William Docker Browning

In this ERISA case arising from a 1992 car accident, plaintiff Morgan sued the Wal-Mart Associates' Health & Welfare Plan for declaratory relief after the plan sought full reimbursement of medical benefits it had paid him from his third-party settlement proceeds. The court dismissed the plan's counterclaim with prejudice, granted Morgan summary judgment on his declaratory relief claim, and entered judgment in his favor. On Morgan's subsequent motion for fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), the court applied the five Hummell factors, considered ERISA's remedial purposes favoring fee awards to successful participants, and awarded $43,596 in attorneys' fees after deducting time for unrelated matters, errors, and non-compliant entries, while denying non-taxable costs for failure to itemize under local rules.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case was a product liability and negligence action by Laura Cloud against Pfizer Inc., claiming that Zoloft caused her husband's 1997 suicide due to inadequate warnings about suicide risks as a side effect. The court denied a motion to strike one declaration but granted the motion to exclude the plaintiff's expert testimony on general causation, finding the opinions unreliable under applicable standards because pre-1997 scientific literature and FDA reviews showed no statistically significant link between the drug and suicidality. It then granted summary judgment to Pfizer on causation grounds, rendering the punitive damages motion moot, and entered judgment for the defendant.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved the EEOC and intervenors alleging that Wal-Mart failed to fully comply with a 2000 consent decree resolving Americans with Disabilities Act claims by hearing-impaired job applicants who were not hired. The court found that while Wal-Mart had provided some remedies like back pay and hiring, it had not adequately provided ongoing accommodations such as interpreters for meetings, failed to complete required ADA training for staff in a timely manner, and did not develop ASL-formatted training modules as required. Based on these failures to meet deadlines and specific obligations in the decree, the court ordered Wal-Mart to take immediate corrective actions including expert consultations, implementing accommodations, completing training, and submitting compliance reports, with daily penalties for continued noncompliance.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this habeas corpus case, death row inmate Jose Jacobo Amaya-Ruiz challenged his mental competency for execution under Ford v. Wainwright after Arizona state courts initially found him incompetent due to schizophrenia but later allowed the state hospital to certify his restoration to competency without a full evidentiary hearing or appointment of counsel. The federal district court held that when a state seeks to restore competency for execution, the prisoner is entitled to at least the same procedural protections required by Ford for initial competency determinations. Arizona's statutory process was found deficient because it permitted the state's chief medical officer to unilaterally certify competency, provided no meaningful opportunity for the prisoner to litigate the issue in state court, and imposed procedural barriers that violated due process. The court therefore stayed the scheduled execution and ordered a federal evidentiary hearing to determine Amaya-Ruiz's current mental fitness for execution.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Forbes v. Woods, plaintiffs including patients with Parkinson's disease, physicians, and Planned Parenthood challenged Arizona statutes (A.R.S. §§ 36-2302, 32-1401(25)(x), and 32-1854(45)) that criminalized and classified as unprofessional conduct any medical experimentation or investigation involving human fetuses or embryos from induced abortions. The U.S. District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion, declaring the statutes unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement. The court held that the statutes were void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because key terms such as 'experimentation,' 'investigation,' and 'routine pathological examination' lacked definitions or medical standards, creating uncertainty that could not be cured by the statute's scienter requirement and exposing physicians to arbitrary enforcement and criminal penalties. The court resolved the case on these narrow grounds without addressing the plaintiffs' additional claims regarding privacy, liberty, equal protection, or interference with medical practice and anatomical gifts.

abortionhealthcarecivil rightscriminal law

This case involved members of the Arizona Green Party and a Democratic voter challenging A.R.S. § 16-341(C), which barred voters registered with qualified parties (Democratic, Republican, or Libertarian) from signing nomination petitions for presidential elector candidates of non-qualified parties like the Green Party. The plaintiffs argued the restriction violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by limiting ballot access and voter choice in the 1996 election. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's, holding that the provision imposed a severe burden on voting and associational rights without being narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. It enjoined enforcement of the signature restriction while noting that other requirements, such as the 3% signature threshold or filing deadlines, were not challenged as unconstitutional on their own. The decision emphasized that the law prevented major-party voters from supporting independent or minor-party candidates rather than protecting party integrity.

electionsfree speechcivil rights

This case is a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which relator Eitel sued multiple aviation companies on behalf of the United States for allegedly submitting false claims. The district court had dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after finding that the allegations were based on public disclosures and that Eitel was not an original source. Following the government's later intervention and a limited Ninth Circuit remand, the court held that Eitel lacked standing to proceed as relator. The core reasoning was that the appellate order remanded the case without vacating the prior dismissal and that the FCA's original-source requirement continued to bar Eitel even after the government joined the action.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by the Holliman family against the United States after their vehicle was struck by an intoxicated Air Force member, Theodore Curran, who had been drinking on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. The plaintiffs alleged that military personnel were negligent in failing to prevent Curran from driving despite observing his intoxication and in violating internal military orders regarding alcohol consumption. The court treated the government's motion as one to dismiss for failure to state a claim and granted it, dismissing the action with prejudice. Under Arizona negligence law, which governs FTCA claims, social hosts and employers owe no duty to third parties injured by an intoxicated guest or employee, and any duty must arise from state common law rather than federal or military regulations. The court further held that the personnel had not voluntarily assumed a duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 by taking charge of Curran.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case was a Bivens action brought by federal inmates Ben Kalka and Ken Mitchell against multiple prison officials, alleging that the handling of Kalka's legal mail—including inspections for contraband that revealed documents later referenced in a search warrant affidavit for a money laundering investigation—and a cell search violated their rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion. It held that supervisory defendants lacked direct involvement, the cell search did not rise to a constitutional violation, Sheehey and Byron were protected by qualified immunity because the asserted rights were not clearly established at the time, and claims for injunctive relief were moot due to Kalka's transfer and the dismissal of related retaliation claims by stipulation.

civil rightscriminal law

This case concerns a motion by Thomas Davis Medical Centers (TDMC) to stay a temporary injunction issued against it in a National Labor Relations Board proceeding alleging unfair labor practices. The injunction required TDMC to cease and desist from specified practices and to restore pre-December 1996 employment terms and conditions following a union representation election. The district court denied the motion for a stay pending appeal, applying the four-factor test from Hilton v. Braunskill. The court found that TDMC had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because there was no change in the employing entity and the employer had waived its key supervisory-status arguments during the underlying proceedings; it also concluded that TDMC had not shown irreparable injury and that the balance of harms and public interest favored denying the stay.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerns a petition under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act by the NLRB's Regional Director seeking a temporary injunction against Thomas Davis Medical Centers and its parent FPA Medical Management, Inc., based on alleged unfair labor practices during a union's attempt to organize physicians as their collective bargaining representative. Following a change in ownership and the filing of a representation petition, the employer made unilateral changes to employment terms, entered new individual contracts, and refused to recognize or bargain with the union. The court granted the injunction, ordering the employer to recognize and bargain with the union, rescind unilateral changes and new contracts, and restore prior terms and conditions, while applying the equitable criteria from Miller v. California Pacific Medical Center through the prism of preserving the integrity of the collective bargaining process pending Board proceedings. The decision emphasized the Board's strong deference on issues like supervisory status and the need for interim relief to prevent irreparable harm to employee rights.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case involved a challenge by multiple plaintiffs to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) procedures and interpretations under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) for granting legalization and amnesty to eligible aliens, including claims that INS practices infringed on constitutional and statutory rights and prevented creation of an adequate record for appeal. After prior rulings were reversed on appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the district court considered an amended complaint with twelve claims focused on procedural issues such as application processing, termination of temporary resident status, and revocation of work authorization. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claims were not purely collateral procedural challenges but instead attacked the INS's substantive eligibility interpretations, which are subject to exclusive review provisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1255a and related precedents like McNary and Reno v. Catholic Social Services. The court found that plaintiffs failed to show jurisdiction over the specific claims regarding record creation or terminations, leading to dismissal with prejudice.

immigrationfederal powerprocedure

In Elliot v. LTD Direct Marketing, Inc., the plaintiffs filed suit in Arizona state court alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (including retaliation for a workers' compensation claim) and emotional distress, citing both state statutes and Title VII. The defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and moved for partial summary judgment. The plaintiffs moved to remand. The court granted remand and denied the summary judgment motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the claims could be supported by independent state-law theories without Title VII as a necessary element, that plaintiffs are masters of their complaint, and that removal jurisdiction is strictly construed against the removing party.

procedurelabor & employmentcivil rights

In Sandefur v. Lewis, an Arizona state prisoner sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his placement in administrative segregation and subsequent security reclassification—based on confidential information about a planned disturbance—violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because he was denied the chance to call witnesses, review evidence, or fully participate in the classification hearings. He also filed a related habeas corpus petition seeking release from segregation. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the habeas petition, and dismissed both actions with prejudice. The core reasoning was that prisoners have no protected liberty interest in their security classification or in avoiding administrative segregation under the Due Process Clause, so no procedural protections were constitutionally required; the court further found no Eighth Amendment violation and noted that the habeas relief sought was duplicative of the § 1983 action.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge by the Southwest Center for Biological Diversity to the U.S. Forest Service's decision to conduct an emergency salvage timber sale in the Coronado National Forest following a 1994 wildfire, without preparing an environmental assessment under NEPA or further consultation under the ESA. The plaintiff argued that the presence of the Mexican Spotted Owl constituted an extraordinary circumstance precluding a categorical exclusion from environmental review requirements. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' cross-motion, struck extra-record documents, and dismissed the case. It reasoned that the 1995 Rescissions Act grants the Secretary of Agriculture broad discretion to determine the scope of environmental and biological reviews for such sales, deems those documents to satisfy other environmental laws, and limits judicial review to the arbitrary and capricious standard based solely on the administrative record; the agency's "no effect" finding on the owl was therefore within that discretion and supported application of the categorical exclusion.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involved homeless individuals living in an encampment on city-owned property in Tucson challenging a city council resolution that directed officials to provide notice and then enforce trespassing laws to remove them. The plaintiffs argued this violated their Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, and right to travel. The court denied the preliminary injunction, reasoning that there is no constitutional right to occupy public lands and that the city's interests in health, safety, and property use outweighed the claims, with no likely success on the merits.

civil rightscriminal lawproperty

The case involves PPG Industries suing Pilkington and Libbey-Owens-Ford for antitrust violations under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging a scheme to monopolize markets for float glass manufacturing technology and flat glass through licensing agreements and disputes over PPG's LB process, including a project in China that triggered London arbitration. Pilkington moved to dismiss the monopolization and attempted monopolization counts, arguing that PPG's allegations of only an approximately 20 percent worldwide market share failed to plead the required monopoly power or dangerous probability of monopolization. The court analyzed whether specific market share allegations could support an inference of market power under Ninth Circuit precedent such as Hunt-Wesson, and addressed the separate motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration of the antitrust claims pursuant to the parties' licensing agreement and Supreme Court authority like Mitsubishi Motors.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved whether evidence seized from Defendant's vehicle during a search following his arrest for reckless driving should be suppressed. The court had previously granted the motion to suppress and now denies the government's request to reconsider that ruling. The core reasoning is that Arizona law generally prohibits custodial arrest for misdemeanor traffic offenses like reckless driving, requiring instead that the driver be cited and released, and the arrest was therefore unlawful, invalidating the subsequent search.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Alphagraphics, an Arizona-based franchisor, and its Michigan franchisees over the location of arbitration proceedings under their franchise agreements, which specified Tucson but which the franchisees refused to follow. The court denied the franchisor's motion to compel arbitration in Arizona and instead ordered the hearings to take place in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The core reasoning was that the Michigan Franchise Investment Law voids provisions requiring out-of-state arbitration, the franchisor had provided an MFIL notice highlighting this rule while failing to disclose its intent to enforce the clause, and this conduct amounted to fraud in the inducement that rendered the forum selection provision unenforceable despite an integration clause and the Federal Arbitration Act.

business & regulatory

This case involved claims by Hispanic Spanish-speaking employees of the Tucson Police Department alleging that TPD's practices were discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, because the department required them to use their Spanish skills on the job without extra compensation, failed to assess proficiency levels, and did not provide training to enhance those skills. The court noted that numerous facts were deemed admitted due to plaintiffs' discovery failures, including that no class member had been denied promotions, pay increases, assignments, training, benefits, or faced discipline or involuntary transfers based on Spanish-speaking ability or national origin, and that no discrimination occurred in the terms and conditions of employment during the relevant period. Applying a disparate impact analysis, the court examined whether TPD's requirements had a discriminatory effect on the protected group but concluded based on the record and admitted facts that plaintiffs failed to establish a viable claim of discrimination in employment practices.

civil rightslabor & employment