responded by filing in federal district court for declaratory relief affirming the leases' validity and challenging the tribal court's existence. The court granted in part and denied in part the Tribe's motion to dismiss, holding that sovereign immunity barred personal jurisdiction over the Tribe and its officials in their official capacities but not over the officials in their personal capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief. It also denied dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the companies were not required to exhaust tribal remedies because no valid tribal court existed. The core reasoning rested on Supreme Court precedents regarding tribal sovereign immunity from contract suits and the factual determination that the purported tribal court lacked legitimacy under tribal law.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case is an interpleader action brought by Stretch-O-Rama, Inc. to resolve competing claims to commissions owed to defendant Herbert Hart, including federal tax liens asserted by the United States and assignments by the Hart Defendants to the B.M. Trust and Zebra IV Trust. The United States filed a cross-claim seeking to reduce tax assessments to judgment, set aside the transfers as fraudulent under Texas law, and foreclose its liens on the commissions and the Harts' former residence. The court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, while denying the Hart Defendants' separate motion requesting various forms of relief including a three-judge court. The ruling rests on the validity of the IRS assessments and liens arising from unpaid 1994 and 1995 taxes, the timing and circumstances of the asset transfers, and the absence of genuine issues of material fact on the enforceable claims.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved the Loe Defendants, who operated a marina and resort on Lake Texoma and were convicted in two separate trials of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, money laundering, false statements to the Army Corps of Engineers, and related tax offenses stemming from fraudulent insurance claims and misreported lease payments. After the jury returned special verdicts of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982 for the defendants' Florida real property, cash proceeds, and lease rights, the defendants moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) to set aside those verdicts as contrary to law, unsupported by the evidence, and excessive. The court applied a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to the forfeiture proceedings, found that 52.6% of the Florida property was traceable to a specific money-laundering offense while rejecting arguments that commingling required use of the substitute-asset provision, and therefore granted the motion in part and denied it in part.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

Taylor Publishing Company sued competitor Jostens, Inc., alleging attempted monopolization of the national scholastic yearbook market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, and Texas state-law claims for tortious interference, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair competition. After a jury returned a verdict for Taylor on most claims, the district court granted Jostens' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held that the record lacked legally sufficient evidence of predatory conduct, a dangerous probability that Jostens would achieve monopoly power, or causation linking any of Jostens' actions to Taylor's claimed injuries or lost customers.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a former State Farm employee, Stephen Fisher, who sued his employer under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) after being terminated for absences related to his father's illness and death, and also claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fisher had requested extended leave to handle his father's estate and family matters following a diagnosis of adjustment disorder, but State Farm approved only two weeks of leave based on medical certification and terminated him when he failed to return or request more time. The court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment, finding that Fisher did not qualify for FMLA protection because he failed to demonstrate a serious health condition causing incapacity for work, and that the employer's actions did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct required for an emotional distress claim.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In this case, a Texas plaintiff sued a Delaware/Missouri corporate defendant in state court under the DTPA over the defendant's failure to fund a promised loan, without initially specifying damages. After an August 1996 settlement demand letter sought $950,000 and a November 1996 amended petition sought about $29 million, the defendant removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds; the plaintiff moved to remand, arguing the removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The court granted remand, holding that the unfiled demand letter between counsel qualified as "other paper" from which removability could first be ascertained, starting the 30-day removal clock in August rather than November. The reasoning drew on Fifth Circuit precedent treating informal written notices expansively and economic principles indicating that a $950,000 settlement demand implied an amount in controversy exceeding the jurisdictional threshold.

procedure

The case involved a Federal Tort Claims Act suit by a former Army sergeant and his family alleging that his exposure to toxins and medications during service in the Persian Gulf War caused severe birth defects in their child. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the claim was filed prematurely without exhausting administrative remedies, and that sovereign immunity barred the claims under the Feres doctrine for injuries incident to military service, as well as exceptions for discretionary functions and combatant activities.

procedurefederal powertorts & liability

This case involves allegations by DSC Communications Corporation against its former employees, Thomas Eames and Peter Keeler, and their new company Next Level Communications, for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of proprietary information agreements, and misappropriation of trade secrets in developing a competing product. Following a jury verdict in favor of DSC, the defendants moved for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in admitting evidence of indemnification agreements provided by General Instrument Corporation to Eames and Keeler after acquiring Next Level. The court denied the motion, holding that the indemnification agreements were admissible because they do not constitute liability insurance under Federal Rule of Evidence 411, are relevant to issues such as damages and ownership of trade secrets, and because the defendants opened the door to such evidence; additionally, any potential error was not prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this product liability lawsuit alleging injuries from airbag deployment and chemical exposure, attorney E. Todd Tracy filed a motion to withdraw as plaintiff's counsel less than two months before trial, asserting a conflict with the client that would not prejudice her case. The district court issued a show-cause order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) to examine whether Tracy's statements in the motion violated Rule 11(b)(1) and (3) by lacking evidentiary support or serving an improper purpose, including evidence of communications with defendant Chrysler's attorneys. After hearings and review of testimony, the court analyzed the factual basis for the claimed conflict and prejudice assertions, along with the timing and circumstances of the withdrawal request, to determine compliance with the certification requirements of Rule 11.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved an appeal by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from a bankruptcy court's approval of a debtor's Chapter 11 plan of reorganization for an apartment complex, where HUD held a mortgage exceeding the property's value. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings on the plan's compliance with most confirmation requirements, the good faith filing, feasibility, and property valuation at $3 million, but reversed the determination that the plan satisfied 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) for cramdown on the unsecured claim. The core reasoning centered on the need for a proper interest rate on the unsecured portion of HUD's claim under the plan, leading to remand for further proceedings, while upholding the secured claim treatment and valuation based on credible appraisal evidence.

business & regulatoryfederal powerpropertyprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff, claiming to be the common-law wife of a man killed in a 1993 drunk-driving accident while riding as a passenger in an uninsured vehicle, who sued her auto insurer for benefits under the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage of her policy, both for herself and on behalf of their daughter. The insurer moved for partial summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claims, arguing that no valid common-law marriage existed at the time of death, that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations for proving informal marriages under Texas Family Code § 1.91(b), and that quasi-estoppel applied because the plaintiff had represented herself as unmarried when obtaining the policy; it also sought summary judgment on extracontractual claims. The court denied both motions, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of a common-law marriage and the parties' representations to the insurance agent, holding that the statute of limitations violated the Equal Protection Clause and was therefore inapplicable, and concluding that the extracontractual claims could not be dismissed because the contractual claims survived.

family lawcivil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case was an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision holding that Banc One Capital Partners had no valid interest in two ground leases at Addison Airport because an unrecorded assignment of the leases from Avcor to H.B. Leasing made them part of H.B. Leasing's bankruptcy estate, which were not assumed within 60 days under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). The district court reversed, finding that the Texas recording statute (Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 13.001) protects only against prior unrecorded transfers and does not invalidate the subsequent assignment as to Banc, meaning the leases were never part of the estate with respect to Banc's deed of trust. The court further held that a deemed rejection of the leases under bankruptcy law does not terminate the leases or extinguish third-party security interests, citing Eastover Bank for Savings v. Sowashee Venture.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Anant Kumar Tripati, a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, who attempted to file a motion and adversary complaint in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas but had the documents returned because he could not pay the filing fees upfront and sought to proceed in forma pauperis or pay in installments under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Tripati petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the bankruptcy court to accept the filings. The district court granted the petition, finding that Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Kras did not apply because Tripati was a creditor rather than a debtor seeking discharge, and instead relying on Boddie v. Connecticut to hold that denying access due to indigency would violate due process and equal protection where bankruptcy was the exclusive forum for resolving his claims. The court reasoned that Tripati had no adequate alternative means to protect his interests and directed the bankruptcy court to determine his eligibility to proceed without prepayment of fees.

civil rightsprocedure