Jon D. Krahulik

In Derado v. State, the defendant was convicted of five counts of dealing in cocaine as an accomplice based on deliveries made by a co-defendant, along with a separate conviction for conspiracy to deal in cocaine where the same deliveries were alleged as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conspiracy conviction on double jeopardy grounds, concluding that the same facts were used to establish both accomplice liability for the dealing offenses and the overt acts supporting the conspiracy. Applying the Blockburger test along with review of the charging documents and jury instructions, the court determined that the offenses were not distinct because each did not require proof of an additional fact independent of the other. The dealing convictions and sentences were affirmed, while the conspiracy conviction and consecutive sentence were vacated.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Owings, the defendant faced drug-related felony charges based on testimony from an inmate witness who later died by suicide, raising the question of whether the witness's pretrial deposition could be admitted at trial even though the defendant had not attended the deposition. The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the deposition was admissible. The court reasoned that the defendant waived her confrontation rights under Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution because she received notice of the deposition, was free on bond, and did not request to attend or have the deposition relocated. The court further concluded that the deposition bore sufficient indicia of reliability due to procedural safeguards, including cross-examination by defense counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

In Martin v. State, the defendant was convicted by jury of one count of criminal deviate conduct, one count of attempted child molesting, and two counts of child molesting, receiving consecutive sentences totaling twenty-five years. The appeal centered on whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior sexual misconduct, including testimony from his daughter about events twenty years earlier, after the defendant had filed a motion in limine to exclude such evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and held that the defendant's objections were preserved for review because he raised the issue outside the jury's presence and the trial court confirmed the record was preserved. However, the court concluded that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless, as the victims' detailed testimony and corroborating observations provided sufficient basis for the convictions without a substantial likelihood that the prior acts evidence affected the verdict, and therefore affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved insured parties suing Erie Insurance for denying their first-party claims under an insurance contract and seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. The court granted transfer to reaffirm that insurers have a legal duty to deal in good faith with their insureds and recognized an independent tort cause of action for breaching that duty. This allowed potential recovery of punitive damages, which are unavailable in pure contract actions. The core reasoning balanced the special fiduciary-like relationship in insurance contracts, the foreseeability of harm from bad-faith claim denials, and public policy favoring fair play between insurers and insureds.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Clausen v. State, the defendant was convicted by jury of two counts of child molesting, class B felonies, based on sexual acts committed against his eleven-year-old stepdaughter, and he appealed the trial court's admission of evidence of his prior sexual misconduct with another child as well as the order requiring him to pay for the victim's counseling. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that Clausen waived any appellate claim regarding the prior misconduct evidence because he failed to make a timely, contemporaneous objection when the testimony was offered at trial. The court reasoned that denial of a motion in limine does not preserve error for appeal and that a post-trial motion to insert an objection into the record does not substitute for an objection at the time the evidence is presented, consistent with longstanding precedent requiring such objections to allow the trial court an opportunity to rule and to create a proper record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved multiple plaintiffs injured when an Indianapolis police officer drove through a red light without activating emergency signals while responding to a domestic disturbance call, leading to a collision. The plaintiffs sued the officer and the City of Indianapolis for negligence, but the trial court and Court of Appeals granted summary judgment based on immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Supreme Court of Indiana granted transfer, holding that a police officer traveling to the scene of a crime is not immune from civil liability for negligent driving. The court interpreted Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-3(7) to limit "law enforcement immunity" to activities directly attendant to effecting an arrest, rejecting broader prior interpretations from cases like Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State and the dicta in Tittle v. Mahan.

torts & liability

This case involved a lawsuit by Jeffrey Kemezy against Muncie police officer Bruce Qualls and others, alleging injuries from excessive force including being pushed, struck, and stunned with a stun gun during and after an arrest at a bowling alley. The U.S. District Court certified questions to the Indiana Supreme Court about whether intentional excessive force by officers during an arrest qualifies for immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, specifically Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-3(7) for enforcement of a law or within the scope of employment. The court held that such conduct is not immunized because officers owe a private duty to avoid excessive force, following its recent decision in Quakenbush v. Lackey distinguishing public duties (which are immunized) from private duties (which are not). It further explained that even intentional acts can fall within the scope of employment if connected to the job, but the immunity provision does not apply to breaches of private duties like this one. The matter was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

In this case, Shannon Belding and Brian Whitehead sued the Town of New Whiteland for injuries sustained when a third vehicle struck a parked police car during a traffic stop for speeding and suspected underage drinking, claiming the officers negligently positioned the squad car. The trial court granted summary judgment to the town on grounds of law enforcement immunity under Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-3(7), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed, ruling that the officers owed the plaintiffs a private duty to exercise reasonable care when parking, as emergency vehicle operators must still drive with due regard for others' safety under Ind. Code § 9-21-1-8(d)(1). Because this private duty exists, statutory immunity does not apply, and the case was remanded for a factual determination on whether the officers breached the duty of care.

torts & liability

In Fries v. Fincher, Gloria Fincher sued sheriff's deputy Kenneth Fries and the Allen County Board of Commissioners for negligence after Fries, responding to a call for assistance, drove the wrong way on a one-way street without a siren and collided with her vehicle. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act for acts undertaken in the enforcement of law. The Indiana Supreme Court held that immunity does not apply because Fincher's claim alleged breach of a private duty to exercise ordinary care while operating a vehicle on a public roadway, not merely a public duty of law enforcement. Following its decision in Quakenbush v. Lackey, the court determined that a factual question existed regarding whether Fries exercised reasonable care, so summary judgment was inappropriate. The court granted transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, and remanded the case.

torts & liability

This case concerned a petition by adoptive parent Donna Jean Sudis to revoke the 1986 adoption of T.B. after the child developed severe behavioral problems, including violence and death threats, which Sudis attributed to undisclosed prior sexual abuse that the Lake County Division of Family and Children Services allegedly should have discovered. Following a CHINS proceeding in juvenile court, the trial court granted revocation on grounds of fraud and the child's best interests, but the Court of Appeals reversed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the probate court retained jurisdiction over the adoption revocation despite the CHINS case, but ruled that revocation was improper because the evidence showed at most negligence rather than fraud by FCS, and Sudis lacked standing to seek termination of the parent-child relationship under the applicable statutes. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment against the petitioner.

family lawprocedure

This case involved the estate of Lillian Jonas suing the Stirlings, who were joint owners on bank accounts and CDs that Jonas had funded, for conversion after the Stirlings withdrew about $65,000 hours before Jonas died. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Stirlings, finding Jonas intended them to receive the funds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the estate lacked standing. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, held that the estate had standing under probate statutes to pursue claims Jonas could have brought, and ruled that the survivorship presumption did not apply because the funds were withdrawn before death. It reversed the summary judgment and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Jonas had completed an inter vivos gift of the funds to the Stirlings. The core reasoning was that the right to withdraw funds from a joint account is distinct from ownership rights, so evidence of intent beyond the account agreements was needed to establish ownership at the time of withdrawal.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

John Farrell was convicted by jury of kidnapping after an incident in which he allegedly approached a woman at a pay phone, forced her into her car at gunpoint, and drove around for fifteen to twenty minutes before she escaped. Farrell challenged his conviction on multiple grounds, including the trial court's decision to require the jury to continue deliberating after more than twenty-four hours without rest despite signs of juror exhaustion. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, reversed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, reasoning that the trial court abused its discretion by compelling continued deliberations under these circumstances, which violated the defendant's right to a fair trial. Other issues, such as the victim's identification and expert testimony on eyewitness reliability, were not resolved in light of the new trial and upcoming evidence rules.

criminal lawprocedure

In Womack v. Womack, the Indiana Supreme Court considered a divorce-related dispute in which the husband sought to reclaim title to property he had purchased and deeded solely to the wife during their brief marriage, arguing that a presumption of undue influence applied due to the spousal relationship. The trial court had found the transfer to be a completed gift under the parties' prenuptial agreement with no evidence of deception or improper influence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed while rejecting the presumption. The Supreme Court granted transfer and held that Indiana no longer recognizes a common-law presumption of undue influence in spousal transactions, placing the burden on the challenging spouse to prove undue influence; it affirmed the trial court's award of the property to the wife after reviewing the evidence of the husband's voluntary statements and actions. The decision extended the principle from a prior case eliminating similar presumptions in joint-account survivorship contexts, viewing the presumption as outdated given modern equality between spouses.

family lawproperty

The case concerned Carol Banko Rogers' petition to reopen the closed estate of her father August Banko, asserting that joint bank accounts held with his wife Nadine contained assets that should have been included in the probate estate rather than passing directly to Nadine by survivorship. The probate court denied the petition, concluding that the joint accounts were valid under the Non-Probate Transfers Act and that statutes favored finality in estate administration. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, holding that the Act creates a presumption that a joint account survivor is entitled to the proceeds, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent lacked intent for the survivor to receive them or later changed that intent in writing to the financial institution. The court further held that Rogers bore the burden of proof on this issue and that the probate court's negative judgment was not clearly erroneous, as it would not reweigh evidence or credibility determinations.

propertyprocedure

In Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc., dairy farmers sued feed manufacturers and suppliers under negligence, breach of warranty, and strict product liability theories after their cows suffered illness, reproductive issues, and death from consuming feed allegedly contaminated with the banned pesticide Aldrin. The trial court granted summary judgment on punitive damages and some claims but denied it on negligence and strict liability against one defendant; the Court of Appeals reversed the strict liability claim, holding that the damage did not qualify as sudden and major property damage under Indiana's Strict Product Liability Act. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to clarify the Act's scope for property damage recovery and concluded that whether the harm constituted sudden and major damage presented a factual question for the jury rather than a legal determination suitable for summary judgment, allowing the strict liability claim to proceed.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned Hall Farms' claims against seed retailer Rispens and grower Petoseed for crop losses from bacterial fruit blotch in watermelons, which Hall Farms attributed to defective Prince Charles variety seeds purchased in 1989. Hall Farms asserted theories of strict product liability in tort, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to clarify the interrelationship among these product liability theories and reviewed the Court of Appeals' rulings on summary judgment motions. It examined whether written statements on seed cans and order forms created express warranties, whether privity was required for implied warranty claims, whether contractual limitations of liability to the purchase price were enforceable, and the elements for strict liability recovery, ultimately determining that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on most but not all claims.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerns Stuart S. Kennedy, who was convicted by jury of murder, felony murder, kidnapping, and robbery. After the jury recommended against the death penalty, the trial court imposed it, and on remand following a prior appeal the court again sentenced Kennedy to death, concluding that the jury's recommendation was unreasonable given the calculated and brutal nature of the crime in which Kennedy played the primary role. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge's override of the jury recommendation was not supported because the facts did not show that the proven aggravators pointed so clearly to death that the jury's recommendation must be superseded. The court emphasized that a jury recommendation against death receives special weight in the sentencing process as it reflects both factual determinations and community values, even though the judge makes the final decision.

criminal law

This case was a negligence lawsuit brought by a utility meter reader injured by the defendant's dog while attempting to read a meter on the defendant's fenced property. The trial court granted judgment on the evidence for the defendant, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the evidence could allow a jury to find the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in restraining the dog, including by leaving it under the supervision of his twelve-year-old daughter despite knowing the dog's aggressive tendencies toward visitors. The decision turned on the landowner's duty to invitees and common-law principles governing the keeping of domestic animals with known propensities.

torts & liabilityproperty

In Templin v. Fobes, the plaintiffs sued defendant Fobes for personal injuries and loss of consortium arising from a car accident, alleging negligence, while Fobes raised an affirmative defense blaming an unnamed nonparty for negligently designing or installing the van's driver's seat. The trial court denied the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add Rockwood, Inc. as a defendant and permitted Fobes to name Rockwood as the nonparty despite missing the statutory deadline for doing so. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the amendment on grounds of potential delay and expense to the existing parties but reversed the ruling on the nonparty defense, holding that the pleadings showed the nonparty was not timely identified as required by Ind. Code § 34-4-33-10(c), so the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment on the pleadings and a new trial without the defense.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned Vincent Tofany's lawsuit against his former employer NBS Imaging Systems for employment benefits under an alleged pension plan, stock funds, and defamation, along with the company's counterclaim on a guaranteed note. Tofany sought to offensively apply collateral estoppel based on a prior federal district court judgment in a similar case brought by a fellow former employee, James v. National Business Systems, to prevent relitigation of whether the pension plan existed. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of NBS on the pension claim, holding that offensive collateral estoppel was properly denied because Tofany could have joined the earlier action but instead chose to wait and see its outcome, and that substantial evidence supported the finding that no pension plan had been approved or existed. The court adopted the Court of Appeals' resolution of the remaining issues, including sufficiency of the evidence and denial of appellate damages.

procedurelabor & employment