Clarence B. Martin

The case involved a surety company that paid $10,000 to the State of Indiana after the Farmers State Bank of Monticello failed, seeking to have its claim allowed as a preferred claim in the bank's receivership ahead of general creditors by subrogating to the state's alleged priority rights over public fund deposits. The trial court allowed the claim only as a general claim. The appellate court affirmed, holding that no statute provided priority for state deposits in bank liquidations and that any common-law prerogative right of the state did not apply where the deposit was already secured by a bond, as there was no public necessity for such preference.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a conviction in the Grant Circuit Court for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, where the defendant was sentenced to a fine and imprisonment for what was charged as a felony due to prior convictions. The court first addressed and overruled the state's motion to dismiss the appeal, finding that a second notice to the prosecuting attorney perfected the appeal within the required time limits. It then upheld the validity of the search warrant based on the affidavit and evidence presented. However, the court reversed the judgment because the affidavit, lacking the prosecuting attorney's approval, did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit court to try the defendant for the felony offense, limiting it to the misdemeanor charge, and the finding of guilt on the felony was contrary to law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a mandate action brought by the school town of Galveston and related taxpayers against Jackson School Township and its trustee, seeking to compel the township to transport schoolchildren from the southern part of the township to the joint school in Galveston, to contribute proportionally to the school's maintenance costs, and to continue participating in the joint school arrangement established by a 1910 contract. After a trial with special findings, the lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered enrollment, transportation, and cost-sharing. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the township trustee's decisions regarding pupil transportation and withdrawal from the joint school were discretionary matters that could be challenged only upon a showing of arbitrary or unreasonable action, which was not sufficiently proven here, and that the trial court had erred by excluding evidence on the relative conditions of the school buildings. The court also addressed procedural issues, such as the propriety of the mandate action despite pending related suits and the availability of judicial review beyond appeals to the county superintendent. The reversal was conditioned on the township paying equitable costs for pupils who had attended the Galveston school during the litigation.

civil rightsprocedure

In Re Davis concerned an assignee for the benefit of creditors who filed a final report claiming $475 for his own services and $600 for his attorney in administering the estate of a mercantile business with allowed claims exceeding $18,000. The trial court reduced the fees to $375 and $400 respectively without hearing evidence, providing notice, or allowing objections, then denied the assignee's verified motion to set aside the order and present supporting proof. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the assignee had detailed the services in a sworn report, no adverse evidence or objections existed, and parties are entitled to an opportunity to present evidence on the value of services before a court determines compensation.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a minor who bought a used car under a lease-sale contract with a note signed by his parents as sureties, paid nearly $200, then disaffirmed the contract as an infant, returned the car, and sued for return of his money. The trial court awarded the minor recovery of his payments but entered judgment against the parents on the note for the balance plus fees. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that although the minor's disaffirmance extinguished his own liability, the sureties remained bound because the minor had used the vehicle for over seven months and did not fully restore the seller to its pre-contract position. The court also noted that title to the car stayed with the seller until the judgment was paid and that storage charges were improper.

propertyprocedurefamily law

The case involved Maud Carson, who was convicted by a jury of unlawfully selling fluid extract of ginger (known as 'Jake' or Jamaica ginger) containing 85% alcohol by volume, in violation of a 1925 Indiana statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor intended for beverage use. The evidence showed that the buyer and others purchased the liquid from her grocery store, diluted it with water, and consumed it as a beverage, resulting in paralysis and poisoning. Carson argued that the indictment was insufficient and the evidence failed to prove the liquid was sold for beverage purposes or reasonably likely to be used as such, and also challenged the judgment due to a missing arraignment and plea on the record. The court held that the allegations and proof were adequate under the statute's definition of intoxicating liquor, as the facts supported the jury's conclusion that Carson knew the liquid would be used as a beverage, with no evidence of other intended uses. On the procedural issue, a 1927 statute barred invalidating the conviction for lack of arraignment or plea unless the defendant objected before trial, which did not occur here. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between opposing candidates Morgan and Wilkerson over the 1930 election for Trustee of Montgomery Township in Jennings County, where initial results favored Morgan but a recount and subsequent trials led the circuit court to declare Wilkerson the winner. Morgan appealed, but after resigning from the office and then dying, motions were filed to dismiss the appeal on grounds of abatement due to these events. The court overruled the dismissal motions, reasoning that the appeal concerned not only possession of the office but also public interest in the election outcome and rights to its emoluments, and that statutes preserved the proceedings after submission despite a party's death. On the merits, the court affirmed the judgment for Wilkerson, holding that two contested ballots with minor unintentional ink marks were valid and not distinguishing marks that invalidated them under election law.

electionsprocedure

The case concerned an indictment against a union business agent under a blackmail statute for verbally threatening a worker with injury to his person and property in order to compel him to abandon his employment and to obtain pecuniary advantages related to that employment for the agent and his associates. The dissenting opinion concluded that the indictment was legally sufficient because it tracked the statute's language, employment and the right to work constitute property, and the loss of employment is a pecuniary disadvantage covered by the broad statutory phrase "any pecuniary advantage whatsoever." It further reasoned that the constitutional requirement of adequate notice was satisfied by the charging document and that the evidence showed the threats were made to secure the employment for the appellant and his union associates, so the conviction should be affirmed.

criminal lawlabor & employment

The case concerned a party in a probate proceeding in Marion County who filed objections to a special administrator's final report and then sought a change of venue from the county and a change of judge; after those motions were denied, she petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court for a writ of mandate to compel the probate court to grant the changes. The court held that it had no authority to issue such a writ to the probate court and therefore dissolved the writ and dismissed the petition. Its reasoning rested on the state constitution and statutes, which grant the Supreme Court original mandamus jurisdiction only in aid of its appellate powers or, by specific statute, to compel action by circuit, superior, or criminal courts; the probate court of Marion County was not included in that list, and any appeal from the underlying probate decision would go to the Appellate Court rather than the Supreme Court.

procedure

This case involved appeals from misdemeanor convictions and sentences in cases concerning search warrants for intoxicating liquors, which had been transferred from the Indiana Supreme Court to the Appellate Court under a 1929 statute. The petitioners sought to set aside the transfers and recertify the appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that the 1929 law was invalid and that constitutional questions regarding search warrant requirements under the Indiana Constitution were at issue. The court held that the transfer statute was valid based on prior precedent, that no unresolved constitutional questions were actually presented because the validity of the relevant search warrant statute had already been settled, and that the petitions were untimely under court rules requiring action within 60 days. The petitions were therefore dismissed, leaving the Appellate Court's decisions intact.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two young defendants serving life sentences after pleading guilty to inflicting injury during a robbery; they filed petitions for writs of error coram nobis seeking to vacate the judgments and withdraw their pleas on grounds that they were ignorant of their constitutional rights, received no advice from the court about counsel, jury trials, or the consequences of pleading guilty, and were not guilty. The trial court denied the petitions after a hearing, and the defendants appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court had failed to advise the defendants of their rights under the Indiana Constitution or inquire into their understanding before accepting the pleas, which prevented them from knowingly asserting those rights. The court reasoned that uncontradicted facts showed the pleas were accepted improvidently due to the defendants' ignorance, warranting relief through the coram nobis procedure.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

Edith Ault sued to quiet title to 40 acres of land, claiming fee simple ownership through her late husband Adam Ault's will after his estate was probated. The defendants, her daughter Eloy House and son-in-law Zadie House, asserted rights based on an oral agreement with Adam Ault under which they would receive the land (subject to his life estate) if they moved onto it, made improvements, and farmed it; they did so by repairing and expanding a house, building a barn and other structures, and paying rent in crops for many years. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the trial court entered judgment that Ault take nothing. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show the defendants were in rightful possession under the fully performed contract and that equitable estoppel prevented Ault from denying their title due to the statute of frauds; the court noted that Ault had specifically claimed only fee simple title and could not obtain relief on an alternative one-third widow's interest theory under the issues presented.

property

The case involved a dispute over the start date of the term for the clerk of the circuit court in Knox County, Indiana, under a 1929 statute that shifted the beginning of such terms to January 1 following the election to create uniformity. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and held the 1929 act unconstitutional under Article 6, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution, which requires clerks to serve four-year terms. The decision followed the precedent of Gemmer v. State ex rel., which had invalidated a similar prior law for improperly altering the timing of when elected officials assume office after the prior term expires.

elections

This case involved a charge of maintaining a liquor nuisance under Indiana law, where the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence from a search conducted pursuant to a warrant and found the defendant not guilty. The State appealed on the reserved question of law regarding the validity of the search warrant and suppression ruling. The court held that the relevant statute is constitutional because it does not deprive the issuing magistrate of the judicial power to determine probable cause, which may be established by the facts alleged in the affidavit or by sworn testimony. The affidavit in this case positively stated facts showing possession of intoxicating liquor in violation of law, which was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause under the state constitution's warrant requirements, and thus the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the appellant for transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile under Indiana law. The court addressed challenges to the warrantless search of the vehicle and the admission of evidence obtained from it, including 30 gallons of alcohol found in plain view. Officers had received tips about the defendant's car and route, observed alcohol cans during a traffic encounter, and pursued and arrested him after resistance, then searched the car at the jail. The court decided that the officers had reasonable and probable cause to believe a felony was being committed, authorizing the stop, arrest, and search without a warrant, so the evidence was properly admitted. The pretrial motion to suppress was overruled because the defendant offered no evidence in support of it.

criminal lawprocedure

In Mahoney v. State, the appellant was charged with automobile banditry after he and accomplices used firearms to rob two slot machines from a filling station in Fountain County, then escaped in a waiting car; he was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 15 years in the reformatory. The court addressed challenges to the sufficiency of the charging affidavit, the evidence supporting the verdict, and various jury instructions. It held that the affidavit adequately alleged the underlying robbery by describing a forcible taking in the victims' presence through violence and fear. The evidence was deemed sufficient to establish the victims' possession and control of the machines, and the 1929 statute governing automobile banditry precluded convictions for lesser included offenses like larceny. The court affirmed the judgment, finding no reversible error in the instructions or other rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Mattie Griffin, a permanent public school teacher with an indefinite contract under Indiana's Teacher Tenure Law (ch. 97, Acts 1927), who sought a writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement after the Elwood school trustees canceled her contract solely because she was married, pursuant to a board resolution barring married women from teaching positions. The trustees argued that their decision was final and unreviewable by courts under the statute, which states that the school board's decision shall be final. The court held that the board lacked authority to dismiss her on this ground, as the statute enumerates specific permissible causes for cancellation (such as incompetency, insubordination, neglect of duty, immorality, or justifiable decrease in positions, but not marriage or marital status) and prohibits dismissals for personal reasons; actions outside these grounds are subject to judicial review and can be set aside if arbitrary or without statutory basis. It therefore overruled the board's jurisdictional challenges, sustained the complaint, and ordered reinstatement of Griffin and the other relators to their teaching positions and contract rights.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Ulysses Mack's conviction in Indiana state court for the first-degree murder of Josephine Odorizzi, whom he killed with an axe during a robbery and rape in Gary, leading to a death sentence by electrocution under the 1929 statute. Mack appealed after a change of venue, claiming multiple errors including the denial of continuances, refusal to allow withdrawal of his not-guilty plea to file a plea in abatement or motion to quash based on grand jury issues, evidentiary rulings, and improper statements by the judge. The court conducted a thorough review due to the capital nature of the case but found no reversible errors in the trial proceedings, the admission of evidence such as the blood-stained axe and confession excerpts, or the sufficiency of the circumstantial and direct proof linking Mack to the crime. It therefore affirmed the judgment and postponed the execution date to allow for any rehearing petition.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jacoby v. State, the appellant was convicted by jury of robbery based on the victim's testimony that he and a companion held him up at gunpoint in Fort Wayne and took money. The defense presented an alibi with multiple witnesses placing the defendant in Indianapolis at the time, but the trial court refused the defendant's proposed jury instruction on alibi and instead gave two of its own that addressed the effect of alibi evidence and referenced aiding or abetting the crime. The court also admitted the victim's out-of-court identification statement made in the defendant's absence. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the alibi instructions were incomplete and misleading because they failed to properly instruct on the presumption of innocence and the defendant's burden and incorrectly suggested accomplice liability when the charge was as a principal, and that the identification evidence was improperly admitted.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a boundary dispute between owners of adjacent lots in an Indianapolis subdivision where the appellant claimed that appellees' new brick building encroached 4.5 inches onto his lot due to an unadjusted one-foot shortage in the original plat measurements along Meridian Street. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the appellees. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the lots' actual boundaries had long been fixed by fences, hedges, and structures matching the plat distances without any allowance for the shortage, so no encroachment existed. The court also noted that the evidence supported title in the appellees by adverse possession and by a practical boundary agreement observed for over twenty years.

property