Frank E. Gilkison

This case involved a mortgage foreclosure judgment rendered on March 13, 1954, against Sam Tadros for $17,000 plus costs, ordering the sale of real estate in LaPorte County, Indiana. After the final judgment, the appellants filed an application for the appointment of a receiver to secure rents collected by the First National Bank as trustee, which the trial court denied on May 8, 1954. The court determined that the denial was not an interlocutory order because it occurred after the final judgment in the principal case, making the appeal under the interlocutory order statute unavailable and transferring jurisdiction to the Appellate Court of Indiana.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a challenge to an Indiana statute (Burns' § 11-1424) that authorized free hunting, trapping, and fishing permits exclusively for honorably discharged veterans of specified wars who were state residents. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the law violated Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution (equal privileges) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court upheld the statute, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, finding it a valid exercise of legislative authority that reasonably classified veterans as a distinct group based on their military service without arbitrary discrimination. The court emphasized presumptions of constitutionality and noted that the statute's distinctions bore a rational relation to the state's regulatory interests in game and fish resources.

civil rights

The case concerned a defendant's conviction for the rape of an eleven-year-old girl following a bench trial in which his appointed pauper counsel presented no evidence, called no witnesses, made no objections or arguments, and did not secure a jury trial. The defendant filed a verified petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging that counsel rendered only perfunctory representation, that police obtained a confession through beatings, and that he never waived his right to a jury. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of the petition, holding that the attorney's complete failure to mount any defense deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to adequate representation. The core reasoning was that counsel's inaction, including not seeking alibi witnesses or even objecting to evidence, amounted to less than pro forma representation in violation of Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of Burnie Salyers' estate against Isabelle Borntrager, alleging that her negligent driving of a pickup truck caused his death as he walked along a highway at night. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction directing a verdict in her favor at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that a directed verdict is improper when there is any evidence or legitimate inference supporting the material allegations of the complaint, including from physical facts and circumstances surrounding the accident such as the truck's path, the body's location, and the defendant's testimony about visibility and control. The court emphasized that conflicts in evidence or inferences must be resolved by the jury rather than the judge weighing them at this stage.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved appellant Rufus Bell, who was charged with driving an automobile on public highways in Noble County, Indiana, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of state statute. Following a bench trial, the court found Bell guilty, imposed a fine and costs, and recommended suspending his driving permit for one year. Bell appealed, arguing that the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law, claiming his physical symptoms could be explained without intoxication. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the testimony of three police officers describing Bell's unsteady gait, slurred speech, flushed face, red eyes, and odor of alcohol provided sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The court noted that it could not reweigh the evidence on appeal and that the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial.

criminal law

The case involved a defendant charged by affidavit with inflicting physical injury on a victim using a soft drink bottle while committing a robbery of $3,000. The defendant moved to quash the affidavit on grounds that it failed to state a public offense with certainty, improperly joined charges, and that a soft drink bottle was not within the statutory class of dangerous weapons under the ejusdem generis rule; he also sought to have the charges separated and parts of the affidavit struck. The trial court overruled these motions, the jury convicted the defendant of inflicting injury in the commission of a robbery, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that a single-count affidavit properly pleaded the robbery as context and focused on the injury offense, that later procedural motions were untimely after the plea, and that the statutory language allowed the bottle as a dangerous weapon without needing to invoke ejusdem generis.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the prosecution of Jack Wedmore for the rape of a minor female under the age of sixteen in St. Joseph Superior Court No. 2, which was transferred by agreement of the parties to the St. Joseph Probate Court after a change of judge; the Probate Court then tried the case without a jury and convicted Wedmore of assault and battery, sentencing him to six months in the Indiana Penal Farm along with a fine and costs. The Attorney General raised the issue of whether the Probate Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this criminal matter. The court held that the Probate Court lacked general criminal jurisdiction under the 1945 statute establishing it, which granted the court specific authority over juvenile delinquency, neglect, paternity, and related matters but did not extend general criminal jurisdiction through its concurrent jurisdiction provisions with circuit and superior courts. Because the Probate Court had no jurisdiction, its judgment was void, and the case was reversed with instructions to vacate all proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the selection of a special judge in a post-divorce custody modification proceeding in Marion County Superior Court. After granting the mother's timely affidavit for a change of judge, the trial court directly appointed an attorney as special judge rather than following the required process under Indiana Supreme Court Rule 1-12 of submitting a panel of three for the parties to strike from. The mother sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the appointed judge from proceeding. The Indiana Supreme Court made the writ permanent, holding that a 1937 statute gave the Supreme Court exclusive authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, that Rule 1-12 exclusively governs the selection of special judges, and that the trial court's failure to follow the rule meant the appointed judge lacked authority to act.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Mildred Smith (also known as relatrix or Mildred Smith Lintzenich) to halt proceedings in the Vanderburgh Probate Court. The underlying dispute concerned the estate of Leo Lintzenich, who died intestate, and his alleged 50% interest in a snack bar partnership with Smith; the administrator sought appointment of a receiver for the partnership assets under surviving partner statutes after more than six months had passed without Smith qualifying as surviving partner. Smith, claiming status as common-law wife, challenged the court's authority in both the receivership action and her separate petition asserting marital rights. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the probate court had jurisdiction under relevant statutes to hear and decide the issues presented in the estate and receivership matters. It revoked the temporary writ and denied a permanent writ, reasoning that it would not presume error by the lower court or supervise its proceedings where jurisdiction existed.

procedurepropertyfamily law

This case involved an original mandamus action filed in the Indiana Supreme Court by relator Beatty, who sought to require a special judge to expunge an order overruling a motion to withdraw submission of cause No. 2446 under Supreme Court Rule 1-13, to grant that motion, and to appoint a new judge. The underlying case had been heard and taken under advisement in January 1954, the withdrawal motion was denied in May 1954, and judgment was entered against the relator. The court revoked the alternative writ and denied a permanent writ of mandate. It held that its mandamus authority is limited and does not extend to directing or reviewing exercises of judicial discretion, which are properly addressed through appeal rather than mandamus proceedings.

procedure

In Trisler v. State, the defendant was charged by affidavit with assault and battery in Brown Circuit Court. The trial court overruled motions to quash the affidavit (which lacked the judge's approval required for filing in vacation) and a jury convicted the defendant, who was fined and sentenced despite a suspended sentence recommendation. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that strict compliance with the statutory filing requirements under Burns' Sec. 9-908 was necessary and the absence of judge approval on the record made the affidavit vulnerable to the amended motion to quash, and that refusal to give the defendant's tendered self-defense instruction (when evidence supported that defense and no such instruction was given) was reversible error.

criminal lawprocedure

In Knopp v. State, the defendant was charged and convicted under an Indiana statute (Sec. 10-2103) with obtaining money by false pretenses after selling a house to the victim for $600 via check on January 26, 1951, despite not yet owning the property, which he acquired the following day. The trial court found him guilty following a bench trial, sentencing him to 180 days and a $50 fine. On appeal, the court identified multiple errors, including the prosecutor's improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify, admission of irrelevant contract details and hearsay testimony, and insufficient evidence to prove the required intent to defraud or that the victim was actually deceived. The evidence showed the victim received the house without dispute and only learned of the one-day title gap months later, leading the appellate court to reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Edward J. Kelley, who was charged in an affidavit with two counts following a fatal automobile collision: involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence and through a red light, and leaving the scene of an accident without stopping or providing required information under Indiana statutes. A jury acquitted him on the manslaughter count but convicted him on the leaving-the-scene count, imposing a one-year prison sentence and $5,000 fine. The trial court overruled Kelley's motion in arrest of judgment, which argued that the second count failed to state a public offense. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that penal statutes must be strictly construed and that the affidavit was defective because it did not allege failure to provide the statutorily required name, address, and license information to the specific persons designated in the statute (the person struck or vehicle occupants/attendants), particularly where the victim was killed instantly.

criminal lawprocedure

In Bryant v. State, the defendant was charged with robbery under Indiana law and, after a bench trial, was convicted and sentenced to one to ten years in the reformatory. On appeal, Bryant challenged several evidentiary rulings, including restrictions on cross-examination of a state witness and the admission of testimony from rebuttal witnesses about the prosecuting witness's good reputation for truth and veracity. The court held that while most claims lacked merit, the trial court committed reversible error by allowing evidence of the prosecuting witness's reputation before it had been attacked or put at issue, contrary to established precedent that such character evidence is presumptively inadmissible until impeachment occurs. The judgment was therefore reversed with instructions to grant a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Sweet v. State, the defendant was charged with kidnapping in 1933, arraigned without counsel in 1935, and after requesting a pauper attorney had counsel appointed only four days before trial; he then withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea, resulting in a life sentence. Years later, through a petition for writ of error coram nobis, he alleged violations of his constitutional rights, including inadequate time for counsel to prepare and the prison warden's suppression of his attempts to file motions, appeals, and habeas petitions. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the lack of preparation time denied the right to counsel under the Indiana Constitution and due process under both the state and federal constitutions, and that the warden's actions violated due process and equal protection under the 14th Amendment and state law. The court ordered the plea withdrawn and further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Shutt v. State, the defendant was charged by amended affidavit with robbery and with being a habitual criminal based on three prior felony convictions (two auto thefts in Kentucky and one burglary in Indiana), each with resulting imprisonment. The defendant moved to quash the habitual-criminal portion of the affidavit, arguing that it failed to identify the specific courts in which the Kentucky convictions occurred and raising constitutional challenges to the habitual-offender statute; the trial court overruled all such motions, allowed the prior-conviction allegations to be read to the jury, and permitted evidence on those allegations. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the affidavit was legally insufficient because, under the controlling statute, it was required to “describe each [prior conviction] separately” by stating the court and county where the convictions were obtained. Because the defective habitual-criminal count had been presented to the jury along with the robbery charge, the court reversed the judgment with instructions to sustain the motion to quash the habitual-criminal allegations and to proceed accordingly on the robbery charge alone.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Clarence Eulan Richeson, who was charged by affidavit with unlawfully uttering a forged check for $12.60 to Uel T. Fox, knowing it to be counterfeit, with intent to defraud. After a jury trial where he was found guilty as charged, Richeson moved for a new trial, arguing errors in admitting the check (which had additional endorsements) into evidence, insufficient evidence, and that the judgment improperly convicted him of forgery rather than uttering. The trial court overruled the motion and sentenced him to 2-14 years in prison plus a fine. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the extra endorsements on the check caused no prejudice, the evidence supported the verdict, and the judgment correctly applied the statutory penalty for uttering a forged instrument.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a widow's $1,000 statutory allowance under Indiana law (Burns' §6-711) should be subject to state inheritance tax when calculating the tax due on an intestate estate. The trial court had allowed the deduction as exempt, and the Indiana Department of State Revenue appealed. The court affirmed the exemption, holding that the allowance is a preferred claim against the estate that does not pass by descent or inheritance, that the inheritance tax statute does not expressly impose tax on it, and that taxing statutes are construed against the state in cases of doubt. It further noted the legislature's long-standing treatment of such allowances and the absence of any provision subjecting them to tax.

taxesfamily law

The case involved the State of Indiana bringing an in rem proceeding under the Uniform Indiana Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to condemn and destroy over 11,000 cases of canned tomatoes and 7,000 cases of canned tomato juice alleged to be adulterated. After a jury trial in which the jury returned a general verdict for the claimant owner, the trial court treated the verdict as advisory only, made its own findings for the claimant, entered judgment returning the goods, and denied the State's motion for new trial. In this original mandamus action, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court had a clear legal duty to enter judgment conforming to the jury verdict under the governing statutes, rendering the court's judgment void, and issued a writ of mandamus to compel proper entry of judgment on the verdict. The court further held that the State was not entitled to a stay of the return of the merchandise pending appeal because the statute provided no such mechanism.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved an original action in which relator Charles W. Martin, appointed guardian of Effie M. Martin in Texas, sought a writ of mandate to compel the Hancock Circuit Court to grant a change of venue from the county in a proceeding to appoint a permanent guardian for the ward's Indiana property. The Indiana court had denied the change of venue motion, found relator was not a party with standing, appointed a local guardian, and proceeded with the case. The Indiana Supreme Court held that under the relevant statutes, a foreign guardian who files authenticated documents in Indiana gains only limited rights to manage personal property and is not made a party to a statutory guardianship appointment proceeding under §8-217, nor entitled to a change of venue which requires party status. Because relator had not been joined as a party and the filing did not confer broader authority or party status, the denial of the venue change was proper and the writ was denied.

family lawpropertyprocedure