
Belmares-Bautista v. State
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2010-12-22 · cited 4×
The case involved Oscar Belmares-Bautista, who was pulled over for loud music, produced a forged Mexican driver's license, and was convicted after a bench trial of possessing counterfeit identification and driving without a valid license. Representing himself, he had signed Spanish-language forms advising of rights and waiving counsel, and he confirmed through an interpreter at his initial hearing that he understood his rights and wished to proceed pro se. The sole issue on appeal was whether this constituted a valid waiver of the right to counsel under the federal and Indiana constitutions. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the signed forms and hearing exchange were sufficient to establish a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver where the defendant made no claim of misunderstanding, coercion, or translation error, consistent with precedents like Maloney v. State.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Forman v. Penn
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2010-12-08 · cited 6×
This case involves an appeal from a trial court's grant of summary judgment to an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action regarding its duty to defend insureds in an underlying personal injury lawsuit. The underlying suit alleged negligence related to the ingestion of a controlled substance by a minor at the insured's home. The trial court ruled that a policy exclusion for claims arising from controlled substances barred coverage, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The dismissal was because the order did not resolve all claims in the case and lacked the certification required under Trial Rule 54(B) to be appealable as a final judgment, following the bright-line rule from Martin v. Amoco Oil Co.
proceduretorts & liability
Dowden v. State
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2010-11-16
The case Dowden v. State was a criminal appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals from a trial court judgment. The court issued an unpublished memorandum decision affirming the lower court's ruling. The three-judge panel, consisting of Senior Judge Boehm along with Judges Riley and May, unanimously concurred in the affirmance without further elaboration in the excerpt.
criminal law
Clark v. State
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2010-11-12
The case Clark v. State was a criminal appeal filed in the Indiana Court of Appeals after a trial court ruling against defendant Clark. The court reviewed the matter under case number 33A01-1004-CR-236 and disposed of it through an unpublished memorandum decision. Senior Judge Boehm authored the decision affirming the lower court's outcome, with Judges Robb and Brown concurring. No further details on the underlying facts, charges, or legal analysis appear in the excerpt because the opinion was not published.
criminal law
State v. Hobbs
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-09-30 · cited 64×
In State v. Hobbs, the defendant was arrested inside a restaurant pursuant to an unrelated warrant, after which officers summoned a drug dog to sniff his parked car in the public lot; the dog's alert led to a warrantless search revealing marijuana and paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the dog's alert supplied probable cause but a warrant was still required. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception allows warrantless searches of operational vehicles in public places based on probable cause, and that the search was reasonable under Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because the defendant was already arrested and the alert provided strong evidence of contraband. The decision rested on the vehicle's ready mobility, its location in a public place, and the balance of intrusion against the state's interest in preventing evidence loss.
criminal lawprocedure
Eads v. Community Hospital
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-09-01 · cited 34×
The case involved a patient who was injured after falling while leaving a hospital on crutches following denial of her request for a wheelchair; she initially filed a premises liability negligence complaint in court, which was dismissed for failing to first submit a proposed complaint to the Indiana Department of Insurance as required by the Medical Malpractice Act. The patient had filed an identical proposed complaint with the IDOI shortly before the dismissal, and the hospital sought to bar it as untimely under the Act's two-year statute of limitations. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the hospital, holding that the IDOI complaint qualified as a continuation of the original action under the Journey’s Account Statute. The core reasoning was that the complaints alleged the same facts and thus provided sufficient notice to the hospital, and the statute's language does not require the new filing to occur after the original action's failure.
proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare
Ghosh v. Indiana State Ethics Commission
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-06-30 · cited 9×
This case involved Subhen Ghosh, a longtime IDEM engineer, who was terminated for using a state vehicle and credit card in connection with his personal gas station business, prompting separate proceedings before the State Employee Appeals Commission (SEAC) and the Indiana State Ethics Commission. SEAC upheld the termination, and Ghosh's attempt at judicial review failed; the Ethics Commission later imposed a $456.96 fine for violating the conflict-of-interest statute. The Indiana Supreme Court held that a 2005 statute allows SEAC to consider ethics violations when reviewing terminations but preserves the Ethics Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the Ethics Code, so Ghosh was collaterally estopped from relitigating his termination in the Ethics Commission proceeding. The Court also upheld the fine amount as within the Commission's statutory authority and supported by the evidence of benefit received from the violation.
labor & employmentprocedure
Duran v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-06-30 · cited 55×
The case involved police officers attempting to serve an arrest warrant for a suspect at an apartment building based on uncorroborated information from an anonymous informant. Upon entering the defendant's apartment after forcing the door, they discovered evidence of an unrelated crime. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the warrantless entry violated both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, requiring suppression of the evidence. The court reasoned that the officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe the suspect was present, there were no exigent circumstances, and the high degree of intrusion outweighed the low degree of suspicion and law enforcement needs.
criminal lawprocedure
Owens v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-06-29 · cited 17×
The case involved Myron Owens, who was convicted of dealing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a youth program center along with related charges, and received a habitual offender sentence enhancement based on prior convictions that included a 1995 dealing cocaine conviction and a 2004 conspiracy to deal conviction. The Indiana Supreme Court held that a conspiracy to deal conviction does not count as a dealing conviction under the habitual offender statute's drug-offense provisions, because the statute enumerates specific dealing offenses but not conspiracy and penal laws must be strictly construed. Nevertheless, because Owens had one prior enumerated dealing conviction plus the current dealing conviction, the enhancement was permitted, and his convictions and sentence were affirmed.
criminal law
Brown v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-06-29 · cited 275×
In Brown v. State, the defendant was convicted of drug-related offenses after police conducted a warrantless search of his home following an anonymous tip and a knock-and-talk consent search, during which drugs and paraphernalia were found. Brown had filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment and state constitutional grounds, which was denied, but at trial his counsel stated 'no objection' when the items were offered and later attempted to renew the objections outside the jury's presence. The Indiana Supreme Court held that a challenge to the admission of unlawfully seized evidence is not preserved for appeal absent a timely objection at trial and that such a claim, without additional factors like evidence fabrication, does not constitute fundamental error. The court therefore affirmed the convictions without addressing the legality of the search itself. The decision emphasizes procedural requirements for preserving evidentiary issues and limits fundamental error review to egregious circumstances affecting the fairness of the trial.
criminal lawprocedure
Travelers Indemnity Co. of America v. Jarrells
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-05-27 · cited 3×
This case involved an employee who received workers' compensation benefits after a workplace injury and later obtained a jury award in a personal injury suit against third-party tortfeasors. The workers' compensation insurer sought to enforce a statutory lien to recover a portion of those benefits from the judgment, but the trial court denied the lien on the ground that the jury had already accounted for and deducted the benefits in calculating damages. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, finding both the jury's deduction and an alternative interpretation plausible based on the evidence and instructions presented, but upholding the trial court's determination that no further repayment was required. The Court noted that in future cases, juries should be instructed to include amounts subject to repayment obligations in the award. The decision turned on the application of the Collateral Source Statute and the specific facts of how the jury was informed of the benefits.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Indiana Family & Social Services Administration v. Meyer
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-05-25 · cited 29×
This case involved a petition for judicial review of a final agency action by the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration denying Medicaid eligibility to Alice Meyer based on the valuation of a remainder interest in a family farm transferred to a trust, which triggered a penalty period under agency guidelines. The Trust challenged the administrative law judge's calculation of the penalty period but failed to file a complete certified copy of the agency record within the 30-day statutory deadline under the Indiana Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA), Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-13, or obtain a timely extension. The Indiana Supreme Court held that a trial court lacks authority to grant an extension of time to file the agency record after the statutory period has expired without prior authorization. The core reasoning was that AOPA imposes strict filing requirements for the full agency record, as interpreted in prior cases like Brownsburg, and partial filings or late requests do not suffice to invoke judicial review jurisdiction.
procedurehealthcare
Gonzalez v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-05-19 · cited 10×
In Gonzalez v. State, the defendant was charged with criminal mischief and several operating-while-intoxicated offenses after his truck struck a school bus. He entered a plea agreement that the trial court took under advisement; while awaiting a decision, Gonzalez sent an apology letter to the victim school corporation in an effort to secure its non-objection to the plea. After the court rejected the agreement and the case proceeded to trial, the letter was admitted over Gonzalez’s objection under Evidence Rule 410, and he was convicted. The Indiana Supreme Court held that statements made to a victim or the court to obtain acceptance of a plea agreement are inadmissible under Rule 410, but concluded the error was harmless because independent witness testimony overwhelmingly established Gonzalez’s intoxication and reckless driving. The court therefore affirmed the convictions.
criminal lawprocedure
Reiswerg v. Statom
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-05-06 · cited 25×
This case involved a legal malpractice lawsuit by Pam Statom against attorney Joseph Reiswerg and the law firm Cohen Garelick & Glazier, claiming that Reiswerg's failure to properly file a timely tort claims notice against the VA caused her underlying medical malpractice claim to be dismissed as time-barred. After the trial court granted Statom partial summary judgment finding Reiswerg negligent as a matter of law, the defendants later moved for summary judgment asserting that Statom's malpractice suit was itself barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court struck those motions on the ground that the defense had been waived by not being raised earlier. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party does not waive an affirmative defense by failing to raise it in response to a motion for partial summary judgment that would not be dispositive as to the issue of liability.
proceduretorts & liability
Jackson v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-04-27 · cited 78×
The case involved Gary Jackson, who was charged with battery after an altercation that led to a victim's death. After a hung jury in the first trial, a second trial was disrupted when jurors saw a newspaper article quoting a letter from Jackson to the prosecutor; the trial court declared a mistrial over Jackson's objection. A third jury convicted Jackson of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court's decision to declare a mistrial was entitled to deference and did not constitute an abuse of discretion, so the subsequent trial did not violate double jeopardy. The Court also found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.
criminal lawprocedure
Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-04-20 · cited 48×
In Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg, plaintiffs claimed ownership of a small parcel of land within a larger tract leased by the City of Lawrenceburg to Indiana Gaming for a casino site and filed suit in 2005 to quiet title, eject defendants, and recover damages under negligence and unjust enrichment theories. The Indiana Supreme Court held that inverse condemnation is the exclusive remedy when the government purports to exercise full ownership rights over land and that such claims are governed by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to trespass actions. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued no later than December 1997 when casino operations began on the site, making their 2005 filing untimely under the limitations period. The trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment for the defendants.
propertyproceduretorts & liability
Shotts v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-04-15 · cited 45×
In Shotts v. State, David Shotts was arrested in Indiana by local officers acting on information from an Alabama felony warrant obtained via the NCIC database; during the arrest, officers discovered an unlicensed handgun, leading to Indiana charges for possession of a handgun without a license and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Shotts moved to suppress the handgun evidence, arguing that the Alabama warrant lacked probable cause and that the warrantless Indiana arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the arrest was valid under both constitutions because the Indiana officers reasonably relied on verified NCIC information from Alabama authorities and had no control over any defects in the out-of-state warrant process. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and upheld Shotts's convictions after a bench trial.
criminal lawprocedure
Smith v. CHAMPION TRUCKING CO., INC.
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-04-15 · cited 8×
This case involved an employee, Jimmie Smith, who was injured in a work-related truck accident caused by a third-party driver and received initial worker's compensation benefits from his employer, Champion Trucking. Smith later settled his claim against the third party for a limited amount without obtaining Champion's consent to the settlement or notifying it of the negotiations, then sought additional permanent impairment benefits through the Indiana Worker's Compensation Board. The Board dismissed the claim, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the Worker's Compensation Act, an employer's liability for benefits ends if the employee settles with a third party without the employer's consent. The court's reasoning centered on the statute's provision barring further claims after an unauthorized settlement, which releases the third party and prevents the employer from pursuing reimbursement, consistent with longstanding precedent interpreting the law to require consent for such settlements.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Bules v. Marshall County
Indiana Supreme Court · 2010-01-27 · cited 40×
The case involved a traffic accident in which plaintiffs Robert and Brian Bules were injured when their vehicle hit floodwater on a Marshall County road caused by unusual weather fluctuations and a rising river; they sued the county and its highway department for negligent failure to provide adequate warnings. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground of immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, which shields governmental units from liability for losses resulting from temporary weather-related conditions on public thoroughfares. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory immunity extends through the period of reasonable response to the weather event—at least until the condition stabilizes—and covers alleged deficiencies in the government's remedial measures such as placement of signs. The court rejected arguments that the suit was based on inadequate warnings rather than the weather condition itself, and it found no material factual disputes or evidentiary errors affecting the immunity determination.
torts & liability
Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair
Indiana Supreme Court · 2009-12-15 · cited 30×
This case involved an Indianapolis police officer who responded to a report of an unruly patron at Babes Showclub, an adult entertainment business, and was injured in an assault by an underage customer who had been served alcohol. The officer and his wife sued the club and its owners for negligence in failing to provide adequate security, maintaining a nuisance, and violating Dram Shop laws and alcohol sale prohibitions, seeking damages for injuries and loss of consortium. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that Indiana's fireman's rule barred the claims. The court reasoned that the rule, established in Woodruff v. Bowen, precludes recovery by professional emergency responders for injuries resulting from the negligence that necessitated their response, unless a statute or ordinance was specifically enacted to protect such responders. The alleged violations here, including local ordinances and enhanced penalties for battery on officers, did not meet that standard, so the complaint failed to state a claim.
criminal lawproceduretorts & liability