Richard M. Givan

In Tidwell v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of murder and conspiracy to commit murder after shooting Matt Lightfield in the head during a dispute over a woman, with assistance from Eddie Dunn, and was also found to be a habitual offender, resulting in a 100-year sentence. On appeal, Tidwell challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the conspiracy conviction, arguing lack of proof that Dunn agreed to the murder, and claimed the trial court erred in denying funds for an investigator and psychiatric expert to examine witness credibility and potential blackout from intoxication. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that under the unilateral theory of conspiracy, Dunn's subjective beliefs were irrelevant and the evidence showed Tidwell's intent and agreement to use the gun to kill Lightfield; it also found no abuse of discretion in denying expert funds because the requests were exploratory rather than necessary for an adequate defense.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Nelson Harris for murder, robbery, and confinement arising from the 1991 robbery of a gas station in Indianapolis during which attendant Kurt Kahlo was shot and killed. Harris challenged the prosecutor's rebuttal arguments, the admission of testimony about his prior statements expressing a desire to kill someone, and the sufficiency of the evidence based on accomplice testimony. The court held that the prosecutor's comments were proper responses to defense arguments and were not objected to at trial, that the prior statements were admissible to show motive or intent, and that the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated for the jury to assess credibility. The convictions and consecutive sentences totaling 100 years were affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Rodney Bonham's appeal from the denial of his 1992 petition to file a belated motion to correct errors following his 1980 conviction for the 1975 murder of Nora Boothe. Bonham argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to properly object to testimony from a pastor about his confession, a detective about his statements during fingerprinting, and a co-conspirator, as well as errors in jury instructions and failure to address a hearing-impaired juror. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that counsel had objected where appropriate, that the challenged evidence was admissible because no clergy privilege applied and Miranda rights were honored, that res judicata did not bar the co-conspirator's testimony, and that other claims were either waived or lacked merit as the instructions adequately covered the law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the validity of an antenuptial agreement signed by Gaylord and Janet Parr before their remarriage following an earlier divorce. The trial court upheld the agreement, which limited the wife's share of the marital estate in the event of dissolution, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that there was sufficient evidence of asset disclosure and that the wife had knowledge of the husband's finances and an opportunity to consult her attorney. The Court reasoned that the appellate court had improperly reweighed the evidence presented to the trial court instead of deferring to its findings on issues including disclosure and undue influence.

family lawproperty

The case involved appellant Linda Chiesi, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and murder of her husband, receiving consecutive sentences of 50 and 60 years. She appealed, arguing that double jeopardy barred convictions for both the conspiracy and the completed crime because the charging information and facts showed the murder as the sole overt act, and she also challenged the denial of a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence and recantation as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The court affirmed, distinguishing the case from Buie v. State on the grounds that the evidence showed a lengthy conspiracy with multiple separate overt acts by the appellant, including providing a gun, detailed instructions, and money, before the killing occurred; it further held that the evidence was sufficient and that the new evidence claims did not warrant a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the convictions of appellant Underwood on multiple felony counts including three robberies, attempted rape, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, and habitual offender status, stemming from a February 1993 incident in which he robbed several victims at knifepoint and assaulted one victim. The trial court denied motions to suppress identifications and evidence, found sufficient proof of the crimes, and declined to declare a mistrial after an improper reference to marijuana. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the show-up identification was not impermissibly suggestive, officers had probable cause to arrest based on victim descriptions and flight, the defendant's actions constituted a substantial step toward rape, and any evidentiary errors were harmless or cured.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Michael Allen Lambert's conviction for the murder of a police officer and his resulting death sentence. After being arrested for public intoxication, Lambert shot and killed the transporting officer with a stolen pistol while handcuffed in the back of the patrol car. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed challenges to the jury selection process, which drew only from voter registration lists rather than also including tax schedules as required by statute, the trial court's handling of intoxication evidence as a mitigator upon remand, and the admission of victim impact testimony regarding effects on other officers. The court affirmed the conviction and death penalty, finding no reversible error in jury selection because no common thread of exclusion was shown to affect the jury composition, and determining that the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances including intoxication.

criminal lawprocedure

In Faust v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of murdering his live-in partner after an argument, receiving an enhanced 60-year sentence; he had admitted to police that he sat on her during a struggle but omitted mentioning strangulation, which the pathologist identified as the cause of death. On appeal, he challenged the admission of his videotaped confession as involuntary due to intoxication and alleged police intimidation, the procedure for excusing a sleeping juror and seating an alternate, the effectiveness of his trial counsel for not pursuing certain defenses or objections, and the sufficiency of evidence to prove intent to kill rather than manslaughter or accident. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court properly admitted the statement after considering voluntariness, that the juror issue was waived by agreement of counsel and caused no prejudice, that counsel's choices did not violate Strickland standards given the evidence of sobriety and intent, and that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of murder including neck injuries inconsistent with the defendant's minimization. The court rejected claims of insufficient evidence and intoxication negating intent.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Gary Police Department complied with Indiana Code § 5-14-3-5(c) by disclosing only the neighborhood where a rape occurred rather than the exact street address in response to a public records request from the Post-Tribune. The trial court ruled that the department's disclosure satisfied the statute, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a strict reading required the precise address. The Indiana Supreme Court set aside the appellate decision and affirmed the trial court, reasoning that the statute's purpose of protecting rape victims from public identification and encouraging reporting would be defeated by releasing exact addresses that could reveal the victim's identity; instead, the required 'location' information should be as specific as reasonably possible while safeguarding privacy, such as a street name and block number.

free speechcriminal law

In Holmes v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of murder and one count of attempted robbery after he entered his parents' home armed with a rifle, demanded money, and fatally shot both parents multiple times in front of his nine-year-old sister and three-year-old brother. The trial court imposed enhanced consecutive sentences of 60 years for each murder and 20 years for attempted robbery, relying on numerous aggravating circumstances including premeditation, the brutality of the killings, prior violent acts toward family members, and trauma to the child witness, while treating the jury's rejection of the death penalty as the sole mitigator. Holmes appealed, arguing that the court improperly used elements of the offenses as aggravators, that the sentencing statement was inadequate, and that the sentences violated provisions of the Indiana Constitution concerning rehabilitation and excessive punishment. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, concluding that the trial court did not double-count offense elements, properly considered and weighed the factors, and imposed sentences that were within statutory limits and not manifestly unreasonable.

criminal lawprocedure

In Burris v. State, the defendant had been convicted of felony murder in 1981 and sentenced to death based on a jury recommendation, but the Indiana Supreme Court later remanded for a new sentencing hearing due to ineffective assistance of counsel at the original penalty phase. After more than a decade, a new jury was empaneled, heard evidence, and deadlocked on whether to recommend the death penalty; the trial court discharged the jury and imposed the death sentence itself. Burris appealed, arguing that the court should have attempted to locate and reconvene the original 1981 jury rather than using a new one. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute permitted the judge to proceed without a jury recommendation once deadlock occurred and that reassembling the original jury after eleven years served no practical purpose and was not required. The court drew on precedents involving habitual-offender resentencings to support using a new jury and found that both parties had a full opportunity to present their cases to the replacement panel.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of appellant Gonzales for murder after he stabbed a victim during an argument over an unpaid phone bill at a party, then directed a minor accomplice to rob the victim before fleeing. Gonzales appealed, claiming error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter and in imposing the maximum 60-year sentence. The court held that defenses of insanity and intoxication, which were raised to negate intent, were inconsistent with a lesser-included offense instruction, and noted that the proposed instruction was not in the record, resulting in waiver of the issue. Regarding sentencing, the trial court properly identified aggravating circumstances including the defendant's prior record, probation status at the time of the offense, need for rehabilitation, and involvement of a minor, satisfying statutory requirements. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.

criminal law

In Splunge v. State, the defendant was convicted of murder and robbery following a third trial after an earlier hung jury and a prior reversal on habeas corpus; he received a 60-year sentence. On appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, the defendant argued that prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments—comments implying his failure to testify and appeals to jury sympathy regarding the victim's inability to go home—violated his Fifth Amendment rights and warranted reversal. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the comments were improper but did not constitute reversible error in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the context of defense counsel's own arguments. A dissent contended that the errors were of constitutional magnitude and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wallace v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a second petition for post-conviction relief filed by Donald Ray Wallace, who had been convicted in 1980 of four counts of murder and sentenced to death after a jury recommendation. Wallace's prior direct appeal and first post-conviction petition had both been affirmed, and this second petition raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and prior post-conviction counsel, along with assertions about his childhood history, competency, and procedural errors by the post-conviction court. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the issues had already been adjudicated or were available in earlier proceedings and thus waived, that post-conviction counsel is judged under a lesser due process standard rather than Strickland, and that no procedural errors or need for additional examinations existed. The core reasoning emphasized finality in successive collateral attacks on a conviction and sentence that had been upheld multiple times.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved appellant Wingett, who pursuant to a plea bargain pled guilty to murder, robbery, and carrying a handgun without a license in exchange for avoiding the death penalty; he received a 60-year sentence for murder enhanced by 30 years due to a habitual offender finding, plus a consecutive 20-year term for robbery. He appealed, arguing that the sentences were manifestly unreasonable and disproportionate under the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions because the trial court failed to properly consider and weigh certain mitigating factors. The court affirmed the sentences, finding that the trial court had adequately identified and weighed ten aggravating factors (including prior criminal escalation, risk to the public, and the senseless nature of the killing) against six mitigating factors (such as the defendant's paraplegia and substance abuse issues), that the sentence fell within statutory limits, and that it was not disproportionate to the offense or offender. The court noted it would not reweigh the factors or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.

criminal law

In Brennan v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of murder and sentenced to sixty years after evidence showed he and an accomplice bludgeoned, shot, and burned the body of a church treasurer following a dispute over repair costs. The court rejected the appellant's claims that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the accomplice's post-arrest violent acts in jail, that trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing general reputation evidence or objecting to certain statements, that prosecution violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act after the appellant sought disposition of other charges while in federal prison, and that a photograph of the victim's burned face was inadmissible. The court held that specific acts were inadmissible to prove character, there was no showing of deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland standards, any removal issue did not affect jurisdiction, and the photo was relevant to autopsy testimony. The conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an interlocutory appeal by the State challenging a trial court's pretrial ruling in a death penalty prosecution for a 1991 murder. The trial court had granted the defendant's motion to instruct the jury on the new sentencing option of life imprisonment without parole, holding that the saving clause in P.L. 250-1993—which limited the 1993 statutory amendments to murders committed after June 30, 1993—violated equal protection under the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the saving clause was constitutional. The court applied rational-basis scrutiny because the classification by offense date neither implicated a fundamental right nor targeted a suspect class, and it found the prospective application rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in determining when the new sentencing alternative would take effect. The opinion further held that the defendant must be sentenced under the law in force at the time of the offense.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Perry v. State, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine, dealing in cocaine, and possession of cocaine, and was sentenced to an enhanced term as a habitual offender. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on alleged advice to flee and inadequate witness preparation, insufficient evidence for the convictions and habitual offender finding, and improper admission of evidence from a search. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and habitual offender determination, holding that counsel's statements did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland standards, that fingerprint and identification evidence sufficiently proved the prior convictions, and that the trial evidence including testimony about the drug transaction and seized cocaine was adequate to support the verdicts. The court also rejected claims that the search evidence was illegally obtained.

criminal law

In White v. State, the defendant was convicted in a bench trial of murder and three counts of criminal recklessness after firing a handgun at two men, killing a child who was in the line of fire near a residence in South Bend, Indiana. The trial court sentenced him to sixty years for murder and three years on each recklessness count. The defendant argued that the killing was reckless rather than intentional and that he should have been convicted only of reckless homicide. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction, holding that the doctrine of transferred intent applied because the defendant had stated his intent to kill the two men he was targeting, and that intent transferred to the child who was struck by one of the shots.

criminal law

The case involved Jeremy Tidmore's convictions for felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery after he and an accomplice planned and carried out an ambush on a pizza delivery driver using baseball bats, resulting in the victim's death from brain injuries thirteen days later. Tidmore appealed his enhanced concurrent sentences of sixty and fifty years, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on elements of the conspiracy such as lying in wait and premeditation as aggravating factors, failed to properly weigh mitigating factors, and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the extent and manner of the ambush could serve as valid aggravators separate from the conspiracy elements, that the court adequately considered mitigators by ordering concurrent sentences, and that counsel's performance met required standards with no manifestly unreasonable sentence. A concurring and dissenting opinion would have found most aggravators improper and imposed only presumptive sentences.

criminal lawprocedure