Donald H. Hunter

In Alfaro v. State, defendant George Alfaro was convicted by a jury of murder and sentenced to thirty years after confessing to killing Robert Marcinkovitch by striking him with a baseball bat following an argument. Alfaro appealed, claiming error in the admission of his oral and written statements to police and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a murder conviction rather than a lesser offense. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial oral statement was voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation, while the subsequent written statement was given after a valid Miranda waiver with no evidence of coercion or improper influence. On sufficiency, the court found that conflicting evidence about self-defense and sudden heat was properly resolved by the jury, which could infer intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon, and that the verdict was supported by substantial evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Frank R. Davis, who pled guilty to two counts of murder and two counts of attempted murder arising from three separate incidents in which he sexually assaulted and attacked teenage boys, resulting in two deaths. Under a plea agreement, the state dismissed other charges but sought the death penalty on the murder counts. The trial court imposed death sentences after a sentencing hearing, finding multiple statutory aggravating circumstances including that the murders occurred during child molesting and while lying in wait, along with one uncharged aggravating circumstance. On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in finding those aggravating circumstances and in weighing them against mitigating factors, concluding that the trial court's process deviated from the statutory requirements for death penalty sentencing and required remand for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Dean Marsh, who was convicted by a jury of robbery, confinement, and theft after two masked men robbed a restaurant at gunpoint in 1983; he appealed his consecutive prison sentences, challenging the legality of a police officer's stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger and the admission of evidence found inside. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the stop was constitutional and that the evidence was properly admitted. The court reasoned that the officer had reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio to stop the vehicle based on the recent crime by two white men, the vehicle's proximity to the reported possible destination at 1:45 a.m. on empty streets, and the occupants' unusual behavior. It further held that the gun, ski masks, and money bag were in plain view when illuminated by flashlight and thus not the product of an unlawful search. The accomplice's testimony also independently supported the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Richard Dean Smith, who was convicted by a jury of burglary of a dwelling and attempted theft after being found inside a residence with items prepared for removal, and was also adjudicated a habitual offender, resulting in concurrent sentences plus an additional term. Smith appealed on multiple grounds, including denial of his motion for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) for exceeding the 70-day speedy trial limit, refusal of consent and mistake-of-fact jury instructions, admission of certain exhibits and fingerprint records in the habitual offender proceeding, and imposition of separate sentences for burglary and attempted theft in alleged violation of double jeopardy. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in full, reasoning that Smith had waived the speedy trial claim by agreeing to the trial date without objection, that the challenged evidence qualified under the business records exception, that the tendered instructions were unsupported, and that the two offenses each required proof of an element the other did not.

criminal lawprocedure

In Murphy v. State, the petitioner appealed the denial of his post-conviction relief petition after pleading guilty in 1982 to rape and criminal deviate conduct under a plea agreement resulting in a twenty-year sentence. He argued that his plea was involuntary due to threats of a habitual offender charge, that there was an improper lineup and insufficient evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance from both trial and post-conviction counsel; he also challenged the trial court's appointment of local pauper counsel instead of the state public defender's office. The court held that the appointment of local counsel was error under Indiana post-conviction rules but did not constitute reversible error because the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice or ineffective assistance. Applying the Strickland standard, the court found no reasonable probability that different counsel actions would have changed the outcome, that the guilty plea record showed the plea was knowing and voluntary, and that the state's use of a potential habitual offender charge was a legitimate bargaining tool. The judgment denying post-conviction relief was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In Williams v. State, the defendant was convicted of criminal deviate conduct, three counts of rape, and three counts of robbery after a jury trial and appealed his convictions directly to the Indiana Supreme Court. The court addressed two issues: whether the victims' in-court and out-of-court identifications were tainted by unduly suggestive pretrial procedures and whether evidence of the defendant's flight following an investigatory stop in Missouri should have been excluded as the product of an unconstitutional detention. The court held that the identifications were properly admitted because each victim had an independent basis for her identification arising from her extended observation of the defendant during the crimes under adequate lighting. Although the Missouri investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment under Terry v. Ohio and Brown v. Texas because the officer lacked specific and articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, the admission of evidence of the defendant's flight was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of the identification testimony and evidence of his failure to appear for trial. The court therefore affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure