Arch N. Bobbitt

The case involved a relator seeking a writ of prohibition from the Indiana Supreme Court to prevent the Porter Circuit Court from further exercising jurisdiction in a civil contempt proceeding, after the relator had been found guilty following a hearing. The court dissolved its temporary writ and denied a permanent writ. It reasoned that the trial court had inherent authority to punish for contempt and possessed jurisdiction over both the relator and the case, rendering the judgment not void for lack of jurisdiction. The proper remedy for any error in the judgment was an appeal, not a writ of prohibition, and the petition was also defective for failing to first challenge jurisdiction in the trial court as required by court rules.

procedure

In Gates v. State, the petitioner appealed the denial of a writ of error coram nobis, challenging his guilty plea to obtaining money under false pretenses by arguing that he was not properly advised of his right to counsel and did not enter the plea knowingly and understandingly. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the writ. The court reasoned that the record showed the petitioner was advised of his right to counsel on multiple occasions, declined it, confirmed his understanding of the charge and penalty, and that the trial judge had observed his demeanor and found the plea voluntary; conflicts in evidence were resolved in favor of the trial court's findings, and the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned a taxpayer's suit to enjoin Van Buren civil and school townships from issuing bonds totaling $147,000 to build and equip an elementary school, on the ground that the bonds plus existing debt would exceed the two-percent constitutional debt limit in Article 13, § 1 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied the injunction after the parties stipulated the assessed valuations and outstanding indebtedness. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed, holding that the constitutional limit is calculated on the true cash value of taxable property rather than the fractional assessed value (one-third of true value) used for taxation under 1959 legislation. The court reasoned that the phrase "value... ascertained by the last assessment" refers to actual value, consistent with the purpose of the debt limitation and decisions from other states with similar provisions, and that a 1961 statute implementing this method was valid.

taxesproperty

The case involved relator Joseph M. Shannon, an attorney who had represented a client in a divorce action venued to Hendricks Circuit Court and served as a commissioner to sell real estate under the property settlement; after receiving settlement funds on the client's behalf but before receiving his contingent fee, Shannon retained the money asserting an attorney's lien, prompting the circuit court to issue a contempt citation and order to pay over the funds under a statute allowing courts to compel attorneys to deliver client money. Shannon petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to bar further enforcement of the contempt order. The court granted the writ, reasoning that the cited statute did not address liens on funds recovered through an attorney's efforts and that Indiana equity independently recognizes a retaining lien allowing an attorney to hold such proceeds as security for unpaid fees. The decision turned on the distinction between statutory mechanisms and equitable liens, concluding that Shannon's retention did not constitute a refusal to deliver funds within the statute's meaning.

family lawprocedure

The case involved property owners who sought a court mandate to compel issuance of improvement location permits for lots in a subdivision plat approved by the former Marion County Plan Commission in 1955 but recorded in 1959 without approval from the newly established Metropolitan Plan Commission. The trial court granted the mandate, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the recording lacked legal effect. The court reasoned that under the 1955 legislation creating a unified planning authority for Marion County and the subsequent adoption of a subdivision control ordinance granting the Metropolitan Plan Commission exclusive authority over plat approvals, two steps were required to establish a valid subdivision: approval by the body with jurisdiction at the time of recording and proper recording itself. Because the owners completed recording only after the new commission had assumed exclusive control, the plat was invalid and permits could not issue.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved an appeal by Neville from a conviction for reckless homicide after a jury acquitted him of involuntary manslaughter; he was fined $500 and sentenced to 90 days at the Indiana State Farm. After the appeal was filed but before it could be heard, Neville died, prompting his attorney to suggest dismissal and the State to move for dismissal on grounds that the issues were moot. The court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the death of a criminal appellant generally abates the proceedings because reversal could not lead to a retrial and affirmation could not be enforced against a deceased defendant, that a fine could not be collected from the estate, and that no appeal would be entertained solely on the question of costs.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by DeBoor, who was charged with first-degree murder for killing his stepson but convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and sentenced accordingly. He raised numerous claims of error, including insufficient evidence of malice or intent, his intoxication preventing formation of the required mental state, self-defense, emotional instability, and improper jury contact by a third party. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence of prior threats, the sequence of events, and the defendant's actions supported inferences of malice and intent, that his level of intoxication did not negate those elements as a matter of law, that self-defense was a factual question resolved by the jury against him, and that other asserted errors did not warrant reversal.

criminal law

The case involved a personal injury suit by plaintiff Devine against defendant Grace Construction and Supply Co. for damages from a nighttime automobile accident on U.S. Highway 24, which was under repair pursuant to a state contract; plaintiff swerved to avoid an unlighted barricade, struck a guardrail, and was injured. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on transfer. The court held that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because he drove at 50-55 mph without reducing speed under known hazardous conditions, failed to keep his vehicle under control to stop within visible distance of obstacles, and disregarded prior warning signs and barricades he had passed. This negligence barred recovery regardless of any negligence by the defendant in placing the barricade.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Miller v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder under a statute requiring proof that the killing was done purposely and maliciously but without premeditation. The sole issue on appeal was whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of malice, where there was no direct evidence and the State relied on the use of a deadly weapon. The court examined the circumstances of the shooting during a tavern disturbance and concluded that the evidence did not permit a reasonable inference of malice because the shot was not directed at a vital part of the body and occurred amid efforts to restore order. The Indiana Supreme Court therefore reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

criminal law

The case concerned appellant Smith's convictions for forgery and as an habitual criminal under Indiana law, based on two prior felony convictions (second-degree burglary in Indiana and storehouse breaking in Kentucky). The central issue was whether certified copies of prior judgments and commitments bearing the same or similar names, without additional evidence such as fingerprints or photographs linking the defendant to those records, sufficed to prove the prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority held that name similarity alone was insufficient to establish identity, requiring reversal on the habitual criminal count because the state failed to meet its burden of proof. The court also addressed potential prejudice to the forgery conviction from the admission of the prior records.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Alfred Sutto's application for a license to practice chiropractic in Indiana by reciprocity, based on a license he had obtained in Kentucky. The Indiana Board of Medical Registration and Examination denied the application, finding that Kentucky's licensing standards were not substantially equivalent to Indiana's requirements, which mandate four thousand 60-minute hours of resident instruction and examination in subjects including chemistry and bacteriology. Sutto sought judicial review, and after the trial court affirmed the Board's decision, the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether the trial court's conclusions of law were erroneous. The court held that the Kentucky statute's requirement of only four thousand 45-minute hours and lack of testing in the specified subjects meant the qualifications were not substantially equivalent, and thus the Board's denial was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment affirming the denial was upheld.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a petition for a writ of prohibition by Continental Music Company to bar the Marion Circuit Court from hearing an injunction action filed by James N. Winkel. Winkel sought to stop enforcement of a 1959 judgment against him for $1,204.60, claiming his subsequent bankruptcy discharge released the debt and that the judgment creditor had improperly obtained it without disclosing the pending bankruptcy. The Circuit Court overruled the company's demurrer challenging jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the complaint. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court possessed jurisdiction over the parties, subject matter, and case, and that any error in overruling the demurrer could be addressed on appeal rather than through extraordinary writ; accordingly, the temporary writ was dissolved and a permanent writ denied.

procedure

This case involved a request for a writ of mandate to compel the Juvenile Court of Marion County to provide a bill of exceptions containing the evidence from an underlying proceeding (Cause No. PT 60-651) so that relator Vanus Armstrong could pursue an appeal. The relator had not arranged for a court reporter at trial and later petitioned the trial court to prepare the bill after being told no transcript existed; the trial court denied the request. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that it is the appellant's duty to prepare the transcript or a narrative bill of exceptions, that the trial judge has no duty to furnish one, and that no effort had been made to agree on a bill with the opposing party or to show any failure by the court to perform a legal duty. The court noted that mandate is available only to compel performance of a duty enjoined by law, which was not shown here.

procedurefamily law

In Marshall v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment under an Indiana statute. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting five photographs of the victim's body over objection, which the appellant argued were irrelevant and introduced only to inflame the jury, relying on the precedent in Kiefer v. State. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that exhibits B, C, and D illustrated material facts already described in witness testimony about the crime scene and tire marks; exhibit E was properly authenticated; and exhibit F, showing cleaned fatal wounds, was relevant to the cause of death as detailed by the autopsy physician and did not match the prohibited autopsy images in Kiefer that depicted surgical procedures. The court reasoned that the photographs were admissible because they tended to prove or disprove material facts in issue, consistent with the standard that photos are allowed if a witness could describe the depicted objects.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a petition to transfer from the Indiana Appellate Court to the Supreme Court in a matter arising from the Public Service Commission of Indiana. Appellee telephone companies moved to dismiss the petition because appellants failed to serve copies on the appellees or their attorneys of record within the time required by court rules. The court dismissed the petition to transfer. It reasoned that Rule 2-13 requires service of copies of motions and petitions within the allowed filing period, mailing on the final day did not constitute timely service since receipt occurred the next day, and Rule 2-15A providing for mail service applies only to briefs, not petitions.

procedure

This case concerned claims for unemployment benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act by non-striking workers at International Harvester's Fort Wayne plants who refused to cross picket lines established by striking unions during a 1958-1959 labor dispute. The Review Board denied benefits, finding that the claimants were participating in the labor dispute by electing to honor the picket lines without making reasonable attempts to cross them, even though work remained available and there was insufficient evidence of threats preventing access. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision as not contrary to law, emphasizing that the Board's factual findings are conclusive if supported by evidence and that the record showed the claimants' unemployment resulted from their choice to respect the picket lines rather than an involuntary stoppage.

labor & employment

This case involved a lawsuit by plaintiff Glad against the New York Central Railroad for personal injuries and property damage after his truck was struck by a train at a grade crossing on Liverpool Road in Indiana. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the railroad appealed, arguing that Glad was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop and look properly before entering the crossing. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the undisputed evidence showed Glad violated the statutory duty under Burns' § 47-2114 by proceeding onto the tracks when the train was plainly visible and in hazardous proximity, and that no conflicting evidence prevented this conclusion as a matter of law. The court therefore reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

torts & liability

This case involved a dispute between former spouses who owned property as tenants in common. The wife sought appointment of a temporary receiver to collect rents and sell the property due to unpaid rents and a tax lien, after the husband dismissed his partition complaint. The trial court appointed a receiver, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the pending action for accounting and partition provided an adequate legal remedy and that no emergency or special circumstances justified the drastic remedy of a receiver.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved the State of Indiana filing a complaint to condemn land owned by the Laxtons in Starke County for construction of a limited-access highway. After the trial court overruled objections to the condemnation, appointed appraisers, and a jury awarded $19,000 in damages, the state appealed on the ground that the court erred by denying its motion for a change of venue from the county. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the motion was timely filed with the clerk within ten days after the issues were closed, even during an interim without a qualified judge, and that the special judge had a duty to recognize the filing and grant the change upon assuming jurisdiction.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the partition of real estate owned by the relator and defendant as tenants in common in Marion County Superior Court. After the defendant filed an answer with paragraphs seeking an accounting of rental income, appointment of a receiver, and sale of the property, the relator filed a dismissal of his complaint followed by a motion for change of venue from the county. The court held that the defendant's paragraphs constituted valid counterclaims under Indiana statute because they arose from the same facts and sought affirmative relief that could support an independent judgment, meaning the dismissal did not terminate the action per the 1881 statute preserving such claims. However, the relator's timely motion for change of venue from the county was proper and required to be granted, leading the Indiana Supreme Court to mandate that relief while denying the request to set aside the decree.

propertyprocedure