Louis B. Ewbank

This case involved the administrator of a childless second wife who was murdered by her husband (who then killed himself), suing the husband's children from a prior marriage to obtain one-third of his lands for the duration of her life expectancy or the equivalent rental value. The trial court struck parts of the complaint alleging the husband's motive and intent, made findings that the wife died minutes before the husband, and ruled for the defendants. The appellate court affirmed, holding that under the applicable statute the wife never acquired a vested life estate because she did not survive her husband, so her administrator had no claim to the property regardless of the murder. The court further noted that the complaint did not plead a statutory wrongful-death action and that common-law rules barring murderers from inheriting did not apply here since the property belonged to the husband.

criminal lawfamily lawproperty

The case involved an affidavit charging the appellant and her husband with unlawfully possessing and manufacturing intoxicating liquor in Lake County, Indiana, on July 30, 1925. The husband was discharged for lack of evidence, but the appellant was convicted after a still, mash, and whisky she admitted making were found at the premises. The sole issue on appeal was whether the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; after reviewing the record, the court concluded that the evidence sustained the finding that she had manufactured and possessed the liquor, and therefore affirmed the judgment.

criminal law

This case involved two Indianapolis police officers, McGee and Bedford, who were dismissed by the Board of Public Safety after being charged with neglect of duty and insubordination for failing to report information about a suspected murderer to their superiors as required by department rules. They sought a writ of mandamus to compel their reinstatement. The trial court ordered Bedford reinstated but denied relief to McGee, leading to an appeal. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the reinstatement of Bedford, holding that mandamus does not lie to control or set aside the board's decision because the board had properly invoked jurisdiction to hear the charges and decide the matter, even if its ruling might have been erroneous; other remedies like certiorari might apply but not mandamus.

procedurelabor & employmentcriminal law

This case concerns an appeal from an order appointing appraisers to assess damages in a condemnation proceeding for a railroad right of way across land owned by the Sisters of Providence. The Lower Vein Coal Company, which leased coal mining rights, sought to construct a short lateral railroad (under ten miles) from its mine to connect with an existing railroad line, intending to operate it as a common carrier open to public use for transporting coal and other goods. The Vigo Circuit Court overruled objections to jurisdiction and the complaint's sufficiency and proceeded with the eminent domain action under Indiana statutes. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the company had express statutory authority to appropriate intervening lands for the railroad, that the surveyed route was reasonably necessary, and that the filings and allegations met all procedural requirements without evidence of fraud or overreach.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Spring Valley Coal Co. suing the State of Indiana to recover $854.41 in license fees and tonnage taxes paid under a 1920 statute that created a Special Coal and Food Commission to regulate coal mining. The company alleged it paid under protest and threat of criminal enforcement and mine seizure after the commission issued orders requiring licenses and per-ton taxes, but the trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the payments were voluntary because the statute allowed challenges to the commission's orders in circuit court without penalties during pendency, and apprehension of litigation or expense did not amount to duress. The court held that voluntary payments of taxes or fees cannot be recovered even if illegal, and the statutory right to sue the state does not create liability beyond what would exist against private parties. The opinion did not reach the constitutional challenges to the 1920 act.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case was an action for mandamus by a construction company against the mayor, clerk-treasurer, and council members of the city of Hobart to compel payment of a judgment the company obtained against the city. The judgment arose after a property owner appealed an assessment for street improvements, the company intervened, and the assessment was reduced with the reduction entered as a judgment against the city. The trial court overruled a demurrer to the complaint, sustained demurrers to two paragraphs of the answer, and entered judgment for the relator after trial on the remaining issues. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the complaint adequately alleged facts entitling the relator to mandamus under the statute, that any defenses in the demurred-to answer paragraphs could be presented under the general denial and verified-denial paragraphs that were tried, that the underlying judgment was within the trial court's jurisdiction even if entered irregularly, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment.

procedureproperty

This case involved actions of mandamus filed against the City of Hobart, its mayor, and common council members. The relators sought to compel the city officials to act on petitions for disannexing certain lands owned by the relators from the city. The court noted that the issues were fully addressed and decided in a related case, City of Hobart v. State, ex rel. (1926). Relying on the decision in that prior case, the court affirmed the judgments in these actions.

propertyprocedure

This case involved landowners filing a petition with the City of Hobart's common council to disannex their property from the city under a 1907 statute, after which the council repeatedly refused to take any action or decision on the petition despite proper notice and filing. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus to compel the mayor and council to act, which the trial court granted, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that the statute requires the council to decide such petitions on the merits, with an appeal available afterward, and that mandamus properly compels an inferior body to make a final decision when it refuses to act at all, though not to direct the outcome. Certain facts, such as the city's corporate status, were subject to judicial notice or deemed admitted, and proof of the petition's underlying merits was unnecessary in this mandamus action.

propertyprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a trial court's order appointing a receiver without notice to collect rents from real estate in Muncie, Indiana. The plaintiff alleged that defendant Frank Kubasiak owed money on a promissory note and had fraudulently conveyed the property to hinder creditors, with the conveyances ultimately reaching defendant Bookout, who held title and possession; the complaint also referenced an assignment of rental income and sought the receiver to protect the plaintiff's security interest. The court held that the appointment without notice was improper, as the verified complaint alone did not allege facts showing an emergency, such as imminent waste, destruction, or loss that could not be prevented by other means like a temporary restraining order. The opinion emphasized statutory requirements that facts must demonstrate sufficient cause for ex parte appointment and that property in a defendant's possession should not be taken without notice when lesser measures would suffice. The judgment appointing the receiver was reversed.

procedureproperty

This case involved contractors seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Jay County auditor to issue warrants for the $7,600 balance owed on a brick road built under the three-mile road law after the board of commissioners accepted the work as complete following a hearing on a taxpayer remonstrance. The auditor (as county official and taxpayer) and the board filed cross-complaints seeking to vacate the 1917 acceptance order and require further work, alleging latent defects, but the complaints did not challenge the prior proceedings or allege extrinsic fraud. The trial court overruled demurrers to the cross-complaints and ruled for the cross-complainants, but the appellate court reversed with directions to sustain the demurrers. The court held that the prior judgment accepting the road was conclusive and could not be collaterally attacked based on matters that were or could have been litigated in the original proceeding, as no extrinsic fraud affecting jurisdiction was shown, and the board lacked a sufficient interest to seek such relief.

procedure

This case involved an appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder after the defendant shot and killed her son's wife. The defendant challenged a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt and sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that she was insane at the time of the crime and trial. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the instruction caused no harm in light of the uncontradicted evidence of guilt and that the insanity evidence could not support a new trial because that defense had not been pleaded and key witnesses had been available at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with three counts under 1920s Indiana liquor laws: unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, maintaining a common nuisance by keeping a place where liquor was sold or people drank it as a beverage, and selling liquor to an unknown person. The trial court found the defendant guilty only on the nuisance count and not guilty on the others. On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant maintained or assisted in maintaining such a place, and that acquittal on the possession and sale counts did not contradict this because actual possession of the liquor was not required for the nuisance offense.

criminal law

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for assault and battery on a six-year-old girl with felonious intent. The appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The court held that the bill of exceptions in the record did not include a statement that it contained all the evidence presented at trial, and the reporter's certificate was not properly incorporated or verified by the judge. An attempt to supplement the record with a later certificate from the judge was rejected because it was not part of the original record and could only be corrected through proper amendment in the lower court via certiorari. As a result, questions about the evidence could not be reviewed, and the judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with involuntary manslaughter after his automobile struck and killed a pedestrian at a street intersection in Fort Wayne, Indiana. The defendant was convicted on the first count of the affidavit following a jury trial, but appealed on grounds that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash both counts for failing to state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense or with sufficient certainty. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that neither count alleged the required facts to show a legal connection between the alleged unlawful act (such as failing to keep to the right when turning) and the death as its natural and probable consequence, nor facts demonstrating wanton or reckless conduct endangering life, as mandated by the state constitution and common-law standards for manslaughter. The court reasoned that mere allegations of negligence or epithets like "wanton and reckless disregard" without supporting details about speed, location, conditions, or proximate causation were insufficient under Article 1, §13 of the Indiana Constitution.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the township trustee and advisory board of Pipe Creek Township in Miami County, Indiana, to construct a consolidated grade school building at the site of a former schoolhouse destroyed by fire in the Nead area. The trial court ruled in favor of the relators after making special findings of fact, which showed that children in the consolidated district were being transported long distances to overcrowded schools elsewhere due to the lack of local facilities. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because the appellants' brief failed to properly present any reviewable issues: it did not set out the motions for a new trial or to restate conclusions of law, indicate exceptions taken, include evidence, or assign errors regarding the legal conclusions drawn from the facts found.

procedure

The case involved an appellant who was charged in an Indianapolis city court with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor under one count of a five-count indictment. After conviction in criminal court and sentencing to a $200 fine plus sixty days at the Indiana State Farm, he moved for a new trial on grounds that the finding lacked sufficient evidence and was contrary to law; the motion was denied. On appeal, the court examined the record and held that the evidence, if believed, adequately supported the guilty finding under the third count, so the denial of a new trial was not error. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

criminal law

The case concerned charges against the appellant for unlawfully possessing and transporting liquor. At trial, the defendant requested written jury instructions, which the court partially provided before delivering additional instructions orally over objection. The court determined that giving oral instructions after agreeing to provide them in writing was reversible error. Evidence from police officers about observing the defendant discard bottles of alcohol was found sufficient for admissibility, though other issues were noted as potentially moot on retrial. The judgment was reversed on the procedural ground.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death claim brought by the administrator of Charles W. McQuaid's estate against the railroad after its train struck his automobile at a highway crossing, killing him. The complaint alleged that the railroad negligently placed box cars obstructing the view of the tracks, failed to give any whistle or other signals, and operated the train at fifty miles per hour. The trial court overruled a demurrer and entered a $3,000 judgment for the plaintiff after a jury trial. On appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim for negligence without needing to negate contributory negligence, that the jury instructions correctly described the standard of care and did not improperly require the decedent to stop his vehicle, and that other requested instructions were either covered or properly refused.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved an appeal by a defendant convicted of unlawfully buying and concealing stolen diamonds, for which he received a fine and prison sentence. The defendant had requested in writing that the jury be instructed in writing, and the trial court provided some requested written instructions but then delivered additional instructions orally. The court held that this violated the statute requiring written instructions upon timely request before arguments, and that shorthand transcription did not satisfy the requirement, creating reversible error because the jury might not treat oral and written instructions equally. The evidence of guilt, resting largely on a co-conspirator's testimony, was not so conclusive as to overlook the procedural error. The judgment was reversed with directions for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the prosecution of the appellant for unlawfully selling, bartering, or otherwise disposing of intoxicating liquor, specifically one-half pint of whisky. A jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged and imposing a fine of $500 plus six months imprisonment in the county jail. The trial court overruled the defendant's motion for a venire facias de novo, which claimed the verdict was too uncertain for judgment, and entered judgment fining the defendant $500 and ordering imprisonment until discharged by law. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the verdict was intelligible and that state law required the imprisonment to be served at the Indiana State Farm.

criminal law