Dan C. Flanagan

The case involved the Marion County Plan Commission's effort to enjoin operation of a trailer coach park on two adjacent tracts of land as a violation of the county's 1948 zoning ordinance. The court examined whether the ordinance was validly enacted under the 1947 state enabling act, whether its annual licensing fee provisions were authorized, whether those provisions survived a 1949 statute, and whether prior use of the "blue" tract created a lawful nonconforming use exempt from the ordinance. It concluded the ordinance took effect in late 1948 or early 1949, that annual permit fees lacked statutory authorization, and that evidence supported the trial court's finding of no qualifying prior use, resulting in affirmance of the injunction judgment.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission revoking Midwest Liquor Dealers, Inc.'s liquor wholesaler's permit after a hearing, based on a major stockholder's prior felony conviction in violation of the governing statute. The company obtained a restraining order from the Superior Court of Marion County to block enforcement of the revocation. The state then sought an original writ of prohibition from the Indiana Supreme Court to prevent the superior court from enforcing that order. The Supreme Court made the temporary writ permanent, holding that the superior court lacked authority because liquor permits create no property or contractual rights and the statute provides only a limited right of appeal as the exclusive remedy.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Lunce, Reynolds v. State, two defendants convicted of robbery appealed their convictions, arguing that their out-of-state counsel's incompetent representation denied them due process under the Indiana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, ruling that the claimed errors by counsel did not rise to the level of a complete lack of representation equivalent to or worse than none at all, as required by precedent such as Wilson v. State. The majority emphasized that ordinary procedural mistakes or strategic decisions by attorneys do not justify reviewing every case on appeal to maintain stability in appellate practice. A dissent contended that the record demonstrated gross incompetence, including improper handling of the appeal, warranting reversal to safeguard the defendants' constitutional rights to competent counsel.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case is an appeal from a trial court judgment granting a permanent injunction. The appellees petitioned to transfer the appeal to the Appellate Court, arguing that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. The court agreed, holding that jurisdiction requires a constitutional question to be both involved and properly presented to the trial court. Appellants' claim in their brief that the injunction deprived them of property without due process was insufficient because the issue had not been raised below, as supported by cited precedents. The petition for transfer was granted and the cause ordered transferred.

procedureproperty

This case was an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of coram nobis following the appellant's guilty plea to auto banditry after being charged with robbery and auto banditry. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition. The majority reasoned that the appellant had voluntarily admitted guilt in detail to police, knew the penalty for auto banditry and his right to a jury trial, and that the brief consultation with his appointed pauper attorneys and lack of further advice on constitutional rights caused no prejudice given the facts. A dissent argued that the ten-minute consultation demonstrated inadequate representation violating due process.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a petition for writs of mandate and prohibition challenging a trial court's denial of a plea in abatement in an underlying action on account and for appointment of a receiver. The relator argued that service of summons was improper because it was left at his place of business rather than his residence. The court vacated the temporary writ, holding that writs of prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that do not issue where an adequate alternative remedy, such as an appeal, exists.

procedure

This case concerned the State Department of Public Welfare's effort to recover $2,312.20 in old age assistance and medical aid payments from William Doughty after he received a $6,000 estate settlement. The trial court initially impounded the funds, but after an appellate reversal, a sustained demurrer, and an amended complaint, Doughty's attorney withdrew the money, prompting a new order requiring its return to the clerk. The court held that the June 1953 impounding order remained in full force because reversal of a judgment restores the parties to their pre-judgment positions, including any existing orders, and a sustained demurrer does not remove the complaint but permits amendment under the applicable statute. The Madison Circuit Court's order directing return of the funds was therefore affirmed.

procedurehealthcare

In this case, a citizens' association petitioned the Lake Criminal Court to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate alleged irregular activities by the regular prosecutor, but the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding that the appellants lacked any right to compel such an appointment. The court reasoned that prosecuting attorneys are judicial officers under the Indiana Constitution, and while courts may appoint special prosecutors upon a proper showing of disqualification after notice and hearing, they cannot be compelled to do so based on citizens' demands or mere suspicion. The opinion emphasized that courts control their internal affairs and that alternative proper procedures, such as actions by the Attorney General or grand juries, remain available. The petition to reinstate the appeal was also denied.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by a defendant convicted of assault and battery with intent to commit murder, who challenged the charging affidavit on three procedural grounds: that it was made on information and belief rather than by the prosecuting attorney or complaining witness, that the prosecutor's approval did not include his full official title, and that it omitted an allegation that the victim was "another human being." The court rejected all three claims, ruling that an affidavit upon information and belief satisfies legal requirements, that the prosecutor followed the applicable statute in approving the affidavit, and that prior precedent had already decided the third issue against the appellant. The judgment of conviction was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In Taylor v. State, the defendant was charged with first-degree burglary in Marion County Criminal Court and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of unsound mind. After being found insane and committed to a hospital, he regained sanity, was returned for trial, waived a jury, and was found guilty; the court took the matter under advisement on May 3, 1952, but did not enter judgment until April 18, 1953, after the defendant had been committed to and escaped from an epileptic village, at which point the court sentenced him to ten to twenty years. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court lost jurisdiction under Rule 1-13 because it held the case under advisement for more than ninety days without a timely decision, requiring reversal and entry of judgment for the appellant. The core reasoning centered on the mandatory time limit in the rule for issues under advisement and the automatic withdrawal of submission and disqualification of the judge upon violation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appellant convicted on three counts of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, reckless driving, and public intoxication. The only issue raised on appeal was the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion for a new trial, and all arguments depended on the evidence presented at trial. However, the evidence was not included in the record on appeal. As a result, the court determined there was nothing before it to review and affirmed the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved eight consolidated indictments against the appellant for violations of state gaming laws, with evidence obtained through a police search authorized by statute. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution because it permitted searches without a judicial determination of probable cause. However, the appellant waived any objection to the illegal search by denying ownership or interest in the seized property and premises. Challenges to the grand jury proceedings, denial of a change of venue, the right to a jury trial, evidentiary rulings, peremptory challenges, and jury instructions were all rejected as lacking merit or reversible error. The convictions were affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the discharge of a longtime employee serving as Director of Staff Services in the Indiana Department of Public Welfare, which the State Personnel Board upheld after finding inefficiency or insubordination. On judicial review, the Marion Superior Court reversed the Board's decision and ordered reinstatement, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The sole question was whether the Board's ruling was supported by substantial evidence; the record showed only minor incidents, such as not bringing staff to a meeting, delays in task assignment, errors by subordinates, limited meeting participation, scheduling conflicts, and an interview with the press on personal legal views, none of which established inefficiency or insubordination.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned whether a New York corporation distributing motion picture films to Indiana exhibitors through its Chicago office was engaged in interstate commerce, making its gross receipts exempt from Indiana's gross income tax. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the corporation was engaged in interstate commerce and thus its receipts from Indiana licensees served by the Chicago office were not subject to the tax. The court reasoned that the licensing process, involving submissions to out-of-state offices for approval, shipment of films across state lines, and payments received out of state, constituted interstate transactions that could not be taxed by the state as a direct burden on commerce. It relied on precedents establishing that similar film rental activities are interstate commerce and that gross income taxes on such transactions are unconstitutional.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerned the eligibility of a sitting county sheriff to run for reelection under a 1948 amendment to the Indiana Constitution that established four-year terms beginning January 1, 1951, and barred any person from holding the office more than eight years in any twelve-year period. The court was asked to decide whether prior service before 1951 counted toward the eight-year limit, which would have disqualified the appellee from the 1954 election. The court held that the limit applied only to service after the new constitutional terms began on January 1, 1951. It reasoned that constitutional amendments operate prospectively and that the new term structure created a fresh starting point, rendering any earlier service under prior rules irrelevant to the new restriction.

elections

The case involved an Indiana corporation that processes stove and refrigerator parts by enameling them for customers. The company attempted to restructure its out-of-state dealings as sales rather than bailments to avoid Indiana's Gross Income Tax by claiming the transactions were interstate commerce. The court held that relabeling the transactions did not alter the essential nature of the business activity, which occurs in Indiana, and thus the gross receipts remain subject to the state tax under a prior U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the same company. The decision emphasized that substance controls over form in determining tax liability. The judgment in favor of the tax division was affirmed.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case challenged the constitutionality of a 1951 Indiana statute creating a new Health & Hospital Corporation as a municipal entity in counties with populations over 500,000, granting it powers to issue bonds and levy taxes. The court examined multiple constitutional claims, including whether bond issuance violated debt limits under Article 13, whether the act was an impermissible special law under Articles 4 and 1, whether board appointment rules violated equal privileges, whether the title adequately covered all provisions under Article 4, and whether the act improperly transferred powers over county asylums under Article 9. The court held that the act was constitutional in most respects, as it applied to future censuses, did not exceed debt limits per corporation, satisfied equal privileges and title requirements, but found the provisions shifting asylum authority from county boards unconstitutional and severable. The judgment was reversed with instructions to sustain the appellants' motion for a new trial.

healthcaretaxesbusiness & regulatory

The case Wallace v. State centered on a criminal defendant who sought to avoid liability after his attempt to commit suicide resulted in the death of a bystander who intervened. The defendant requested a jury instruction that attempted suicide is not an unlawful act in Indiana, on the ground that no statute defines it as a criminal offense. The trial court refused to give the instruction, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that the terms "unlawful" and "criminal" are not synonymous, as some tortious acts are unlawful but not criminal, and that self-destruction violates the law of both God and man.

criminal law

The case concerned whether an Indiana resident was subject to the state's gross income tax on capital gains realized from buying and selling stocks on the New York Stock Exchange via margin accounts, where brokerage firms advanced funds, held liens, and retained certificates in New York. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the transactions were exempt, holding that they fell within interstate commerce under the precedent of Freeman v. Hewit. The majority reasoned that the key inquiry is whether the sale itself occurs in interstate commerce, and differences in financing methods like margin accounts or the physical location of stock certificates do not remove the transaction from that category. The dissent contended that the tax was effectively on net capital gains rather than gross receipts and therefore did not violate the Commerce Clause.

taxesfederal power

The case involved an appellant convicted of grand larceny who escaped from the Indiana Reformatory during his appeal and fled the state, later being held in another state on new charges. The court dismissed the appeal upon the Attorney General's motion. It held that a defendant who absents himself from state custody and jurisdiction as a fugitive from justice cannot prosecute an appeal. This rule applies even if the appellant is captured and held elsewhere, following established precedent.

criminal lawprocedure