The case involved an Indiana resident who executed a promissory note in Indiana, payable in Illinois, containing a warrant of attorney authorizing any attorney to confess judgment without notice. An Illinois court entered judgment against the maker via this confession procedure, which is valid under Illinois law though not under Indiana law, and the holder then sued in Indiana to enforce the judgment. The Indiana court held that the Illinois judgment must be recognized and enforced in Indiana under the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, because the note was payable in Illinois and the parties' chosen law governed the enforceability of the confession provision. The court distinguished the place of execution from the place of performance and affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.
The case concerned a dispute over ownership of certain real estate, with the appellant seeking partition based on a claimed undivided one-third interest. After an initial trial court judgment in the appellant's favor, the Appellate Court reversed on the ground that she was estopped from asserting any interest in the property. On retrial, the lower court made special findings of fact and again concluded that the appellant was estopped. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, holding that the facts found on retrial were substantially the same as those in the prior appeal and that the law of the case therefore required the same result.
The consolidated cases challenged the validity of an Indianapolis "Anti-Picketing" ordinance, with plaintiffs seeking to enjoin its enforcement and others appealing convictions for violations during labor disputes. The court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of the city council's authority under its charter to preserve peace and good order, ruling that it properly prohibited picketing involving compulsion, threats, coercion, intimidation, or violence at workplaces or businesses. The decision rejected arguments that the ordinance was unreasonable, exceeded granted powers, or conflicted with state criminal statutes on assault or similar offenses, noting that violations of the ordinance do not necessarily require or duplicate statutory crimes. Judgments enforcing the ordinance were affirmed.
This case was a dispute between a landlord and tenant over a written lease for a store room in South Bend, Indiana, running from May 1, 1920, to April 29, 1935. The tenant sued for breach after the landlord began installing a new storefront (per the tenant's plans) on May 1 and did not finish until October 25, claiming lost use of the premises, devalued seasonal merchandise, extra storage and drayage costs, and failure to provide heat. A jury awarded the tenant $7,400, but the appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial. The court held that the lease imposed no deadline for the improvements, so the landlord had a reasonable time to complete them; absent evidence that the work was unreasonable, negligent, or excessive, there was no breach regarding possession, and the only potentially recoverable item was $176.94 for the heating failure.
In Pritchett v. State, the appellant was tried and convicted of attempted rape based on an affidavit charging assault and battery with intent to commit rape, and he appealed the resulting judgment and sentence after the trial court overruled his motion for a new trial and motion in arrest of judgment. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in denying a special venire drawn from the jury box and instead allowing the sheriff to summon extra jurors, as the record showed the regular panel was used and no substantial rights were affected. It further held that there was no abuse of discretion in rulings on a state witness's cross-examination testimony regarding reputation evidence, that the record affirmatively showed a unanimous verdict to which all jurors assented, and that jurisdictional objections based on a prior city court proceeding were unsupported by the record and involved a different charge anyway. The appellant had not exercised his right to poll the jury before discharge, waiving any later challenge to unanimity.
This case involved a petition to establish a drain in which commissioners filed a report assessing benefits to the appellants' lands. The appellants filed remonstrances against the report on February 18, 1922, more than ten days after the report's February 6 filing, and the trial court struck the remonstrances as untimely under the governing statute. The statute allowed ten days, exclusive of the filing day and Sundays, for owners to file remonstrances, and the appellants argued that Lincoln's Birthday, observed as a holiday on the intervening Monday, should also be excluded. The court held that only the days expressly listed in the statute—the filing day and Sundays—could be excluded from the computation, applying the principle that unspecified holidays are included in the time period. The remonstrances were therefore untimely, and the judgment striking them was affirmed.