Willard B. Gemmill

In Emmons v. Clark, Oscar Clark and others petitioned the Martin County board of commissioners to establish a highway over a used road in Lost River Township; after viewers approved it, Clarence Emmons remonstrated claiming about $200 in damages, but reviewers found no damages owed, and a jury in the circuit court ruled against him on appeal. Emmons challenged the circuit court's jurisdiction, arguing the proceeding should have been under a different statute for long-used roads, and also moved for a new trial on evidentiary and sufficiency grounds. The court held that jurisdiction objections not apparent on the petition's face must be raised promptly before the board or they are waived, and that the reviewers' report was properly admitted as evidence under the statute governing de novo appeals from highway proceedings. It further found the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and affirmed the judgment against Emmons.

propertyprocedure

This case is an appeal from a Porter Circuit Court judgment finding Joe Loerasto guilty of indirect contempt, fining him $100, and sentencing him to 30 days in jail for violating a temporary restraining order. The order, issued in a case charging operation of a house of ill fame, prohibited removing personal property from the premises and continuing prostitution there. The court held that this constituted civil contempt, which is exempt from the criminal contempt statute, and that the verified information sufficiently alleged a willful violation by allowing prostitution on premises the defendant controlled. The defendant's verified answer denying knowledge and ownership was insufficient to purge the contempt because it admitted potential control and failed to show efforts to comply. The judgment was affirmed, as the trial court's rulings on motions were not properly assigned as error and no reversible error was shown.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the State seeking to recover from parents the costs of their son's support at the Indiana Farm Colony for Feeble-minded, set at $4 per week by the institution's board. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers to the complaint on grounds that it failed to state a cause of action and entered judgment for the parents, but the appellate court reversed. The court held the 1919 statute constitutional under the Indiana Constitution as a general law of uniform operation that did not violate provisions on institutions for the insane. It reasoned that parents owe a continuing duty of support to defective children even after majority, the complaint sufficiently alleged the parents' financial ability to pay, and no additional showing was required regarding the estate's use for other relatives when seeking payment from parents.

family lawprocedure

In this case, a plaintiff creditor sued a company for an alleged debt of $341 and sought ex parte appointment of a receiver, claiming the defendant was in imminent danger of insolvency due to mismanagement of funds and that its income stream would be wasted without immediate court intervention. The trial court appointed a receiver without notice based on the verified amended complaint and oral testimony. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the appointment, ruling that state law requires reasonable notice to the adverse party before appointing a receiver unless the verified complaint (not oral evidence) states sufficient facts showing why notice or a temporary restraining order would be inadequate. The complaint here contained only conclusions and failed to demonstrate that alternative relief could not protect the plaintiff's interests until a noticed hearing.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a lawsuit by a resident seeking to enjoin the city of Crown Point and Tuf-Tread Corp. from resurfacing a public street under a contract alleged to be illegal for various reasons. The trial court granted a temporary injunction to halt the work during the pendency of the action. On appeal from that interlocutory order, the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the defendants' refusal to plead further after their demurrer was overruled resulted in a default that admitted the complaint's allegations, which were sufficient to show a substantial question warranting equitable investigation and preservation of the status quo. The court further held that the decision to grant a temporary injunction rests in the trial court's sound discretion absent arbitrary action, and that other assigned errors regarding the complaint were premature without a final judgment.

procedure

This case involved a mandate action by attorney Thomas M. Ryan against the Howard County auditor to compel payment of $447.30 remaining on a $900 claim for services assisting the prosecution in a banker's embezzlement case transferred from Howard Circuit Court to Clinton Circuit Court. The Clinton court appointed Ryan under the relevant statute, and the Howard court judge later allowed the full claim after the county council appropriated sufficient funds in 1929, though the auditor paid only the prior year's unexpended appropriation amount. The trial court ruled for the auditor, but on appeal the court held that the Howard judge's allowance was valid and within the existing appropriation, that the auditor had a duty to issue a warrant for the full amount allowed, and that the lower court's finding was contrary to law. The judgment was reversed with directions to grant a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Zirkle v. Zirkle, the appellant mother petitioned to enforce a 1923 divorce decree's weekly child support order against the appellee father, who had stopped payments after she moved their minor child to Michigan following the child's sixth birthday; the father defended on grounds that the move deprived him of visitation rights. The trial court awarded the mother only partial arrears of $125, but the appellate court reversed, ruling that the father remained liable for the full accrued support and that his answer failed to state a valid defense. The court reasoned that divorce decrees concerning children remain in effect until modified by the court, which retains continuing jurisdiction, and that the child's removal from the state without a court order did not automatically relieve the father of his support obligations or permit him to unilaterally cease payments.

family law

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for rape of a female child under age 16, where the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of motions for venire facias de novo and a new trial on grounds that the jury verdict was defective in form. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment sentencing the defendant to an indeterminate term of five to 21 years, finding that the verdict, though informal, sufficiently established the material facts charged in the affidavit and allowed entry of judgment. The court reasoned that verdicts receive a reasonable construction if intelligible to the court, no timely objection was raised to the verdict form, and the motion for new trial did not properly raise the verdict issues.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a shareholder seeking to enjoin a band instrument company's reorganization under the Indiana General Corporation Act. After the trial court denied a temporary injunction, the company completed its reorganization by filing and recording the necessary documents, prompting the defendants to move to dismiss the appeal. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, reasoning that the reorganization was fully consummated before the appeal was perfected, so no injunctive relief could be granted and no question of general public interest remained.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved the Hildebrand Hardware Company (later replaced by its bankruptcy trustee) seeking a personal judgment and foreclosure of a mechanic's lien against real estate owned by Better Homes Company for furnace installation and other materials and labor supplied during house construction, with multiple other lienholders filing cross-complaints. Bennett had contracted with Better Homes Company under an option-to-purchase agreement that included provisions for the company to advance construction funds, approve plans, and make payments, though Bennett later abandoned the project. The trial court entered findings and judgments upholding the liens on the property and personal liability against Bennett. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the company's active involvement in the improvements—beyond mere consent—made its interest subject to the liens under Indiana mechanic's lien law, as the contract treated Bennett effectively as an agent or reflected the company's authorization of the work.

property

The case involved the City of Crawfordsville suing a theater owner for violating a municipal ordinance that prohibited operating moving picture shows on Sundays for profit. The actions originated in city court and were appealed, with the key issue being the ordinance's validity in light of an existing state statute on Sabbath breaking. The court held the ordinance invalid, ruling that it could not punish an act already defined as a public offense under state law. This conclusion followed from statutes granting cities regulatory powers over shows but expressly barring local ordinances from duplicating state criminal provisions, as the defendant's conduct aligned with the state's Sabbath law.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

This case was an appeal from a probate court judgment denying admission to probate of a 1917 joint will executed by Margaret (Maggie) Klein and Michael J. Klein. The court affirmed the denial of probate, holding that the proponent failed to prove due execution of the instrument. The core reasoning was that an attesting witness could recall nothing about the signing beyond recognizing his own signature, the other attesting witness was deceased, the signatures of the testators and witnesses were shown but there was no full attestation clause, and Indiana statutes required more than mere proof of handwriting to establish proper execution when a subscribing witness was available but could not testify to the formalities.

propertyprocedure

This case is the second appeal in a drainage proceeding originally petitioned in White Circuit Court to construct a public drain, where assessments had been confirmed but construction bids exceeded available funds due to rising costs. After an earlier ruling that the construction commissioner lacked authority to seek reassessment, affected landowners filed a verified petition for reassessment of benefits, which the trial court accepted, leading to a supplemental report by drainage commissioners. The appellate court held that the petition was legally insufficient because it failed to allege facts showing either that additional assessments could be made within the limits of already adjudged benefits or that benefits had increased due to changed conditions, as required by precedent. The court therefore reversed the judgment, directing the trial court to sustain the demurrer to the petition and strike the commissioners' report, while confirming jurisdiction existed for a properly pleaded petition.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a condemnation proceeding by the State of Indiana to acquire about 3.9 acres of the appellee's land in Parke County for building and improving State Road No. 41 under the State Highway Act and the Eminent Domain Act. Appraisers initially awarded $7,000 in damages, which the appellee accepted, but a jury later awarded $7,500, leading to a modified judgment of $570.35 after accounting for the prior payment. The central dispute on appeal was whether any benefits to the remaining land from the highway could be considered or deducted when calculating damages. The court determined that the Eminent Domain Act permits deduction for benefits only in takings by municipal corporations, which does not include the State, and the highway funding comes from general taxes without special assessments on benefited properties. The judgment for the appellee was affirmed as the trial court properly excluded evidence and instructions on benefits.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the conviction of James McHugh for the unlawful purchase and receipt of intoxicating liquor under Acts 1925, ch. 48, §4. McHugh sought to withdraw his not guilty plea to file a plea in abatement, arguing that the indictment was a blank form when filed and later altered by the prosecutor, and that the grand jury was illegally organized because a vacancy was filled by the sheriff selecting a bystander rather than following statutory procedures for drawing from the jury box. The trial court overruled the plea in abatement without a hearing or issue being formed. The appellate court held that the grand jury was not legally organized under the applicable statute and that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on the plea, leading to reversal of the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Sylva Headlee, who was indicted and convicted by a jury of vehicle taking under a 1921 statute after allegedly receiving an automobile that had been unlawfully taken from its corporate owner. Headlee appealed the judgment, arguing that a pending prosecution against him for receiving stolen goods in another county required abatement of this case, that the statute was unconstitutionally uncertain, that the indictment was defective due to a minor variance in the owner's name and other grounds, and that several jury instructions were erroneous or misleading. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the two prosecutions involved distinct offenses so the plea in abatement was properly denied, that the statute and indictment were valid under applicable rules against surplusage or repugnancy, and that the instructions were either accurate or not prejudicial to the defendant. The court found no reversible error in the trial proceedings or the timing of the judgment after post-trial motions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Sylva Headlee, who was indicted and convicted by a jury of vehicle taking under a 1921 statute after allegedly receiving an automobile that had been unlawfully taken from its corporate owner. Headlee appealed the judgment, arguing that a pending prosecution against him for receiving stolen goods in another county required abatement of this case, that the statute was unconstitutionally uncertain, that the indictment was defective due to a minor variance in the owner's name and other grounds, and that several jury instructions were erroneous or misleading. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the two prosecutions involved distinct offenses so the plea in abatement was properly denied, that the statute and indictment were valid under applicable rules against surplusage or repugnancy, and that the instructions were either accurate or not prejudicial to the defendant. The court found no reversible error in the trial proceedings or the timing of the judgment after post-trial motions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Sylva Headlee, who was indicted and convicted by a jury of vehicle taking under a 1921 statute after allegedly receiving an automobile that had been unlawfully taken from its corporate owner. Headlee appealed the judgment, arguing that a pending prosecution against him for receiving stolen goods in another county required abatement of this case, that the statute was unconstitutionally uncertain, that the indictment was defective due to a minor variance in the owner's name and other grounds, and that several jury instructions were erroneous or misleading. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the two prosecutions involved distinct offenses so the plea in abatement was properly denied, that the statute and indictment were valid under applicable rules against surplusage or repugnancy, and that the instructions were either accurate or not prejudicial to the defendant. The court found no reversible error in the trial proceedings or the timing of the judgment after post-trial motions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a prosecution in Indiana for the crime of vehicle taking, in which the defendant pleaded not guilty, was convicted by a jury, and received a sentence of one to ten years in prison along with disfranchisement. On appeal, the defendant claimed error in the trial court's overruling of his motion for a new trial. The court determined that the motion for a new trial, the ruling on it, and the exception to the ruling were part of the record without needing a bill of exceptions, yet they appeared only in a special bill of exceptions rather than the record proper. Because no valid ruling or exception on the motion was properly presented in the record, no question regarding the motion could be considered on appeal. With no error shown, the judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gale v. State, the defendant was charged with grand larceny, pleaded guilty after one count was dismissed, and was sentenced to prison, fined, and ordered to pay costs following a hearing on evidence related to sentencing. The defendant moved to withdraw the guilty plea and for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counter-affidavits fully disputed the claims in the verified motion to withdraw, that withdrawal of a guilty plea is within the trial court's sound discretion absent abuse (which was not shown), and that a motion for new trial is not available after a judgment on a guilty plea. The court further noted that evidence heard post-plea was only for considering sentence suspension, not guilt.

criminal lawprocedure