The case involved petitioners seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus to have two foster children placed in their home or released from state custody. The court dismissed the petition, holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction over matters involving the custody of minors, which are reserved for state courts. Additionally, the court found the claims barred by res judicata since the same issues, including constitutional due process challenges, had already been adjudicated in New York state courts up to the Court of Appeals.
This case is a personal injury action arising from a 1972 car accident in which the plaintiff, a passenger, sought damages in the Eastern District of New York against the owners and operators of the vehicles involved. After the defendants impleaded the plaintiff's husband as a third-party defendant, he moved under Rule 12(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406 to dismiss the third-party complaint or transfer the case to the Northern District of New York on venue grounds. The court denied the motion, ruling that the original defendants and third-party plaintiff had waived any venue objections by failing to raise them in their answer, and that venue statutes do not apply to third-party claims in an already pending action. The court further held that the plaintiff's choice of forum would not be disturbed because the balance of convenience, including access to proof and witnesses, favored keeping the case in the Eastern District.
This case involved the U.S. government's action to forfeit a fully mounted leopard that was illegally imported into the country after being listed as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969. The claimant purchased the leopard in Kenya and attempted to import it, leading to its seizure by federal authorities; an administrative hearing resulted in a $10 civil penalty for a non-willful violation. The court decided in favor of forfeiture, reasoning that the Act mandates forfeiture following the assessment of such a penalty, the claimant's contract occurred after the listing so no exemption applied, and this serves the Act's purpose of deterring illegal trade in endangered species.
The case involved a plaintiff who was arrested by local police on suspicion of robbery, released, then re-detained and turned over to military authorities based on erroneous information that he was an AWOL deserter; after it was confirmed he had been honorably discharged, he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and imprisonment. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The United States was protected by sovereign immunity because the events occurred before the 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act that waived immunity for false arrest claims. The unnamed military police officers were never properly served, depriving the court of personal jurisdiction, and both they and the local Hempstead police acted in good faith with reasonable belief in the lawfulness of their actions under military apprehension authority. The court also noted that municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 for such claims.
The case involved a material supplier, Hasco Electric Corp., seeking to recover unpaid amounts under a Miller Act payment bond for electrical fixtures supplied on a federal government contract to refurbish a VA hospital building. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion, holding that the Miller Act limits recovery on the bond to those with direct contractual relationships with the prime contractor or a subcontractor who provides the required notice, and does not extend to remote materialmen supplying other materialmen further down the chain. This conclusion followed from the statutory text and the Supreme Court's interpretation in MacEvoy Co. v. United States, which emphasized the need to avoid imposing indeterminate liabilities on prime contractors and sureties.
The case involved a dispute over an alleged bareboat charter agreement for the Tug Norwich and repairs made to the vessel by the plaintiff, Petersen Towing Corp., against the defendant owner, Capt. Abrams, Inc. The plaintiff sought to enforce a maritime lien for the cost of repairs and breach of the charter by arresting the tug under admiralty rules, while the defendant moved to quash the arrest, arguing the plaintiff was a partner rather than a repairman and the charter was invalid or executory. The court held that the plaintiff qualified for a maritime lien under 46 U.S.C.A. § 971 by furnishing repairs through supervision, purchasing materials, and advancing funds, and that the charter was not executory because the vessel had been delivered and used. As a result, the arrest was ordered vacated upon the filing of a bond equal to the vessel's appraised value.
