Frederick Eugene Rakestraw

This case involved a county assessor who sought a declaratory judgment to challenge the State Board of Tax Commissioners' decision granting tax exemptions on most of eight tracts of land owned by Indiana University trustees. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and the appellate court affirmed that ruling. The core issue was whether the assessor had standing to question the Board's final determination on property tax exemptions. The court held that the assessor lacked standing because statutes designate the State Board as the final authority in such administrative tax matters, with local assessors serving only as subordinate governmental instrumentalities without authority to contest those decisions.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved an appellant convicted of theft after a bench trial, based on evidence that he possessed a boat, motor, and trailer stolen from a garage shortly after the break-in, along with inconsistent statements to police and an offer to trade a television set for storage. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to one to ten years in prison. On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that guilt for larceny can be inferred from exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property, that the appellant's vague explanation was insufficient, and that questions of fact and witness credibility are for the trial court to decide without reweighing on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the appellant for sodomy upon his ten-year-old stepdaughter following a bench trial, with a sentence of two to fourteen years in prison. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict and argued that the trial court erred by not committing him to the Division of Mental Health under the criminal sexual psychopath statutes instead. The court found the evidence sufficient, relying primarily on the testimony of the victim, her sister, and mother when viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, noting that witness credibility is for the trial court to determine. On the psychopath claim, the psychiatrists had opined the appellant was not a criminal sexual psychopath, and the court held that the statute leaves the final determination to the trial judge regardless of expert testimony, with such decisions not subject to appellate review. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

criminal law

The case involved an appellant charged with robbery who was convicted after a bench trial of the lesser-included offense of assault with intent to commit larceny and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. The appellant appealed, claiming insufficient evidence and error in admitting testimony about prior convictions. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence viewed most favorably to the state supported the finding, that the limited prior-conviction testimony was properly admitted to impeach credibility, and that any factual dispute over whether the taking involved gambling winnings was a credibility question for the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Harry Stock's conviction for theft of a 1964 Chevrolet sedan after a bench trial in which he was found guilty and sentenced to a fine and jail time. On appeal, Stock challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the owner's testimony was unreliable and that his own and his witness's testimony should have been given greater weight. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the owner's testimony provided substantial evidence of probative value if believed by the trial court, and that appellate courts do not reweigh conflicting evidence or determine witness credibility. The court noted that the trial judge had the opportunity to evaluate the witnesses and that the evidence supported the finding of guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was an appeal from a conviction for issuing a fraudulent check, where the defendant, president of a corporation in financial trouble, issued a check to pay a corporate obligation that was later dishonored for insufficient funds. The trial court convicted the defendant of obtaining money by fraudulent check after amending the indictment post-plea to reference payment of an obligation instead. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the statute creates two distinct offenses and that the amendment altered a material element of the charged crime, creating a fatal variance with the evidence, which only supported the uncharged offense of issuing a check for an obligation; the court also noted the imposed sentence did not match the relevant statute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was an appeal by two defendants convicted after a bench trial of first-degree burglary, each sentenced to 10-20 years in prison and disfranchised for 10 years. They challenged the convictions on grounds that they should have been discharged for passage of multiple court terms without trial, that they were sentenced under the incorrect burglary statute, and that evidence from their arrest and vehicle search—including stolen jewelry and confessions—was inadmissible due to lack of probable cause. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the defendants had contributed to delays without proving otherwise, the sentencing statute was correctly applied, and police had probable cause from victim identifications and descriptions justifying the arrest and incidental search.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal from a shoplifting conviction in which the defendant was found guilty after a bench trial based on circumstantial evidence that she and a companion had taken men's clothing from a store and placed it in their car. The trial court imposed a fine and a prison sentence, and the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in her motion for a new trial. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a guilty finding may rest entirely on circumstantial evidence if it provides substantial probative value supporting an inference of guilt, and that the trial court was not required to accept the defendant's contrary testimony. The court further concluded on rehearing that the officers had probable cause for the arrest. A dissent argued that the evidence was insufficient and the arrest unlawful.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a lawsuit by a guardian on behalf of a minor child rendered paraplegic in a car accident caused by a 17-year-old who became intoxicated after purchasing liquor from the defendant druggist. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the complaint, which included one paragraph based on a repealed 1875 statute imposing civil liability for illegal liquor sales and another asserting common-law negligence for selling alcohol to a minor in violation of statutes and with knowledge of the risks. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the 1875 statute had been repealed by later comprehensive alcohol regulation acts but reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim, ruling that a common-law cause of action exists under general negligence principles, including potential negligence per se from statutory violations, with proximate cause and foreseeability questions for the jury, as supported by analogous precedents on furnishing dangerous items to minors.

torts & liabilitycriminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In State v. Clark, the trial court sua sponte raised constitutional challenges to Indiana’s Offenses Against Property Act and sustained a motion to quash two criminal affidavits charging the defendant with obtaining money by deception via a forged check and exerting unauthorized control over an automobile. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the constitutionality issue was improperly raised by the judge rather than by a party whose rights were adversely affected. The court emphasized the strong presumption of statutory validity and the requirement that a challenger demonstrate specific personal harm from the provisions at issue; here, the straightforward charges did not implicate the sections the defendant vaguely attacked. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by a member of the Indianapolis Horse Patrol, Inc., a Shrine-affiliated organization, against the corporation, its directors, and a circus official for conspiracy to defame. The plaintiff alleged that after questioning the use of Shrine Circus proceeds and allocating ticket sales to another unit, he was expelled in meetings where defamatory statements were made, causing him business losses; a jury awarded him $68,000. The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court reasoned that there is no standalone action for conspiracy and that the claim required proof of defamation, which was subject to the doctrine of qualified privilege for internal organizational communications unless actual malice was shown. It held that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on qualified privilege, depriving the defendants of their theory of the case.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the conviction of appellant Lyall for concealing stolen property under Indiana statute after a jury trial, where he was found guilty of hiding nickel anodes worth over $100 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. The facts showed police discovered the anodes in Lyall's barn following a truck breakdown, with evidence tracing them to Guide Lamp Division of General Motors, which had reported a shortage, though no direct link existed between Lyall and any theft. On appeal, Lyall challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the anodes were stolen. The court reversed the conviction, holding that mere evidence of missing property without proof of larceny or other theft is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of concealing stolen goods, and that possession alone does not presume guilt.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for public intoxication after a state trooper approached the appellant's parked tractor-trailer on the berm of a highway, observed him through an open window, requested his license and that he exit the vehicle, and then arrested him upon seeing signs of intoxication. The appellant argued that the evidence should have been suppressed due to an illegal search and that he was not in a public place while inside the truck cab. The court held that no search occurred, as the officer merely observed the appellant and made polite requests with which he complied, and that the investigation was a reasonable response to a potential traffic hazard. It further ruled that the open cab, located close to a busy highway, qualified as a public place under the statute, citing prior precedent. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned negotiations for a 99-year lease on real estate to operate a drive-in restaurant, during which the parties discussed forming a corporation; Grasshoff Realty Corporation was later organized and ratified the pre-incorporation arrangements, but the written lease was never signed and the deal fell apart. The corporation sued the property owners for damages and specific performance, obtaining a $1,000 judgment; Herbert Grasshoff then filed a second suit individually on essentially the same facts and was awarded $83,000. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, ruling that under the real-party-in-interest statute a promoter or stockholder cannot sue individually on a contract that the corporation has ratified and adopted, as only the corporation holds the enforceable rights under such an agreement.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a request by the City of Indianapolis for a writ of prohibition to stop the Marion County Superior Court, Room No. 2, from proceeding in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a 1965 Indiana statute (chapter 434) and seeking an injunction against its enforcement. A similar case was already pending in another room of the same court, and a plea in abatement had been filed in the respondent court but not yet ruled upon. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the petition was premature under its Rule 2-35, which requires that a written motion challenging the trial court's jurisdiction first be presented to and denied or ignored by that court before seeking a writ. The court noted that no such motion had been acted on and dissolved the temporary writ while denying the permanent writ.

procedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit brought by a farmer against a neighboring farmer after the plaintiff was injured when a truck bed fell on him while they were cutting apart an old truck chassis on the defendant's property using an acetylene torch and other tools. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, which the Supreme Court affirmed on transfer. The court reasoned that the undisputed evidence showed both parties had equal knowledge and opportunity to observe any potential dangers, and thus the defendant could not be found negligent without the plaintiff also being contributorily negligent or having assumed the risk, as both owed the same duty of ordinary care.

torts & liability

The case involved an appellant convicted of robbery after a jury trial and sentenced to 10-25 years in prison. He appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence to support the verdict, particularly challenging the victim's identification of him and presenting alibi testimony. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient because the victim had ample opportunity to observe the robber in a well-lit store, identified him from photographs and a lineup by sight and voice, and the alibi evidence was weak with credibility issues left to the jury.

criminal law

This case is an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction in Indiana state court, where the defendant was found guilty of killing a 15-year-old girl based on physical evidence, a detailed written confession, and additional statements. The defendant challenged the admission of two out-of-court statements made to police and a reporter while he was represented by counsel but without counsel present, one of which involved the sheriff misrepresenting the reporter's identity, as well as the jury instructions regarding the confession. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the misrepresentations were not material, that the cited U.S. Supreme Court precedents on the right to counsel did not require exclusion of the evidence, and that the jury instructions adequately addressed the need for corroboration of an induced confession along with other evidence in the record.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two appellants convicted under a statute making it unlawful to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, specifically by inducing a 16-year-old girl to engage in sexual relations at a rented house where drinking and intercourse occurred. The trial court found both guilty after a consolidated bench trial and imposed 180-day jail sentences plus $500 fines each. On appeal, the court rejected challenges to the consolidation (which had been agreed to and not timely objected to), the lack of proof of the defendants' knowledge of the girl's age (as her correct age was stated in their presence), the admission of one defendant's statement (due to waived or invalid objections), and the sufficiency of the charging affidavits (an issue not raised below). The judgments were affirmed because the evidence supported the convictions and no procedural errors were properly preserved.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for armed robbery after a jury trial. The appellant, represented by pauper counsel, challenged the verdict as not supported by sufficient evidence and contrary to law. The court reviewed the evidence most favorable to the state, including details of the robbery at a market, the appellant's role as lookout, his flight to Louisville, and his post-arrest statements to police confessing the details of the crime, and concluded this evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. The judgment of the trial court was therefore affirmed.

criminal law