Echterling Et Ux. v. Kalvaitis Et Ux.
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-05-18 · cited 44×
This case involved a boundary dispute between neighboring landowners in Lake County, Indiana, over a 10-foot strip of land to which the Echterlings held record title but which was separated by an old fence from the Kalvaitis property. The Kalvaitis family claimed ownership of the strip through adverse possession based on continuous use and maintenance of the fence since 1906, and they filed a cross-complaint to quiet title after the Echterlings attempted to build a new fence along a statutory survey line. The trial court ruled for the Kalvaitis family, finding they had acquired title by adverse possession. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence showed open and notorious possession up to the fence for the required twenty-year period and that payment of taxes on the adjoining lot satisfied the 1927 statutory requirement even though the strip itself was not separately assessed.
property
KLAMM v. State of Indiana Ex Rel. Carlson
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-05-06 · cited 17×
The case involved a retired Hammond policeman who sued the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund to compel payment of a pension equal to 50% of the salaries currently paid to active first-class patrolmen, rather than the lower salary in effect when he retired in 1943. The trial court ordered the increased payments, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the 1931 Police Pension Act fixes the pension amount at 50% of the salary paid at the time the retirement application is filed, with no statutory language allowing later fluctuations based on active-duty pay changes. The court reasoned that pensions vest upon retirement and become contractual in nature, but the statute contains no provision for ongoing adjustments, and any such interpretation would require corresponding decreases if salaries fell, contrary to the legislature's expressed intent.
labor & employment
Bally v. Guilford Township School Corp.
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-04-21 · cited 18×
The case concerned the constitutionality of Indiana's Chapter 88 of the Acts of 1953, which permitted voters in qualifying townships (those with populations of at least 3,500 containing an incorporated town of at least 2,000) to transfer control of township schools from the trustee to a new school corporation governed by a five-member board. The trial court upheld the statute as valid, and after granting rehearing the appellate court affirmed that judgment. The court held that the population-based classification was reasonable and not arbitrary because it bore a rational relationship to the objective of creating an optional method for joint school governance in situations where prior consolidation statutes were unavailable, and the law could apply uniformly to additional townships as their populations grew, satisfying the state constitution's requirements against local or special laws.
civil rightselections
Schulz v. Graham
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-04-15 · cited 9×
This case involved a mortgage foreclosure action filed in the St. Joseph Probate Court against the mortgagors and a subsequent purchaser of the property. The plaintiff challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over the civil matter, citing precedent that limited its criminal authority. The court examined the 1945 legislation creating the St. Joseph Probate Court, including amendments that replaced 'exclusive' jurisdiction with 'concurrent' jurisdiction alongside superior courts in civil and probate matters. It concluded that the probate court possessed concurrent jurisdiction in this foreclosure proceeding and found no error in the trial court's handling of tender and payment issues. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
propertyprocedure
Boyle v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-04-06 · cited 14×
This case was a criminal appeal from a 1954 conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after a jury trial in Franklin County. The appellant raised claims of procedural irregularity in jury selection, insufficient proof of venue in Indiana, lack of evidence that he operated a motor vehicle, and improper admission of testimony about his prior guilty plea before a justice of the peace. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant waived the jury and evidentiary objections by failing to preserve them in the record or motion for new trial, that circumstantial evidence permitted the jury to infer venue, and that ample evidence supported the conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. All other justices concurred.
criminal lawprocedure
Enlow v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-03-25 · cited 16×
In Enlow v. State, the appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary in the Marion Criminal Court after evidence from a warrantless search of his automobile was admitted at trial. Police had arrested him and searched both his home and car without warrants shortly after a tavern burglary, but the trial court excluded the home evidence while allowing the car evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court determined that the officers lacked reasonable or probable cause to arrest the appellant or search his vehicle, making the search unlawful under Article 1, §11 of the Indiana Constitution. The court therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Havener v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-03-09 · cited 15×
The case involved Donald W. Havener's appeal from his conviction in Vanderburgh Circuit Court for robbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, based on an affidavit charging the offense on February 8, 1954. The court addressed four main issues: the denial of a motion to quash the affidavit due to a clerical error in the jurat date, which was corrected by the court; the admission of currency evidence seized from the defendant's car glove compartment following his arrest; the denial of a mistrial motion over the defendant's appearance in court; and the imposition of separate sentences for both armed robbery and the lesser included offense of robbery. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the motion to quash was properly overruled as the jurat defect was amendable, the evidence was admissible as seized incident to a lawful arrest for a felony, the appearance objection was untimely, and dual sentencing was improper because robbery is included in armed robbery. Accordingly, the judgment for armed robbery was affirmed while the separate robbery judgment was reversed.
criminal lawprocedure
SECURITIES COMM. OF IND. ETC. v. Holovachka
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-02-21 · cited 9×
This case involved an appeal from a trial court's review of a cease-and-desist order issued by the Securities Commission of Indiana against Metro M. Holovachka, prohibiting him from selling or soliciting contracts related to Barrett Law Bonds and public improvement assessments. Holovachka challenged the order on judicial review, arguing that the Commission had not provided him with formal charges or a bill of particulars before the hearing, as required by the applicable administrative procedure statutes. The court found that no charges were ever filed against him, that his own preliminary statements did not substitute for charges, and that the Commission's final order lacked the required separate findings of fact. Citing precedents on administrative due process and the need for specific findings to enable meaningful judicial review, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the order could not stand without compliance with these procedural requirements. The court did not reach the question of whether the instruments were securities under the Indiana Securities Act.
business & regulatoryprocedure
State Ex Rel. Smith v. DOWD, WARDEN, ETC.
Indiana Supreme Court · 1955-02-14 · cited 8×
This case was an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging the state's authority to enforce a ten-year sentence for armed robbery after the sheriff had released the defendant to federal authorities due to a parole violation from Leavenworth. The court decided to affirm the denial of the petition, ruling that the state retained jurisdiction to execute the sentence despite the surrender and subsequent two-year delay before the defendant was returned to Indiana custody. The core reasoning was that the sheriff lacked power to waive the state's rights, which could only be affected by the governor or parole board through formal pardon or parole processes, that the delay did not satisfy or discharge the judgment, and that due process had been afforded under principles of federal-state comity as illustrated in Ponzi v. Fessenden.
criminal lawfederal powerprocedure