George Washington Henley

The case involved Sam Goldstine (also spelled Goldstein), who was charged in an affidavit with second-degree burglary of a grocery store and with possession of burglar tools as a person previously convicted of a felony. After waiving a jury trial, the trial court found the defendant guilty on both counts and imposed sentence. On appeal, the court considered claims regarding a minor spelling discrepancy in the defendant's name, the sufficiency of the charging document for burglary, the constitutionality of the statute classifying ex-felons for the burglar-tools offense under the Fourteenth Amendment and Indiana Constitution provisions, evidentiary rulings, and the overall sufficiency of the evidence. The court treated the name variation as idem sonans, adopted its prior ruling on the burglary count, upheld the statute as a reasonable classification, found no prejudicial evidentiary errors, and concluded that substantial evidence supported the convictions. It therefore affirmed the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

In Harbaugh v. State, the defendant was charged with armed robbery of a priest and sought dismissal of the case on speedy-trial grounds, arguing that more than two court terms had elapsed since the affidavit was filed without a trial, in violation of Article 1, §12 of the Indiana Constitution and Burns’ §9-1402. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing and convicted the defendant; on appeal the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed. The court held that the record contained evidence, including an order-book entry, supporting the trial court’s finding that the defendant had moved for and obtained a continuance, thereby causing the delay and removing the case from the statutory protection; it further noted that both parties had waived any pleading deficiencies by litigating the motion on its merits. The judgment of conviction was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a Marion County taxpayer's lawsuit against the Indianapolis-Marion Building Authority and its directors and trustees, seeking to enjoin the use of a $1,000 county appropriation on grounds that the 1953 Indiana statute creating the Authority was unconstitutional. The plaintiff argued that the Act would permit governmental units to incur lease obligations exceeding the two-percent debt limit in Article XIII, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution and that it created a corporation by special act in violation of Article XI, Section 13. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act did not authorize indebtedness in excess of constitutional limits and that its classification applying to each county in the state was reasonable and not a prohibited special act.

propertybusiness & regulatory