Roger O. DeBruler

Eric D. Holmes was convicted by a jury of two counts of murder, attempted murder, robbery, and conspiracy to rob arising from a fatal attack on two restaurant managers and a coworker during a robbery at closing time. The trial judge imposed a death sentence based on the aggravating circumstances of killing during a robbery and multiple murders after the jury could not reach a sentencing recommendation. On direct appeal, Holmes raised claims including prosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase and errors in jury instructions regarding alternative sentences. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the murder convictions, the death sentence, and most other convictions and sentences, concluding that the evidence was sufficient and that the asserted errors were either unpreserved or did not require reversal, while vacating the conspiracy conviction and reclassifying the robbery sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief in which Thomas Schiro challenged his death sentence for a 1981 felony murder conviction involving the rape and killing of Laura Luebbehusen. Schiro was convicted by a jury on the felony murder charge but not intentional murder, and although the jury recommended against the death penalty after a sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed it. The Indiana Supreme Court had previously affirmed the sentence on direct appeal without applying a special standard of review for jury recommendations against death. Following its later decision in Martinez Chavez v. State, which requires express judicial consideration of such recommendations and closer appellate scrutiny, the court granted Schiro successive post-conviction relief. It reversed the denial of relief, set aside the death sentence, and imposed the maximum term of sixty years for felony murder, concluding that Schiro was entitled to the benefit of the new review standard.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a second probation revocation hearing based on the same escape from jail violated double jeopardy when the trial court sua sponte set aside its initial revocation order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the second revocation, concluding that revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions subject to double jeopardy. Justice DeBruler dissented, reasoning that the hearings are penal in nature because they risk loss of liberty, are analogous to the juvenile proceedings deemed criminal in Breed v. Jones, and that the sua sponte order functioned like an improper mistrial without manifest necessity, barring the second hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

In Tibbs v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., plaintiff Roy Tibbs, a state engineer, sued mechanical contractor Grunau and general contractor HHN for personal injuries after falling on a piece of pipe in a stairwell during a state office building renovation, claiming negligence in the maintenance of Grunau's nearby pipe-cutting station. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants on the ground that they owed no duty to Tibbs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed as to Grunau, holding that Grunau owed a duty of care because the stairwell was within the range of foreseeable harm from its work area, even though Grunau did not control the stairwell, relying on precedents such as Fort Wayne Cooperage Co. v. Page and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.; the court summarily affirmed the judgment for HHN and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Poulton v. State, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of murder and robbery as an accomplice for participating in the December 1993 home invasion and killing of a 71-year-old man in Clarksville, Indiana, and was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 70 years. On direct appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by admitting his two statements to police (claiming an incomplete Miranda warning on the first statement tainted the second), by denying a motion to continue the trial, and by imposing an excessive sentence. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that any Miranda objection was waived because defense counsel did not object when the statements were offered at trial, that the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable given the defendant's active role in planning, executing, and concealing the crime, and that no other reversible error occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether insurance companies had a duty to defend Seymour Manufacturing Company against claims by the EPA for environmental cleanup costs stemming from alleged improper storage and leaking of hazardous waste at its disposal facility. The trial court denied SMC's motion for partial summary judgment on the duty-to-defend issue, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the insurers must defend SMC because the pollution-exclusion clauses in the policies were ambiguous under the precedent of American States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, and the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. The court construed the ambiguous terms against the insurers that drafted them and remanded for further proceedings.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Jerry Lee Medicus, whose probation was revoked by the trial court following an incident where he was arrested for public intoxication and resisting arrest while on probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation, but the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's oral statement at the hearing was insufficient to satisfy the due process requirements for probation revocations. It reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, mandates a written statement by the factfinder detailing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation to ensure accurate factfinding and facilitate appellate review. The court therefore remanded the case for the trial court to provide such a statement.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether insurance policies issued by American States covered the Kigers' liability for cleanup costs after gasoline leaked from underground storage tanks at their Sunoco station, contaminating sewers and prompting action by the Indiana Department of Environmental Management. The Indiana Supreme Court considered the effect of pollution exclusion clauses in pre-1987 policies requiring that discharges be "sudden and accidental" and in post-1987 policies containing absolute pollution exclusions. The court held that the pre-1987 policies provided coverage because "sudden" referred to unexpected events rather than requiring an instantaneous release, while the post-1987 policies barred coverage as gasoline qualified as a pollutant under the policies' definitions. The decision rested on construing the policy language according to its ordinary meaning without regard to technical or specialized interpretations.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved Ray Howard, a deputy town marshal, who sued the Town of North Judson for wrongful termination after being dismissed without a prior hearing, claiming violations of Indiana Code Section 36-8-3-4, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and Article One, Section Twelve of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Howard had failed to request the statutorily available post-termination hearing. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statute requires a hearing only if demanded within five days of notice and that Howard had received adequate notice of his right to request one but chose not to pursue it. The court further reasoned that providing this opportunity satisfied federal due process requirements for protecting Howard's property interest in continued employment, and that the state constitution did not mandate a pre-deprivation hearing, especially since Howard declined the offered process.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Johnson v. State, the defendant was convicted of dealing in marijuana and being a habitual offender after police conducted a warrantless stop and search of his car and person based on a tip from a confidential informant. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the recovered marijuana, ruling that probable cause existed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to address whether the initial stop and subsequent searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the informant's tip, combined with police corroboration and the defendant's own statements, provided reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio and probable cause for the searches, making the evidence admissible.

criminal law

In this case, Arte L. Mitchell pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine pursuant to a plea bargain that left sentencing to the trial court's discretion; the court then imposed the mandatory suspension of his driver's license, license plates, and vehicle registration privileges under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-15, even though no motor vehicle was involved in the offense. Mitchell appealed, arguing that the suspension violated procedural and substantive due process because the statute did not require proof that driving contributed to the crime. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and held that the statute unambiguously mandates the suspension upon conviction for the enumerated drug offenses, that driving is not a fundamental right, and that the law satisfies rational-basis review as a legitimate means of punishing and deterring crime. The Court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting any requirement of a special nexus between the offense and the penalty.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted in a bench trial of fraud and forgery charges by a special judge, after which the Court of Appeals twice dismissed his appeals for lack of a final appealable judgment due to an inadequate record of the judge's qualification and assumption of jurisdiction. The trial court issued nunc pro tunc orders to retroactively document the special judge's appointment and qualification based on entries in the chronological case summary (CCS). The defendant challenged the validity of these orders and the resulting re-sentencing. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and held that the CCS entries met the legal requirements for a written memorial sufficient to support the nunc pro tunc orders, as they were required by law to be kept, reflected actual court actions with specific dates and details, and confirmed the events occurred as stated. The Court therefore reinstated the appeal and remanded it to the Court of Appeals for decision on the merits.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a direct appeal by Kenneth Elmore from his convictions on charges including dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony, resisting law enforcement, and his adjudication as a habitual offender, which resulted in a 75-year sentence. The court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second motion for continuance after granting an initial one, as counsel had over a month to prepare for relatively straightforward charges. It further found sufficient evidence to support the Class A felony conviction based on the weight of the cocaine recovered exceeding three grams. Finally, the court rejected the double jeopardy challenge to the sentence enhancements, reasoning that using prior convictions both for aggravation and habitual offender status does not constitute multiple punishments for the same offense.

criminal lawprocedure

In Barany v. State, the defendant was charged with murder after killing his longtime partner in a brutal attack involving shooting, stabbing with a maul, and swallowing her finger, while exhibiting religious delusions and other erratic behavior. A jury convicted him of guilty but mentally ill despite testimony from three court-appointed psychiatrists that he was legally insane at the time, and the trial court imposed the maximum sixty-year sentence citing lack of remorse, prior record, and brutality as aggravators. On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury was entitled to disregard expert opinions on sanity and rely on lay evidence and stipulated facts. The court remanded for resentencing to forty years, ruling that the trial judge failed to consider the defendant's clear mental illness as a mitigator whose connection to the crime was obvious, while finding the aggravators otherwise sufficient to support some enhancement but not the maximum term.

criminal law

The case involved Stanley McKnight, who was acquitted of murder but convicted of assisting a criminal, a Class C felony, after helping dispose of a body in a cornfield; the principal had been acquitted of murder in a separate trial. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction on appeal and remanded with instructions to discharge the defendant. The court reasoned that, under common-law accessory liability and Indiana precedent applying a doctrine of mandated consistency between verdicts, an accessory after the fact cannot be convicted when the principal has been acquitted in a separate proceeding, and the Assisting a Criminal statute is sufficiently analogous to prior law to require the same consistency rule.

criminal law

In Gilmore v. State, the defendant was charged with murder in Indiana in 1991 after shooting and killing a victim, but was not brought to trial until 1994 while serving a prison sentence in Michigan, leading to a roughly two-and-a-half-year delay from the filing of charges. He was convicted of murder after a jury trial and sentenced to sixty years, then appealed claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, applying the Barker v. Wingo balancing test and finding that the length of delay was presumptively prejudicial but carried little weight, the reasons for delay were largely attributable to the defendant's flight and multiple continuances rather than bad faith by the State, the defendant never asserted his speedy trial right until late in the process, and no specific prejudice to his defense was shown. The court noted that the defendant had not invoked procedures under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Matthew Scheckel, who pled guilty to murder after stabbing a victim eleven times in 1991 and was initially sentenced to sixty years in prison. On his first appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the sentence for failure to consider mitigating circumstances in the record. After remand to a successor judge who reinstated the sixty-year term without new evidence, Scheckel challenged the sentence as lacking a proper balancing statement and as manifestly unreasonable. The court held the sentence manifestly unreasonable and imposed fifty years, reasoning that the guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility, work record, and character evidence provided significant mitigation that warranted leniency alongside the aggravating factors.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a debtor's filing for federal bankruptcy automatically mooted their pending state court appeal from a trial court judgment on a debt. After the Carpenters defaulted on a promissory note to Farm Credit Services and lost a collection suit resulting in a large judgment, they appealed and later filed for bankruptcy; the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on mootness grounds tied to the automatic stay. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the mere filing of a bankruptcy petition does not moot a debtor's appeal from a judgment on the debt, reasoning that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not bar a debtor from prosecuting their own appeal and that allowing the appeal to proceed provides a clearer picture of liabilities for the bankruptcy process without undermining federal interests. The court granted transfer, vacated the dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings.

procedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over liability for construction costs where the Hoovers were found liable to subcontractors for approximately $213,000 following a bench trial on mechanic's lien claims. After filing a praecipe to appeal the judgment, the Hoovers filed for bankruptcy, leading the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal based on the election of remedies doctrine and the bankruptcy automatic stay. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and held that the appeal could proceed, reasoning that bankruptcy is not an inconsistent remedy with appealing an adverse judgment and that the automatic stay under federal law does not prevent a debtor from pursuing an appeal of a judgment against them, consistent with prior precedent.

procedure

This case involved a medical malpractice claim brought by Charles Sparkman for loss of consortium after his wife Norma died of cervical cancer, alleging that Dr. Mayhue negligently failed to diagnose the recurrence of her cancer in 1989 despite prior treatment. The trial court denied the doctor's motion for summary judgment, which argued that traditional proximate cause could not be shown because Mrs. Sparkman had less than a 50 percent chance of survival even with proper care. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the denial, holding that Indiana law permits recovery in such cases under the approach of Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 when a health care provider's negligence deprives a patient of a significant chance of recovery. The court reasoned that providers should not benefit from uncertainty created by their own negligence and that juries are capable of determining these complex causation questions without adopting a separate loss-of-chance doctrine.

healthcaretorts & liability