Fointno v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1986-01-06 · cited 98×
In Fointno v. State, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of class A felony rape, three counts of class A felony criminal deviate conduct, two counts of class B felony confinement, one count of class B felony robbery, and one count of class D felony intimidation, and was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 104 years. On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed challenges to the admission of expert testimony based on a negligently destroyed rape kit, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the reasonableness of the sentence. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error on the evidentiary issue because the defendant failed to properly preserve and demonstrate his objections at trial, and holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts. However, the court remanded for modification of the sentence to a total of 80 years, concluding that the additional consecutive terms were manifestly unreasonable under Article I, Section 18 of the Indiana Constitution given the defendant's background and the circumstances of the offenses. The court directed that the sentences for confinement, robbery, and intimidation run concurrently with the 80-year terms for the sexual offenses.
criminal law
Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Traina
Indiana Supreme Court · 1986-01-02 · cited 106×
This case arose after an Orkin exterminator accidentally shot a homeowner with a homemade firearm while working unsupervised in the customer's basement, leading to a lawsuit against Orkin for compensatory and punitive damages based on negligent hiring and supervision. The trial court awarded punitive damages, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed that award. The Court held that the evidence of Orkin's hiring practices, limited background checks, and abbreviated training did not meet the clear and convincing standard required to show the obdurate, culpable conduct necessary for punitive damages under precedents such as Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong. The matter was remanded with instructions to vacate the punitive damages judgment while leaving compensatory damages undisturbed.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Carpenter v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1986-01-02 · cited 6×
This case involved a defendant charged with multiple felonies including attempted murder, robbery, confinement, resisting law enforcement, and carrying a handgun without a license after a restaurant robbery in Indianapolis led to a shootout injuring four people. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of class B felony robbery and carrying a handgun without a license (with the confinement conviction vacated at sentencing) and received consecutive sentences totaling 24 years. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for counsel to withdraw because an indigent defendant has no right to counsel of choice and no prejudice resulted from the representation, which included strategic stipulations justified by the evidence. The court also held that the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable, as the trial court properly considered the defendant's prior robbery and handgun convictions plus aggravating factors like the injuries inflicted.
criminal lawprocedure
Bell v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1985-12-30 · cited 5×
In Bell v. State, Roy Bell appealed his jury conviction for voluntary manslaughter, a class B felony, after shooting and killing a victim during a dispute at an illegal gambling operation in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Bell challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and claimed he was justified in using deadly force under Indiana's self-defense statute because he reasonably believed the victim posed an imminent threat with a hatchet. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the evidence showed Bell was the initial aggressor who provoked the confrontation by striking others and pursuing the victim, which negated any self-defense justification. The court applied the standard of review favoring evidence supporting the verdict and found that the State met its burden to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
criminal law
Totten v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1985-12-19 · cited 31×
In Totten v. State, the defendant appealed his jury conviction for attempted rape as a class B felony, challenging the sufficiency of evidence to prove use of force or threat of force and the adequacy of the trial court's findings to support a two-year sentence enhancement above the presumptive term. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim's testimony regarding the defendant's possession of a butcher knife, verbal threats to kill her, and her expressed fear provided sufficient evidence of force despite the jury's rejection of the class A felony charge. On sentencing, the court found the trial judge's references to the defendant's prior similar criminal activities (supported by the presentence report) and his courtroom attitude constituted adequate particularized reasons for enhancement under the relevant statutes.
criminal lawprocedure
Chew v. State
Indiana Supreme Court · 1985-12-19 · cited 8×
In Chew v. State, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of class B felony rape and criminal deviate conduct based on evidence that he forced the victim into his car at knifepoint and compelled her to engage in sexual acts. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the criminal deviate conduct conviction, finding sufficient evidence including the victim's testimony describing the acts, but reversed the rape conviction. The court reasoned that the victim's testimony was too vague and uncertain regarding vaginal penetration, a required element of rape under the statute, and that the expert medical evidence of semen traces was inconclusive as to the timing and nature of the act. The court applied its standard of reviewing only evidence favorable to the State but concluded that an inference of penetration would require impermissible speculation beyond a reasonable doubt.
criminal lawprocedure